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This research examines the effect of cruise missile possession on state behavior.  
Specifically, it seeks to determine if countries who possess cruise missiles are more likely 
to initiate a military threat, display, or use of force than countries who do not possess 
cruise missiles.  Traditional International Relations theory suggests that, all else being 
equal, a state with an asymmetrical military advantage should enjoy concessions from 
target states, decreasing the likelihood of armed conflict.  Accordingly, coercion theory 
warns the use of armed force to change adversarial behavior should be exercised 
sparingly.  However, this dissertation finds that states possessing cruise missile initiate 
armed force at twice the rate of states who do not possess cruise missiles and are 
significantly more likely overall to initiate a militarized interstate dispute or crisis.  These 
conclusions suggest these weapons provide a qualitatively unique capability that makes 
armed force an attractive coercive option at lower levels of conflict.   
As more states seek to fill defense gaps and counter major power military 
capabilities, cruise missiles continue to proliferate, lending urgency to an understanding 
of their effects on conflict initiation short of war.  Using a mixed method approach, this 
research provides a systematic empirical analysis, using an original dataset of cruise 
missile possession created specifically for this project, to measure changes in state 
 behavior.  Additionally, I present two explanatory case studies, to illustrate coercive 
cruise missile use, focusing on the 1982 Falkland Conflict and the use of cruise missiles 
as a coercive tool by the United States in the 1990s.  This research may have profound 
implications for both international relations scholars and policy makers.  The results 
demonstrate that cruise missiles increase the likelihood of using military threats, displays, 
and uses of force regardless of regime type.  More research may be needed to understand 
the impact of technology on coercive strategy, while policy makers may choose to call 
for more robust controls on the spread of cruise missile technology. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Crisis  “A threat to one or more basic values, along with an 
awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, 
and a heightened probability of involvement in military 
hostilities.” (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000, 3) 
 
Conflict An activity between conscience beings to reconcile a 
disparity in wants, needs, or obligations that exists when 
two parties aspire to carry out acts that are mutually 
incompatible or contradictory. (Nicholson 1992) 
 
Cruise Missile  “An unmanned, expendable, armed, aerodynamic, air-
breathing, autonomous vehicle.” (Toomay 1981, 31)  
This definition includes, but is not limited to, Anti-Ship 
Cruise Missiles (ASCM) and their variants such the 
Soviet SS-N-2 Styx, the Chinese HY-2 Silkworm, the 
U.S. RGM-84 Harpoon, and the French MM-38 Exocet 
as well as Land Attack Cruise Missiles and their variants 
such as the Indian BrahMos, the U.S. BGM-109 
Tomahawk, and the United Kingdom’s Storm Shadow. 
 
Dispute  A situation in which the, “actors involved are willing or 
forced to make a trade-off between highly valued but 
mutually incompatible objectives ... involving a rapid 
and acute change in the perception of threats and 
promises for each [participant].” (Maoz 1982, 219) 
 
Global Positioning System “A satellite-based radio navigation system operated by 
the Department of Defense to provide all military, civil, 
and commercial users with precise positioning, 
navigation, and timing.” (Gortney 2010, 99) 
 
Initiator “…the ‘first mover’ that is, the state that first crosses the 
[militarized interstate dispute] threshold by making a 
threat involving force, moving military forces, or 
actually using military force against the other.” (D. S. 
Bennett and Stam 2000b, 658) 
 
Militarized Interstate Dispute  “united historical cases in which the threat, display or 
use of military force short of war by one member state is 
explicitly directed towards the government, official 
representatives, official forces, property, or territory of 
another state.” (D. M. Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, 
168)   
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Military Force Using a state’s armed services to physically compel an 
adversary using violence or coercion 
 
QUAN --> qual  A mixed methods notation indicating sequential 
quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis, 
with weight/priority on the quantitative phase, where the 
qualitative phase builds on the quantitative phase (Morse 
1991). 
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ACRONYMS 
 
A2/AD:  Anti-Access, Area Denial 
ALCM:  Air-Launched Cruise Missile  
ASCM:  Anti-Ship Cruise Missile  
BVR:  Beyond Visual Range 
CALCM:  Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile 
CoW:  Correlates of War 
DoD:  Department of Defense 
DSMAC:  Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator 
DV:  Dependent Variable 
GPS:  Global Positioning System 
ICB:  International Crisis Behavior 
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
IO:  International Organization 
IIS:  Iraqi Intelligence Service 
IV:  Independent Variable 
LACM:  Land-Attack Cruise Missile  
LRSO:  Long Range Standoff Weapon 
MID:  Militarized Interstate Dispute 
MTCR:  Missile Technology Control Regime 
NATO:  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
QUAL:  Qualitative Analysis 
QUAN:  Quantitative Analysis 
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RPA:  Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
SAM:  Surface to Air Missile 
SLAM:  Strategic Low Altitude Missile 
TERCOM:  Satellite Terrain Contour Mapping 
TNT:  Trinitrotoluene 
UAV:  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
U.S.:  United States [of America] 
USSR:  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Cruise missiles offer states a versatile tool to contend with international 
challenges, making them an attractive option across a spectrum of crisis situations.  But, 
do cruise missiles change state behavior by increasing the probability a state will use 
military force to achieve its foreign policy objectives?  More states have in recent years 
sought inventive ways to fill defense gaps, reinforce the credibility of their threats, and 
counter the major powers’ conventional military capabilities.  To date, however, there has 
been little systematic research into the unintended consequences of procuring these 
weapons.  This dissertation uses a mixed method research design to empirically test the 
effects of cruise missile possession on state behavior, using an original data set of cruise 
missile possession created specifically for this project.  Its goal is to determine if states 
armed with cruise missiles have a greater likelihood of threatening, displaying, or using 
force.  Using new empirical data, I find states armed with cruise missiles, regardless of 
regime type, are more likely to initiate military force to achieve their foreign policy 
objectives than states that lack this capability.  This research may have implications for 
the study of armaments and conflict initiation. 
In this introductory chapter, I orient the research with a brief overview of the 
major concepts and procedures used to answer the primary research question:  Does the 
possession of cruise missiles increase the likelihood a state will use force in pursuit of its 
foreign policy objectives?  First, I present the purpose and significance of this research.  
Beyond identifying the gap in the current literature, I also present a brief overview of the 
relevant milestones of cruise missile development over the last century.  Second, I 
introduce the project’s research methodology.  By using an explanatory sequential mixed 
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method approach, I can best leverage the strengths and supplement the weaknesses of the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches typical of social science research.  Next, I present 
my findings.  Beyond testing each hypothesis, I contribute a new understanding of how 
cruise missiles affect state behavior and provide new perspectives on past incidents of 
conflict initiation.  I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the dissertation’s 
limitations and scope conditions as well as provide a roadmap to navigate each chapter. 
Prior research and political attention on force initiation focuses on the effects of 
state characteristics such as regime type, distance, state wealth and resources, and major 
power status.  Only a relatively small portion of this literature pays attention to the effects 
of weapons, and that attention is almost exclusively on ballistic missiles and nuclear 
weapons (e.g. Bell and Miller 2013; Brody 1963; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982; A. 
Carter 2016; Davenport, Horner, and Kimball 2012; Gartzke and Jo 2009; Halperin 1961; 
Mettler and Reiter 2013; Obama 2015; T. V. Paul 1995; Sobek, Foster, and Robison 
2012).  There has been little systematic empirical research into the effects of cruise 
missiles on likelihood of using the military to coerce changes in adversarial behavior 
(Heidenrich 2006).   
One potential consequence of this oversight – at least in policy circles – has been 
relatively weak international agreements to control cruise missile proliferation, resulting 
in a quiet spread of cruise missiles both horizontally (interstate) and vertically (intrastate) 
(Gormley 2009), and increased use among state and non-state actors to coerce their 
adversaries in pursuit of their objectives (Gruselle 2006; Jackson et al. 2008).  This study 
seeks to fill the gap in the literature by systematically investigating whether cruise 
missiles alter state behavior, specifically whether there is a connection between cruise 
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missiles and the likelihood a state will initiate military force, to include threats and 
demonstrations, to coerce adversaries. 
 
Purpose and Significance 
Cruise missiles may provide a means to use force in more diverse contexts than 
other types of weapons, such as the use of ground troops or manned air strikes.  Thus, 
cruise missiles are ideal weapons for coercion.1  The purpose of this dissertation is to 
understand the effects of cruise missiles on state behavior by empirically testing whether 
possession of missiles make the use of military options in crisis situations more likely.  
The relationship between these weapons and conflict initiation is Janus-faced in the 
literature.  On the one hand, there is a theoretical basis to assume possession of advanced 
weapons should reduce incidence of conflict by increasing the possessor’s leverage 
against an adversary.  On the other hand, in some contexts these weapons may instead 
increase the likelihood a state uses force if doing so is politically tenable and the risk of 
escalation is low.  For instance, bargaining theory suggests that, all else equal, 
asymmetrical military advantages, such as those provided by cruise missiles, should 
decrease the likelihood of war as the weaker target state has an incentive to make 
concessions knowing they are at a disadvantage and resistance puts them in peril (Blainey 
1988; Fearon 1995).  However, coercive diplomacy, operating at levels short of war, 
explains the exercise military power as an exception or tacit signal of resolve in crisis 
bargaining situations (George 1991; George, Hall, and Simons 1971; Schelling 1956, 
                                                 
1 Nye (2011) identifies a range of power behaviors ranging from hard behaviors, such as 
commanding or coercing, to soft behaviors, such as persuading and co-opting, to alter 
adversarial behavior. 
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1960; Snyder and Diesing 1977).  Herein lies a puzzle:  If cruise missiles provide a 
qualitative advantage that should induce concessions from an adversary without violence, 
why do we conspicuously observe their use not only in warfare, but more notably in crisis 
bargaining situations in which the use of force would otherwise be unlikely, or at worst, a 
final contingency?  Thus, we must ask:  Do cruise missiles change state behavior by 
increasing the likelihood a state will use its military to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives?   
I examine how cruise missiles affect the initiation of armed conflict at the state 
level, using coercion theory as a theoretical framework (see George 1991; George, Hall, 
and Simons 1971; Schelling 1956, 1960, 1967; Snyder 1961; Snyder and Diesing 1977).  
I rely heavily on George, Hall, and Simons’ (1971) concept of coercive diplomacy to 
sketch out a theory of cruise missile utility and use.  Coercive diplomacy involves 
“efforts to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked 
upon.” (George 1991, 5)  Coercive diplomacy may require threats or displays of force to 
persuade an adversary that the state is willing to use force if an adversary fails to meet its 
demands.  However, to maintain credibility the state may be forced in some situations to 
follow through with its threats by using limited military force, even if the use of force 
may carry the risk of escalation (Slantchev 2011).  Using this framework, I hypothesize 
that states with cruise missiles have an increased likelihood of employing threats, 
displays, and force that are independent of regime type, because of the qualitatively 
different capabilities missiles provide in terms of stealth, precision, reliability, and cost. 
Cruise missiles are a special class of long-range attack weapon.  Unlike ballistic 
missiles which are generally unguided, typically use little more than unguided ballistic 
5 
 
trajectory to reach their targets, and are unpowered in the final stages of flight, cruise 
missiles are autonomously navigated from launch to target (Toomay 1981).  Once 
launched, cruise missiles essentially become small jet aircraft, propelled by rockets 
and/or jet engines, as they approach their targets.  Lacking a human pilot, a cruise missile 
employs a self-contained navigation system such as satellite navigation or terrain 
mapping radar to guide the missile, enabling it to fly extremely low to the ground.  These 
capabilities and flight profiles make them incredibly difficult to detect and deter.  Their 
unmanned nature virtually eliminates the risk to an aircrew.  However, their unmanned 
nature – like remotely piloted vehicles (aka drones) – means their use outside open 
warfare may fall into a belligerency grey zone in which states seek only limited political 
gains which may be short of outright military victory (Michael Horowitz, Kreps, and 
Fuhrmann 2016; Matisek 2017; Mazarr 2015).   
Cruise missiles are not defined by their range, but are instead typified by intended 
mission or launch mode:  Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) for fixed and mobile 
land-based targets, and Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM), for targets at sea (Ballistic 
and Cruise Missile Threat 2013).   Depending on model and mission, either may be 
launched from the ground, ships, submarines, and aircraft (Kueter and Kleinberg 2007) 
while carrying either conventional or nuclear munitions (Feickert 2005b).2  Although the 
majority of countries with cruise missile capabilities have only the shorter range ASCM, 
                                                 
2 Cruise missile warheads range in explosive yield from 1,000 pounds of TNT in the 
Tomahawk, to nuclear yields (U.S. Navy Chief of Information 2018).  The 2018 U.S. 
Nuclear Posture Review calls for a new, low-yield nuclear cruise missile, otherwise 
known as a “tactical nuclear weapon” to counter Russian tactical nuclear presence on 
their western frontier (Mattis 2018a).  Due to the relatively low numbers of nuclear cruise 
missiles and their dual capability, I treat all cruise missiles for this research as 
conventional. 
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the increase in production and distribution of LACMs to other states is expected to 
increase as the technology and knowledge required to build and employ these weapons 
becomes accessible to a wider range of countries (Feickert 2005a; Gormley 2008a).   
Conceived in the early 1900s as a solution to World War I’s trench warfare, cruise 
missiles did not come into their own until the Cold War, when the superpowers sought 
weapons capable of countering their adversary’s potentially superior military capabilities.  
For instance, the Soviet Union focused its efforts on developing anti-ship cruise missiles 
(ASCM) to counter American naval strength, while the United States created 
intercontinental ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons as well as cruise missiles for use in conventional land attack missions such as 
those anticipated in a future European land war.3   
After Egypt’s successful 1973 sinking of the Israeli naval ship, Eilat, using a 
single Soviet Styx cruise missile fired from a relatively small gun boat, other states 
estimated they, too, could supplement their military defenses with cruise missiles to 
counter threats posed by more powerful or capable militaries (Koh 2016; Pavelec 2010).  
This understanding has led to the slow but steady proliferation of cruise missiles 
throughout the world (Feickert 2005a; Gormley 2008b; Gormley and McMahon 1995; 
Mishra 2011), as displayed in Figure 1.1.  By the mid-1970s, an explosion in interest, and 
technological leaps forward culminated in one of the highest-profile and technologically 
advanced cruise missiles of all time, the American Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise 
Missile.  
                                                 
3 Notably, the intercontinental land attack cruise missile concept, largely abandoned since 
the Cold War, has been pursued with renewed interest by Russia (MacFarquhar and 
Sanger 2018). 
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The United States introduced the world to the operational capabilities of the 
Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile during the 1991 Gulf War.  The Tomahawk was 
the culmination of over seventy years-worth of cruise missile development.  It was 
capable of evading Iraqi air defenses, striking targets with precision and impunity.  As 
Chapter Five demonstrates, in the years to follow, the United States found itself 
increasingly reliant on the Tomahawk as the go-to weapon for coercive diplomacy in the 
1990s and beyond.  Between 1991 and 2018, the United States would use cruise missiles 
Figure 1. 1 Cruise Missile Proliferation, 1950-2014 
Data sources:  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “SIPRI 
Arms Transfers Database,” undated, for 1950-2015 data; Werrell, Kenneth P. 1985. 
The Evolution of the Cruise Missile. Air University; Systems Assessment Group 
NDIA Strike, Land-Attack, and Air Defense Committee. 1999. Feasibility of Third 
World Advanced Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat. Volume 2: Emerging Cruise 
Missile Threat; Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat. 2013. Wright-Patterson Air Force 
Base: National Air & Space Intelligence Center Public Affairs Office; Kueter, Jeff, 
and Howard Kleinberg. 2007. The Cruise Missile Challenge: Designing a Defense 
against Asymmetric Threats. George C. Marshall Institute.; Ozga, Deborah A. 1994. 
“A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime.” The Nonproliferation 
Review 1(2): 66–93. 
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against both state and non-state adversaries every other year, on average, for situations 
ranging from low-scale coercive campaigns to large-scale warfare (Allen and Martinez-
Machain 2018b; Cole 2017; Gormley 2008b).4  Contrary to the Powell Doctrine – which 
states a nation either must be willing to fully commit the nation’s armed forces, or the 
situation is not sufficiently important to require any military action – the United States 
had developed a weapon which allowed the use military power in such a way as to 
neither instigate significant condemnation (e.g. United Nations approval), nor put troops 
in harm’s way (Brigety II 2007).  The cruise missile has effectively lowered the bar for 
the United States and other adopters to respond to threats militarily, thus lowering the 
cost of using military force and making it the go-to weapon for conflicts short of war 
(Sparks 1997; Walzer 2006).5 
States targeted by cruise missiles appear less likely to perceive the attack as an act 
of war, keeping overall escalation of a conflict to a minimum.  This is evidenced by the 
nearly continual use of cruise missiles by states throughout the world since the early 
1990s in situations that rarely result in full-scale war.  For example, since 2014 Russia 
has used its Kalibr cruise missile to support its allies in the Syrian civil war (Kramer and 
Barnard 2016).  Even non-state actors, such as Iranian-backed rebels in Yemen, have 
used cruise missiles against state targets, including the United States Navy (Rosenberg 
and Mazzetti 2016).  When a state decides to use a cruise missile, they do not have to 
                                                 
4 Other states increasingly rely on cruise missiles to punctuate their coercive strategies as 
well, such as Russia’s use of Kalibr, and British and French use of Storm Shadow cruise 
missiles in the Syrian civil war, and Chinese installation of anti-ship cruise missiles in the 
South China Sea (Kramer and Barnard 2016; Lendon 2018; Reuters 2018a). 
5 Some speculate remotely piloted vehicles (aka drones) also increase the probability of 
the use of force given their low cost and minimal risk (Zenko 2013). 
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commit large amounts of human, material, and political capital to a conflict.  This low 
cost of entry effectively lowers the threshold for the use of military options, particularly 
in situations below the level of large-scale conflict.  
Cruise missiles are well suited for situations that call for strategic coercion to 
compel or deter adversarial behavior, or to display or test resolve.  These weapons help 
states accomplish these goals by providing capabilities that are qualitatively different 
from many other conventional weapons.  Cruise missiles have high utility throughout the 
spectrum of conflict by lowering the costs usually associated with mobilizing forces or 
initiating violence against the adversary.  The answer to whether they increase this 
likelihood may be relevant to policy makers as they tackle such questions as arms control 
and combat modernization.  I do not suggest that cruise missiles increase the likelihood a 
state will engage in large-scale conflict such as war.  However, at less-than-war levels, 
cruise missiles provide a means of active coercion at low political and physical cost. 
Three Phases of Cruise Missile Development 
To understand how cruise missiles shape the initiation of militarized interstate 
disputes, it is helpful to frame the evolution of the cruise missile’s technology, doctrine, 
and use.6  The history of the American cruise missile program can be illustrated through 
three phases of technological development.7  These three periods show the cruise 
                                                 
6 See Appendix A for more detailed explanation of the three phases of cruise missile 
development. 
7 Though several countries have developed significant cruise missile programs, for 
simplicity I base this classification on the U.S. case to illustrate how cruise missiles have 
gone from tactical battlefield concept, to nuclear strategic and tactical weapon, to 
coercive option in less than 100 years. 
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missile’s evolution from a weapon of promise with little capability or functionality, to a 
lethal and eminently usable surgical instrument of coercion. 
In the first phase, from World War I until the end of World War II (circa 1914-
1945), the concept of a pilotless flying bomb came into its own.  This phase is marked by 
a weapon whose concept was sound but lacked the technological requirements to fully 
develop to its potential.  Early cruise missiles were little more than miniature unmanned 
biplanes that soldiers launched toward the enemy’s location.  Onboard timers were used 
to program the missiles to cease flight when they were estimated to be over enemy 
targets.  Only in the final days of World War II did required advancements in propulsion 
and navigational technologies allow the German Luftwaffe to effectively field the first 
fully operational cruise missile, the V-1 “Buzz” bomb. 
The second phase (circa 1945-1970) witnessed prolific military and civilian 
technological advancement, enabling weapon engineers to revisit earlier disappointments 
in flying bomb development.  While not perfect, the progress made over the course of the 
Cold War, fueled by ideological competition between the superpowers, finally united the 
technologies needed to make the cruise missile usable as a nuclear delivery and anti-ship 
weapon system.  Most early cruise missiles in the second phase of development descend 
from the relatively successful German V-1.  By the mid-1950s, the United States began to 
field several long-range nuclear armed cruise missiles to augment its strategic bomber 
force.  Most early nuclear cruise missiles were unsuccessful.  At the same time, the 
Soviet Union developed anti-ship cruise missiles in order to counter Western naval 
superiority.  Unlike their American counterparts, Soviet cruise missiles required less 
11 
 
technological sophistication due to the simpler navigational task of targeting nearby ships 
at sea, resulting in more successful weapons. 
The third phase of cruise missile development (1970-present) began in the waning 
years of the Cold War.  Advancements in navigation and propulsion drove a newfound 
appreciation for conventional applications, enabling what was once the “unwanted black 
sheep” of the weapons community (Werrell 1989) to take a central role in conventional 
denial and punishments strategies.  During this period, the Tomahawk cruise missile’s 
development would enable the United States to demonstrate a decisive foreign policy 
posture toward threats while minimizing risk to military personnel, and reducing 
collateral damage abroad.  Accurate, sophisticated, navigation technologies and engine 
miniaturization made a change in mission from nuclear delivery vehicle to precision 
weapon possible.  In this phase, the cruise missile became a symbol of coercive power.  
The cruise missile’s evolution led to its ability to affect state behavior.  Initially, 
the weapon was little more than an idea seeking to fill a tactical battlefield need.  The 
second phase of cruise missile development saw cruise missiles become both a strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicle and a means of denying enemies at sea.  It was not until the third 
phase of development that supporting technologies ultimately caught up with practical 
missions.  Not only a nuclear delivery vehicle and way to threaten enemy shipping, cruise 
missiles in the third phase could directly or indirectly threaten, deny, or punish an 
adversary in situations where the use of force would otherwise be less likely.  Cruise 
missile possession, by providing a qualitatively different capability than other weapons, 
may increase the likelihood of a state using force to pursue its foreign policy objectives.   
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Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to force initiation literature by implementing an 
explanatory sequential mixed method empirical analysis based on original data collected 
on cruise missile possession to answer the core research question:  Do cruise missiles 
change state behavior by increasing the probability a state will use its military to achieve 
its foreign policy objectives?  This effort constitutes the first systematic empirical 
investigation of this question.  The answer to this question offers not only policy relevant 
implications in terms of a state’s selection of coercive diplomatic options and strategic 
signaling, but it may also impact our general understanding of the effect of military 
technology on conflict resolution.   
Much of the current force initiation literature focuses on state-centric correlates of 
force initiation such as regime type, wealth, great power status, and territorial contiguity.  
But, as mentioned above, there is scant literature focusing on the effects of weapons on a 
state’s decision to initiate force against adversaries.  Much of this literature is directed 
toward nuclear weapons (e.g. Feaver 1992; Gaddis 1986; Ganguly and Wagner 2004; 
Jervis 1976; R. Powell 1988; Sagan 1994; Sagan and Waltz 2013; Schelling 2008), but 
recently, work has turned toward conventional weapon systems such as ballistic missiles 
(Mettler and Reiter 2013) and remotely piloted vehicles (aka drones) (e.g. Andresen 
2016; Dowd 2013; Michael Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann 2016; Zenko 2013).  
Although some literature examines the role of cruise missiles in military strategy and 
their potential threat to international security, it does not address force initiation nor does 
it systematically test for any correlation between their possession and military force.   
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The relatively small body of literature that examines cruise missiles focuses either 
on the abstract perception that their proliferation presents a military threat, or on technical 
aspects and the debate over suitable missions.  Despite the cruise missile’s surprisingly 
long history, little was written on the topic until the 1980s, when new uses for non-
nuclear cruise missiles became feasible.  In the 1990s, much of the literature transitioned 
from a bi-polar nuclear perspective to concerns over proliferation and use by poorer 
states.  Though scholars have covered a lot of ground in this research, the literature lacks 
a systematic empirical analysis to test the effects of cruise missiles on state behavior.  As 
more states seek to offset real or perceived adversarial military power by supplementing 
their militaries with cruise missiles, the need to understand the effects cruise missiles 
have on conflict becomes pressing.  I seek to fill that gap by empirically evaluating the 
relationship between the possession of cruise missiles, coercion, and the use of military 
force, effectively bridging the cruise missile and force initiation literatures. 
 There are two reasons this research is important.  First, it contributes to the 
growing body of knowledge on the connection between technology and the initiation of 
armed force.  Given the increasing importance of cruise missile issues in current 
international relations, such as the alleged violation by Russia of, and the United States’ 
planned withdrawal from, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (Gibbons-Neff 
2017; Reuters 2018b), a project of this type is warranted.  Second, this research may aid 
policy makers by providing a scientific understanding of the implications of arms 
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proliferation on international stability while either developing new or bolstering existing 
arms treaties or agreements such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).8 
 
Methodology 
To answer the question of whether cruise missiles affect state behavior, I used an 
explanatory sequential mixed methods research design.  The mixed methods research 
design integrates quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis to 
support conclusions by building off the strengths and weaknesses of each individual 
approach (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; Plano Clark and Ivankova 2015).  This 
research is particularly suited for this type of design.  The quantitative strand uses 
empirical data to statistically determine correlations between cruise missile possession 
and the use of force while the qualitative strand helps decipher and explain the findings 
otherwise obfuscated in the quantitative empirics (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Falleti 
and Lynch 2009).  Additionally, the quantitative strand contributes a degree of 
generalizability not possible in qualitative case studies alone (Plano Clark and Ivankova 
2015).  The dissertation’s research design proceeds in three phases. 
In the first phase of the mixed methods design, I performed a quantitative analysis 
to empirically test the correlation between cruise missiles and state behavior.  To 
determine the likelihood an initiator state, armed with cruise missiles, initiates a military 
crisis, I used the directed dyad-year – covering all pairs of states, 1946-2007 – as the unit 
                                                 
8 The Missile Technology Control Regime is an international agreement established in 
1987 by the seven most industrialized states (Canada, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and West Germany) to control the spread of weapon technology 
capable of delivering nuclear weapons, primarily ballistic and cruise missiles.  More 
states have since signed on to the regime and it remains in effect today (Sidhu 2007). 
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of analysis.  By using a directed dyad-year, I leveraged multiple levels of analysis to 
include control variables not possible in higher-level data aggregation (e.g. the system 
year) (D. S. Bennett and Stam 2000b; Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004).  I used 
applicable observations queried between 1946 and 2007 to establish the rate and 
likelihood of cruise missile-equipped states initiating conflict in the years in which cruise 
missiles would have been operational beginning in the second phase of cruise missile 
development. 
To obtain the empirical observations, I used two common conflict data sets, the 
International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set (Brecher et al. 2017) as operationalized by 
Mettler and Reiter (2013) and the Correlates of War Project’s (CoW) Militarized 
Interstate Dispute data set (MID), version 4 including National Material Capabilities data 
(Palmer et al. 2015) to derive dependent and control variables.  For robustness, I used two 
primary dependent variables, ICB challenges and MID initiations, to measure the 
application of military force.  Also, I exploited MID hostility levels to measure instances 
where states used threats and displays of force.   
I coded regime type using two data sets.  To control for dyads in which both states 
are democracies in the general force initiation model, I followed Metter and Reiter’s 
(2013) use of data derived from the Polity 4 Project (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016).  
To test for variances in the likelihood democracies or autocracies will initiate conflict 
when in possession of cruise missiles, I used the more parsimonious Democracy-
Dictatorship data set (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010) for its observational 
properties, reproducibility, and identifiable coding properties.   
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Additionally, I derived the primary independent variable – cruise missile 
possession – from original data on cruise missile possession compiled and coded 
specifically for this project.  Cruise missile possession is based on data from the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database 
(SIPRI 2015), the National Defense Intelligence Agency (Systems 1999), Kueter and 
Kleinberg (2007), and Werrell (1985).  Finally, I controlled for factors believed to 
correlate with a greater likelihood of a state using military force.  These factors included, 
but were not limited to, ballistic missile and nuclear weapon possession, major power 
status, national material capabilities, interstate rivalry, geographic contiguity, and regime 
type. 
In the qualitative second phase, I supplemented the study’s core element, 
statistical analysis, with two explanatory case studies selected from the statistical sample 
to examine the circumstances behind the use of military coercion (Lieberman 2005; 
Morse 1991).  I purposively selected the case studies from the set of observations in the 
MID and ICB data sets using case selection strategies identified by Seawright and 
Gerring (2008) for typical cases that exemplify the relationships identified in the 
quantitative strand.  This method effectively integrates and binds together the quantitative 
and qualitative strands of research (Fetters, Curry, and Creswell 2013; Maxwell, Chmiel, 
and Rogers 2015). The first case study examined Argentina’s use of the Exocet cruise 
missile in the 1982 Falklands Conflict.  The second case studied the American use of 
cruise missiles in the 1990s.  Each case represented instances in which the first phase’s 
statistical models produced a relatively high predicted probability that a state will initiate 
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conflict.  The advantage of selecting typical cases in this research is that they allowed a 
better exploration of the causal mechanisms at work in the quantitative analysis.   
 Following the completion of the quantitative and qualitative phases of research, I 
interpreted the results of each strand together to evaluate the implications for the given 
hypotheses using associative inferences (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011).  In the third 
phase, I critically reviewed the results as they apply to coercive theory and the 
hypotheses, ultimately seeking and elucidating relevant policy implications and 
highlighting opportunities for further research. 
 
Findings 
 The results of this research supported the hypotheses.  Descriptive statistics and 
regression analysis performed in the quantitative strand of analysis indicated strong 
evidence that states armed with cruise missiles are significantly more likely to initiate 
threats, display force, and use military force against their adversaries.  States possessing 
cruise missiles initiated conflict at a rate 2.8 times that of non-cruise missile states for 
ICB challenges and MID initiations.  The odds of a state initiating an ICB challenge 
increased 2.42 times, and a MID 2.49 times, after procuring cruise missiles.  
Additionally, when a state acquires cruise missiles, its risk of resorting to threats 
increases 231 percent and the risk of displaying force increases 260 percent.  Finally, 
though there are only eleven states armed with land attack cruise missiles, they, too, are 
significantly more likely to initiate a militarized interstate dispute than states with no 
cruise missiles at all.  States armed with land attack cruise missiles initiate ICB 
challenges 9.7 times more often and MID initiations 5.6 times more often than states 
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without these missiles.  This comes as no surprise given the advancements in navigation 
and propulsion that made the land attack cruise missile the “go to” weapon since its first 
use in the 1991 Gulf War.  The evidence suggests that these results are stable regardless 
of regime type.  Whether a state is democratic or authoritarian, there was no difference in 
the likelihood they will initiate military force if in possession of cruise missiles. 
 The case studies supported and illustrated these results.  In the first case study, I 
observed that the purchase of air-launched Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles by Argentina 
in the late 1970s coincided with a reversal of a long-standing tradition of peaceful 
diplomacy toward the United Kingdom for repatriation of the Falkland Islands.  Though 
it would be premature to declare causality – there were many factors involved in the 
decision to invade the Falkland Islands – there is powerful evidence to infer that the 
denial capabilities offered by the Exocet missiles played no small role in the decision to 
take the Falkland Islands by force.  Argentina’s possession of cruise missiles helped the 
Argentine junta erroneously rationalize occupation by convincing them that the British, 
long sending signals that they were willing to surrender sovereignty, would not risk 
sending a fleet to expel an Argentine occupation force.  The perception of lower risk, 
backed by the cruise missile’s military denial capabilities, helped persuade the 
Argentinians to invade the islands in hopes of coercing the British into surrendering their 
sovereignty claims.  However, unbeknownst to the Argentine leadership, the British were 
not aware that Argentina’s Exocets were fully operational, knowledge that may have 
significantly factored in their decision to retake the islands by force.  Consequently, the 
Exocets played no role in British decisions until well into the conflict, and only after they 
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sank important British ships. This effectively altered British naval strategy.  Though not 
the entire story of the conflict, cruise missiles clearly played an important part. 
 In the second case study, I found that the successful use of Tomahawk land attack 
cruise missiles in the 1991 Gulf War showed the United States that cruise missiles 
offered a low-cost coercive tool.  By using cruise missiles in situations that called for a 
demonstration of resolve to domestic and international audiences, using force to punish 
undesirable behavior no longer carried a significant political or escalatory risk.  The 
qualitatively different nature of the cruise missile offered a reduction in casualties and 
collateral damage deemed more palatable to domestic audiences, lowering the bar for 
limited uses of force to pursue foreign policy.  The case study illustrated how domestic 
public opinion, political pressure, and advanced weapons can combine to increase the 
probability that military force may be used to deal with secondary national security 
challenges. 
 
Limitations 
 The research presented here is not without limitations.  As King, Keohane, and 
Verba (1994) caution, “All methods – whether explicit or not – have limitations.” (8)  
Methodologically, the quantitative analysis struggles to explain causality.  This challenge 
is mitigated in part by the illustrative case studies, and their aspiration to show how 
quantitative findings may appear in the so-called real world.  But true causality in ex-post 
social scientific research presents a challenge.  In particular, it is difficult to isolate the 
effects of any single weapon system on something so grand and multifaceted as interstate 
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militarized conflict (Lieber 2005).  As Van Creveld (1991, chap. Introduction, para. 3) 
warns us, 
To use a simple analogy, military technology affects warfare like waves 
spreading from a stone thrown into a pond. The disturbance is strongest at 
the point of impact; the farther the ripples spread, the weaker and less 
noticeable they become. And the farther they go, the more likely they are 
to lose their identity by becoming intermixed with ripples thrown up by 
other stones or reflected back from the pond’s banks. Similarly, weapons 
and weapon systems make their power felt principally during combat, but 
war consists of much else besides. Apart from tactics, there are operations, 
strategy, logistics, intelligence, “C3” (command, control, communication), 
and organization, to mention but a few. Naturally, all of these are affected 
by weapons, but all are also strongly influenced by other kinds of 
hardware, as well as by technology in its abstract sense. Thus we must 
begin by taking into account such mundane things as roads, vehicles, 
communications, timekeepers, and maps, and end by considering the most 
complex problems of technological management, innovation, and 
conceptualization. 
 
 Furthermore, it is important to understand that this research does not test the 
cruise missile’s effect on the initiation of war.  As noted, bargaining theory predicts that 
the acquisition of cruise missiles would likely reduce the observed incidence of warfare 
between states as one side gains a bargaining advantage (Blainey 1988; Fearon 1995).  
However, in this research, I propose the effect that cruise missiles has on state behavior 
operates at a lower level of conflict.  States seek to coerce their adversaries 
diplomatically in pursuit of policy goals with the use of the least amount of force 
possible.  Though I included incidents of large-scale warfare in my analysis, I did not 
distinguish between this and conflict short of war, thereby aggregating uses of force.  
This perspective is not only congruent with coercion theory, but follows closely with 
Lieber’s (2005) concept of technological opportunism which asserts that weapon 
technology neither mitigates or produces war, it is a means by which states pursue their 
policies. 
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 In addition, I do not code or test for every use of the cruise missile throughout its 
short history.  Currently there are no data sets available that consolidate this information, 
and collecting it poses a significant data collection challenge due to governmental secrecy 
and operational opacity.  Instead, I examine the role of cruise missiles in making force 
initiation generally more likely.  In the theory advanced below, cruise missiles serve to 
facilitate a broader coercive strategy.  For instance, though they played a role in the 1982 
Falkland Conflict by increasing the likelihood Argentina would attempt to recapture the 
disputed Falkland Islands by force (see Chapter Four), the Exocet cruise missiles were 
not used until later in the conflict.  Their presence increased the prospect of force 
initiation, even though they had little utility in the initial military assault.    
 Another limitation to this research is that I am only interested in determining 
whether a state’s possession of cruise missiles increases the probability of using force.  I 
do not attempt to predict their conditions for use other than to note that the use of cruise 
missiles in coercive situations would likely come in extreme cases, when a state either 
lacks or has extinguished other, less belligerent, forms of coercion.  However, as 
demonstrated in Chapter Three, states armed with cruise missiles are more likely to 
threaten or display force than those that are not so armed. 
 This research does not focus on the conditions under which a state is likely to 
procure cruise missiles.  As Deutch (1992) notes, “the fundamental motivation to seek a 
weapon is the perception that national security will be improved.” (124-125).  Regardless 
of how or why states obtain cruise missiles – which can be voluminous – aside from their 
use as model predictors in Chapter Three, this dissertation does not delve into why or 
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under what conditions a state may obtain them.  For an excellent treatments of this topic, 
reference Gormley (2008b) and Carus (1990, 1992). 
 Finally, this dissertation does not advocate for any particular policy prescription.  
Although evidence indicates that the acquisition of cruise missile technology may pose a 
threat to international security through increased likelihood that a state will threaten, 
display, or use military force, policymakers must weigh all available information to 
determine if stricter international agreements need to be put in place to curb the cruise 
missile’s proliferation.  Furthermore, this research does not test for the effectiveness of 
cruise missiles as coercive tools, nor test coercion theory itself.  Instead, I only attempt to 
empirically determine if states are more likely to initiate military force while in 
possession of cruise missiles.  Although an important question, the role of limited force 
using cruise missiles as an effective means of coercion is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
 
Roadmap of the Dissertation 
 The central thrust of this dissertation attempts to answer the question of whether 
cruise missile possession increases the chance a state will initiate the use of military 
force.  To answer this question, three central hypotheses guide this research.  First, I 
predict that states armed with cruise missiles are more likely to exercise military force to 
coerce their adversaries than states that do not have cruise missiles.  Second, I postulate 
that states armed with cruise missiles are more likely to initiate crises through threats and 
displays of force than states that do not have cruise missiles.  Finally, I posit a null 
hypothesis which predicts that there is no difference between the probability that 
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democratic or autocratic states with cruise missiles will use military power to achieve 
foreign policy objectives.   
I test these hypotheses over the course of the next five chapters.  Chapter Two 
tackles two objectives.  First, I discuss the relevant literature.  Second, I present a 
theoretical framework built around coercive diplomacy.  Chapter Three outlines the 
explanatory sequential mixed method design used to guide my research methodology and 
presents the results of the quantitative data analysis.  Chapters Four and Five present 
explanatory case studies to illustrate the conclusions from Chapter Three.  The first case 
study examines the 1982 Falkland Conflict and the second examines the United States’ 
use of cruise missiles as a coercive tool in the 1990s. 9  Finally, Chapter Six not only 
summarizes the project’s research findings, but also integrates the quantitative and 
qualitative strands of the mixed method research.  Each of these chapters was essential to 
completing this research.  I briefly introduce the chapters in more detail below. 
 Chapter Two establishes a foundation for this dissertation.  Here, I present the 
current line of research for my primary dependent variable, the use of military force, and 
my dependent variable, cruise missile possession.  The literature review demonstrates 
that although the literature examining various state characteristics found to correlate with 
the likelihood of initiating military force is robust, little of this literature specifically 
examined the role of individual weapons or classes of weapons.  The cruise missile 
literature corroborates this verdict.  Much of the cruise missile literature focuses on 
capability and proliferation, but lacks a systematic empirical investigation of the cruise 
                                                 
9 The Falklands Conflict is alternately referred to as the South Atlantic Conflict, Malvinas 
War, the Falklands War, the Falklands Crisis, or the Falklands Crisis.  For consistency, I 
use the term Falklands Conflict. 
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missile’s influence on state behavior.  In addition to the literature review, Chapter Two 
offers a theoretical framework for understanding how cruise missiles influence state 
behavior.  Centered around coercion theory, this theoretical framework guides us toward 
a theory of cruise missile-armed state behavior that supposes states use cruise missiles as 
a low-cost means of coercion.  To test this theory’s efficacy, I present three hypotheses as 
noted above. 
 Chapter Three accomplishes two goals.  First, I present details of the explanatory 
sequential mixed method design used to systematically test the validity of my hypotheses.  
I use two strands of inquiry.  The first strand quantitatively tests each hypothesis using 
original data set of cruise missile procurement integrated with data derived from the 
Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (Palmer et al. 2015) and the International Crisis 
Behavior data set (Brecher et al. 2017).  The second strand illustrates these results using 
two case studies identified from the quantitative analysis.  The second goal of Chapter 
Three is to present the results of the quantitative strand of research.  I not only uncover 
significant empirical support for all three hypotheses, but also note evidence that land 
attack cruise missiles, when analyzed separately, impart their own influence on the 
propensity to use military force. 
 Chapter Four presents the first of two illustrative case studies.  Using primary, 
secondary, and tertiary sources derived from recently declassified documents, scholarly 
analysis, and first-hand accounts, I demonstrate that the Exocet cruise missiles used in the 
1982 Falkland Conflict played a greater role than previously understood.  Seen through 
the lens of coercion, I assert that the Argentine government believed the anti-access/area 
denial (A2/AD) capabilities provided by the Exocet would be an effective hedge against 
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British attempts to recapture the islands, especially as they misperceived waning British 
interest in this far-flung southern outpost.  Armed with newly acquired and operational 
air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, Argentina dispensed with 150 years of non-
aggression and took the Falkland Islands by force in 1982.  In response, and perhaps 
influenced by British misperceptions of Argentina’s A2/AD capability, the United 
Kingdom dispatched a fleet to retake the islands.  But, the five Exocets in Argentina’s 
inventory proved to be formidable denial weapons.  Argentina’s limited number of 
Exocet missiles wreaked havoc on the British fleet, forcing the navy to restructure their 
strategy by forcing the fleet to move beyond the range of Argentine aircraft.  However, 
the Exocets were ultimately not enough to prevent the British from recapturing the 
islands. 
 Chapter Five presents the second illustrative case study examining American 
“cruise missile diplomacy” in the 1990s.  Here, I demonstrate that after the 1991 Gulf 
War, the Tomahawk land attack cruise missile stood out as a promising means to attack 
an adversary at a low cost.  No longer limited by the poor navigation and propulsion 
technology that hindered earlier cruise missile models, the Tomahawk could go beyond 
its Cold War nuclear mission to precisely inflict limited punishment in a way that allowed 
the United States to use credible force to back up threats and inflict punishment in 
coercive situations at a reduced political and material cost. 
I conclude the dissertation in Chapter Six by reviewing the results of hypothesis 
testing and completing the third strand of this mixed method investigation through the 
integration and interpretation of the quantitative and qualitative phases of research.  I note 
that not only do the illustrative case studies support all three hypotheses, but aptly 
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complement the results of the statistical analysis in Chapter Three.  I conclude the chapter 
with a final discussion of the findings, recommendations for future research in the context 
of a broader program of study, and my thoughts on this research’s implications on future 
government policy. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  LITERATURE AND THEORY 
 
The purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between a state’s 
possession of cruise missiles and its likelihood of initiating a militarized interstate 
dispute.  To lay the groundwork for this investigation, this chapter reviews the relevant 
literature, presents a theoretical framework for understanding why cruise missiles would 
increase this likelihood, and suggests three hypotheses for testing the relationship.  The 
chapter opens by discussing some of the reasons a state would use military force to 
pursue its foreign policy objectives.  I follow this discussion with a review of the extant 
literature on cruise missile capability, mission, and utility.  After establishing a 
foundation, I employ a theoretical framework – built on coercion theory – to understand 
why cruise missiles may influence state behavior.  I propose that cruise missiles increase 
the chance a state will threaten, display, and apply military force in situations where force 
is otherwise less likely by providing a qualitatively different capability than that of other 
weapons.  In coercive situations in which the use of force is otherwise held in reserve, 
cruise missiles provide an acceptable means to signal resolve, compel the enemy to 
reverse an action, punish transgressions, and deny an adversary’s objectives. 
To explain how the extant literature informs this research, I examine two core 
themes in the literature.  The first theme is related to this research’s dependent variable, 
the initiation of military force.  For this literature review, I reflect on the common 
correlates that scholars used to explain why states initiate military force.  I also examine 
the relatively limited cruise missile literature to survey the existing state of the art in this 
niche field.  Since the 1980s, scholars understood the cruise missile’s qualitatively 
different capabilities and sought to realize their place in a state’s defense strategy and 
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international security.  I build on this literature with the first empirical examination of the 
cruise missile’s effect on state behavior. 
In Chapter One, I introduced a new schema for understanding the cruise missile’s 
historical utility by typifying three phases of cruise missile development, largely based on 
the American cruise missile program’s experience, that demarcate the weapon’s place in 
military doctrine.10  The first phase, from World War I through World War II, was 
characterized by immature technology, delicate airframes, and woeful unreliability.  The 
second phase, ranging from the end of World War II until 1970, showed a marked 
improvement in reliability, destructive capacity, and range.  Finally, the third, and 
current, phase of cruise missile development sees significant advancements in navigation 
and targeting.  Newfound accuracy permits a switch from nuclear, close enough, 
targeting to conventional precision munitions, which in turn allows for a wider use in a 
coercive strategy.  These modern cruise missiles reduce the need to commit combat 
troops in coercive situations that call for an exemplary use of force, increasing the 
likelihood a state will initiate a limited conflict. 
Building on the military force initiation and cruise missile literatures I present a 
theoretical framework for this research using coercive diplomacy.  Coercive diplomacy 
explains why states may use threats, displays, or limited uses of force to pursue their 
foreign policy objectives.  Using the existing coercion literature, I postulate that cruise 
missiles increase the likelihood a state will act belligerently by providing a qualitatively 
different solution to foreign policy challenges.  Cruise missiles provide the capability to 
inflict controlled and limited damage which can be used either exclusively, in 
                                                 
10 I explore this schema in more detail in Appendix A. 
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combination, or to compliment other belligerent actions without cruise missiles 
themselves.  Not only may this lead to an increased probability of force, but also an 
increased frequency of threats and displays of force.  Moreover, this effect may be 
independent of regime type:  Democracies and autocracies are likely to enjoy the cruise 
missile’s coercive properties equally.  Empirical tests in Chapter Three, combined with 
case studies in Chapters Four and Five, support these hypotheses.  
 
Correlates of Military Force 
 In this section, I present a review of the literature encompassing seven correlates 
of military force initiation:  regime type and age, wealth, alliances, territorial contiguity, 
revisionism, and armaments.  I propose that cruise missiles increase the likelihood a state 
will use military force. However, I do not suggest cruise missiles necessarily increase the 
incidence or severity of full-scale war.   
This literature review does not include scholarship that explains why states 
engage in large-scale conflict (i.e. war) such as the security dilemma (Herz 1950), 
offense-defense theory (Jervis 1978), expected utility theory (Bueno de Mesquita 1980), 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and hegemonic war theory (Gilpin 
1981).  The reason for this can be found in bargaining theory, which suggests an increase 
in military capability on one side of a dispute should drive the defending side to the 
negotiating table (Blainey 1988; Fearon 1995).  When attacking becomes easier for one 
side, the stakes shift, leaving the defender to question whether it is worth resisting.  In 
that circumstance, risks and costs increase, or states may push for a deal early in hope of 
a more acceptable resolution.  Although cruise missiles may increase the likelihood a 
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state may initiate military force, bargaining theory suggests, all else equal, they should 
not necessarily increase the probability of war.  Rather, their use as a coercive tool for 
limited force may best be understood in terms of limiting, rather than escalating, the risk 
of war under terms that are politically acceptable to the state and its regime.   
Military Force and Conflict 
 To begin the literature review, it is useful first to engage the concept of using 
military force as initiating a militarized interstate dispute (MID) or conflict.  A MID may 
occur in the context of an international crisis in which the “actors involved are willing or 
forced to make a trade-off between highly valued but mutually incompatible objectives ... 
involving a rapid and acute change in the perception of threats and promises for each 
[participant].” (Maoz 1982, 219)  For these purposes, I use Jones, Bremer, and Singer’s 
(1996) definition of a MID, which distinguishes these types of disputes as “united 
historical cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one 
member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, 
official forces, property, or territory of another state.” (168)  States display force to 
indicate a commitment that they will take to arms should their demands not be met with 
satisfaction (Slantchev 2005). 
Inquiry into the forces behind initiation of such disputes is not new to the 
scholarly community.  To grapple with the causal mechanisms currently understood – 
despite some debate – to influence the initiation of a dispute, and to illustrate where 
cruise missiles fit into this discussion, I present a brief review of the scholarly literature 
behind the initiation of threats, displays, or uses of limited military force.  As the 
following discussion will highlight, there are seven correlates believed to influence MID 
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initiation.  These aspects include regime type and age, wealth, alliances, territorial 
contiguity, revisionism, and weapon acquisition.  Much has been accomplished in this 
field, but little research has been completed on the effects of specific qualitatively 
different weapon systems on MID initiation.  This research seeks to fill that gap by 
connecting the literature on MID initiation with the literature on cruise missile threats. 
Regime Type 
 Some scholars assert that domestic factors specific to regime type influence 
whether a state will initiate a MID.  This line of research is well-sown ground.  Some 
assert that regime type itself is associated with conflict.  One branch contends that 
authoritarian regimes are most associated with MID initiation.  A dispute may not involve 
military force, yet non-democratic regimes may be more likely to first use force when 
involved in a situation in which states are engaged in threats and displays of force 
(Caprioli and Trumbore 2006).  The link between autocracies and dispute initiation may 
involve the autocratization process itself as new regimes may breed reckless foreign 
relations when attempting to preserve political structures (Enterline 1998; Lai and Slater 
2006; Mansfield and Snyder 1995).   
Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry (2002) argued that the type of authoritarian 
regime matters.  Military and personalist regimes as categorized by Geddes (1999), 
behave relatively peacefully toward one another, while single-party regimes experience 
greater rates of conflict.  This may be due in part to being less casualty or risk averse 
(Sirin and Koch 2015).  Some researchers have argued that over time and as personalist 
autocrats age, they become more capable of navigating difficult foreign policy situations 
and therefore become likely to initiate disputes (Michael Horowitz, McDermott, and 
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Stam 2005).  Lai and Slater (2006), Debs and Goemans (2010), and Weeks (2012) 
concluded that military autocracies were more likely to use military force to pursue 
foreign policy goals.  However, Kim (2017) challenged the notion that military regimes 
were inherently hostile.  Instead, they are the product of hostile security environments.  
Such environments lend themselves to a greater probability of militarized disputes.   
Authoritarian regimes may initiate a MID because of their greater vulnerability to 
coups.  Panel (2017) asserted that a dictator’s risk of being violently removed from power 
can be a strong predictor of dispute initiation.  When faced with possible removal from 
office, prison, and possibly execution, an autocrat may decide that initiating a conflict to 
is worth the risk of losing the conflict (Debs and Goemans 2010).  Finally, the correlation 
between regime type and MID initiation is not exclusive to authoritarian regimes.  
Instead, the correlation may depend on regime type dyadic pairing.  When paired, 
democracy and personalist dyads are more likely to experience a MID, although 
personalist regimes are more likely to initiate a dispute even when less likely to prevail 
(Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002; Reiter and Stam 2003).  Interestingly, so-called 
rogue states are no more likely to initiate or be involved in international conflict than are 
non-rogue states (Caprioli and Trumbore 2006). 
 Others claimed that democratic forms of government are significantly correlated 
with MID initiations.  Maoz and Russett (1993) argued that democracies are just as  
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conflict-prone as autocracies, but rarely clash with one another.11  Maoz and Abdolali 
(1989) believed that democracies are as prone to disputes as autocracies, but disputes are 
disproportionately initiated by other regime types.  Although less likely to initiate large-
scale conflicts, democracies may be quicker to enter low-level conflicts but slower to 
escalate to war.  When they do enter disputes, which have become less severe and shorter 
over time, democracies tend to be on the same side of the conflict (Mitchell and Prins 
1999; Mousseau 1997).12  Dixon (1994) asserted that democracies are better equipped to 
reach diplomatic settlements than are autocracies.  Therefore, they should see fewer 
incidents of conflict initiation, commensurate with democratic peace theory.  A strong 
explanation in the literature for the disparity between democracies’ and autocracies’ 
propensities to initiate a MID is the difference in audience costs for each regime type.   
 Variation in domestic social and institutional constraints in a regime may predict 
the chance a state will engage in conflict (J. L. P. Weeks 2012, 2014).  Democratic 
governments face consequences for their decisions in terms of audience costs, which can 
signal commitment and credibility to adversaries (Fearon 1994b; A. Smith 1998).  
Audience costs are the political costs associated with a leader’s decision, and when this 
                                                 
11 The theory that democracies tend to avoid fighting one another, democratic peace 
theory, has a long tradition in the literature, and is outside the scope of this research.  For 
more on democratic peace see Kant (1796), Babst (1964), Doyle (1983b, 1983a, 1986, 
2005), Maoz and Russett (1993), Russett (1990, 1993), Owen (1994), Russett, Layne, 
Spiro, and Doyle (1995), Maoz (1997, 1998), Gartzke (1998), Bueno de Mesquita, 
Morrow, Siverson, and Smith (1999), Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl (2000), Cavallar (2001), 
Slantchev, Alexandrova, and Gartzke (2005), and Hobson (2011).  For skeptical 
perspectives on democratic peace theory see Layne (1994), Gowa (1999), Rosato (2003, 
2005), Macmillan (2004), Gat (2005), and Tarzi (2007).  
12 Mitchell and Prins (1999) found that most MIDs between democracies involve 
relatively benign matters such as fishing rights, maritime boundaries, and ocean 
resources. 
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decision relates to initiating a militarized dispute, these costs can have a significant 
impact on the decision to use force.  Democratic leaders who respect these constraints 
initiate disputes less frequently, while those who challenge these constraints tend to be 
more aggressive, initiating disputes more often (Keller 2005; Keller and Foster 2012).  
As a crisis escalates, audience costs can become a more powerful influence than the costs 
of concession.  Audience costs may force action, even if the action is ultimately 
undesirable (Fearon 1994a).  They may be measured in terms of threats posed by the 
electorate’s ability to remove or sanction a leader because of unpopular policy (Slantchev 
2006a).  In democracies, favorable policy outcomes can be a measurement of a leader’s 
quality in the eyes of the electorate.  If a leader’s policy position displeases the voting 
public, the leader can be removed from office.  Dynamic political processes resulting 
from an engaged electorate constrain a democratic leader’s ability to initiate conflict by 
signaling the viability of threats (D. H. Clark and Nordstrom 2005; Fearon 1994a, 
1994b).  When making threats, a leader’s position may therefore only be credible if they 
risk removal from office for not fulfilling the threat or commitment; this will increase the 
chances of MID initiation if hawkish policies must be carried to fruition (Fearon 1994a; 
Partell and Palmer 1999; Slantchev 2011; A. Smith 1998).  The public does not always 
assert a pacifying effect on the state, however.  If the population has a reason for revenge, 
popular support for action can generate or even force a MID initiation (Stein 2015). 
One way the public directly holds sway over a democratically elected leader is 
through elections.  Gaubatz (1991) found that when elections are imminent, leaders are 
more constrained in their ability to initiate conflict.  Leaders are more likely to initiate a 
MID earlier in office when they are less electorally vulnerable.  The media plays a 
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powerful role in this process.  As a conduit of information, the media can have an 
ameliorating effect on public opinion.  Increased media openness is negatively correlated 
with MID initiation and fatalities in a crisis, by complementing neo-Kantian peace factors 
such as institutional democracy, economic interdependence, and membership in 
international organizations (Choi and James 2007; B. Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998).   
In the United States, presidential decisions to use force in limited engagements, 
which are essentially political uses of force, are based more on domestic and personal or 
political factors than international ones (Ostrom and Job 1986).  James and Oneal (1991) 
and Meernik (2001) agreed that domestic and political factors are important, but they 
noted the severity of international crises play a more important role than Ostrom and Job 
asserted.  In the United States, support for military operations is affected by the 
willingness to accept casualties, which in turn is based upon the public's weighing of the 
costs versus the benefits of the situation, and the degree of consensus among political 
leaders (Larson 1996; T. C. Morgan and Campbell 1991). Leeds and Davis (1997), 
however, challenged the relationship between constraining domestic political 
considerations and international behavior.  They concluded that leaders who are 
vulnerable simply have fewer international demands made on them, decreasing the 
likelihood they will become entangled in disputes.  Finally, constraints imposed by the 
legislative branch during periods of economic decline may compel the president to pursue 
other means of shoring up support, including the use of force (Brulé 2006).   
Regardless of regime type, one course of action any leader may pursue to shore 
up popular support is the initiation of a militarized dispute.  Ostrom and Job (1986) and 
Miller (1995) noted that domestic political structures and resources condition leaders to 
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use conflict as a means to manipulate domestic audiences and increase political 
popularity.  Diversionary theory is a line of research that tracks a leader’s use of “foreign 
conflict involvement to divert domestic attention from internal problems.” (R. A. Miller 
1995, 761).  A diversionary use of force may be more likely in environments 
characterized by strategic rivalries.  Given their reliance on electoral support (i.e. 
audience costs), democracies arguably have the greatest incentive to use diversionary 
force.  However, the transparency inherent in most democratic regimes leaves them little 
opportunity to do so (Mitchell and Prins 2004).  Morgan and Anderson (1999) observed 
that diversionary theory, tested empirically primarily using data on the United States, is 
also supported using data from the United Kingdom.  They asserted that public support 
for the British government is positively correlated with the likelihood the government 
will use threats, displays, or use of force abroad.  Challenging this thesis, Sirin (2011) 
argued that rather than divert attention away from domestic problems, political leaders 
may use force abroad to build cohesion during time of domestic unrest and violence.   
In Chapter Four, I explore a classic case of diversionary conflict.  The 1982 
Falkland Crisis is often regarded as the product of a faltering military junta trying to 
drum up domestic support in the face of civil unrest and economic trouble (e.g. Levy and 
Vakili 1992; R. A. Miller and Elgün 2011; Oakes 2006).  However, I take a novel 
perspective by arguing that while the aforementioned factors are valid, cruise missiles 
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increased the prospect Argentina would act to reclaim the Falkland Islands by providing a 
capability that offered to lower the risk of a significant British military response.13 
Regime Age 
Other scholars argue that a regime’s age has a significant influence on the 
initiation of a state’s next MID.  The connection between a regime’s age and conflict 
frequently appears in the MID initiation literature as a regime-based independent 
variable.  For instance, an early study of autocratic leadership tenure and conflict argued 
that autocrats are more likely to wage war later in their tenure due to reduced audience 
costs (i.e. electoral punishment for costly foreign policies) noting “the longer an 
authoritarian leader has been in power, the higher the probability that the leader will risk 
waging a war, including waging a war that ultimately is lost” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003, 847).  Bak (2017) conceded that autocratic insecurity may be a source of foreign 
policy constraint, but challenged Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s linear conclusion.  Instead, 
Bak argued that over the course of an autocratic leader’s tenure, the likelihood of crisis 
initiation is greater in the early and late years of the regime, during periods of early and 
late instability as leaders first consolidate their hold on political office, and they turn 
attention toward maintaining power.   
Scholars do not limit this phenomenon to autocratic leaders.  Both new autocratic 
and democratic leaders are more likely to be targets of aggression from foreign powers 
                                                 
13 Though considered by some a classical use of a diversionary use of force (Levy and 
Vakili 1992; Oakes 2006), not all agree diversionary theory explains the Falkland 
Conflict.  Fravel (2010) argued that standard realist models of international behavior and 
coercive diplomacy offer better explanations.  For more on diversionary theory see 
Meernik and Waterman (1996), Miller (1999), DeRouen (2000), Hendrickson (2002a), 
Oneal and Tir (2006), Tarar (2006), Jung (2014), and Blomdahl (2015). 
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due to their inexperience.  A new leader may value concessions over entering a new 
conflict with little experience (Gelpi and Grieco 2001).  It stands to reason, then, that as 
democratic leaders age, they are more likely to initiate a MID as they become more 
comfortable as leaders and gain the confidence needed to enforce their foreign policies 
(Michael Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005).  Potter (2007) challenged this 
conclusion when applied to the United States.  Potter argued that as a president gains time 
in office, the probability of a crisis involving the Unites States declines as increasingly 
skilled presidents are better able to avoid MIDs and find diplomatic solutions to foreign 
policy challenges. 
Wealth and Status 
Factors unrelated to regime type and domestic concerns may also drive the 
initiation of militarized disputes.  Wealthier states have greater capability and capacity to 
use threats and force and so may initiate disputes more often.  Boulding (1962), Bremer 
(1980, 1992), and Schultz (2001) believed that state wealth is a significant predictor of 
dispute involvement.  States with high material capability and generous resources can 
predict if a state has a greater likelihood of initiating a MID, often defining their interests 
globally with military resources to pursue their policies.  This position aligns with 
Fearon’s (1994b) assertion that threats are more likely to work when the threatening state 
is favored by the balance of capabilities or interests.  The greater the military capability, 
the greater the power in realist terms, and therefore the reliability of the threat (Jervis 
1994; Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979).   
The relationship between state economic development and MID propensity may 
be non-linear.  Impoverished and wealthy states are less likely to initiate MIDs.  States at 
39 
 
an intermediate level of wealth have the opportunity and willingness to make contentious 
territorial claims and policy assertions.  Poorer states lack opportunity and resources 
while wealthy states rely more on service-based economies and are more invested in 
international economic relations, making territorial expansion less imperative (Boehmer 
and Sobek 2005).  Strüver and Wegenast (2018) provided an example of the connection 
between wealth and risk of MID initiation.  They asserted that extreme oil abundance or 
dependence is significantly associated with an increased risk of MID initiation.  Oil rich 
states also have an increased risk of being the target of conflict while large oil deposits 
are found to be correlated with an increase in conflict intensity overall. 
In addition to wealth, major power status may also affect whether a state will 
initiate or be involved in a militarized interstate dispute.  Volgy et al. (2011) provided a 
framework for understanding and classifying major power status by adapting Levy’s 
(1983) conceptual approach.  Volgy et al.’s (2011) definition is below. There is a 
distinction between being a major power and being recognized as a major power by other 
states. 
A state is a major power if it (a) has unusual capabilities with which to 
pursue its interests in interstate relations; (b) uses those capabilities to 
pursue unusually broad and expansive foreign policies beyond its 
immediate neighborhood or region; and (c) seeks to influence the course 
of international affairs relatively independently of other major powers.  A 
state is attributed major power status if it is perceived by policy makers of 
other states within the international community as being unusually 
powerful and willing to influence the course of global affairs, and if they 
act toward it consistent with that perception. [emphasis in original] (Volgy 
et al. 2011, 6) 
 
Major powers often possess power projection capabilities which enable them to 
define their interests globally.  This broader scope of international concern and 
involvement increases the opportunity to become involved in conflicts (Schultz 2001, 
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2013).  It is no wonder that there is a general consensus among scholars that the most 
powerful states tend to be the most conflict prone (Bremer 1980; Eberwein 1982; 
Gochman and Maoz 1984; Rosenau and Hoggard 1974).  Gochman and Maoz (1984) 
contended that major powers, due to perceptions of global responsibility and enduring 
rivalries, most often initiate or join ongoing disputes, whereas minor powers may also be 
initiators, but are more likely targets.  Because major powers often have higher domestic 
political constraints on executive decision making, they may initiate military conflict less 
frequently than do minor powers, who are less constrained (T. C. Morgan and Campbell 
1991).  Minor powers may, however, be more likely to initiate violent force in a MID, 
whereas major powers tend to resist escalation in the interest of maintaining the status 
quo (Caprioli and Trumbore 2006; K. Rasler and Thompson 1999; B. Russett and Oneal 
2001). 
Alliances 
 The MID initiation literature also addresses the effects of alliance membership or 
participation in international organizations on whether a state may become involved in a 
militarized dispute.  Alliances may affect the probability a challenger will initiate a 
dispute because they often signal whether other states will intervene in the conflict. The 
type of alliance matters. Alliances that require intervention on behalf of the defender 
reduce the probability of MID initiation, while alliances that support a challenger or 
promise non-intervention increase that likelihood (Leeds 2003).  Additionally, Gochman 
and Maoz (1984) found that states who initiate, or are targets, of MIDs most often join 
ongoing disputes, usually on the target’s side.  Mintz, Russett, and Leeds (2005) showed 
that when disputing states have allies who agree to help during a conflict, they tend to 
41 
 
receive help in any emerging situation.  Agreements of this type affect dispute expansion 
to other states which can escalate the scope of the conflict.  Finally, Shannon, Morey, and 
Boehmke (2010) warned that membership in international organizations may not reduce 
the conflict initiation, but may reduce conflict duration by helping each side overcome 
bargaining obstacles and information deficiencies, thus allowing for quicker agreements 
between the parties. 
Territorial Contiguity 
 In addition to regime type, wealth, major power status, and alliances, proximity 
and territorial contiguity is correlated with MID initiation.  Territorial contiguity can 
itself be a source of conflict as states vie for resources or maneuver to settle 
disagreements over borders.  These events increase the probability of MID initiation and 
risking expansion of the dispute to nearby states (Bremer 1992; Diehl 1985; Hensel 2000; 
Hill 1945; Joyce and Braithwaite 2013; Luard 1986; Vasquez 1993, 1995, 2009; Vasquez 
and Henehan 2001; Wallensteen 1981).  Not only may territorial disagreements lead to 
fighting between neighbors (Diehl 1992; Diehl and Goertz 1988, 2002; Goertz and Diehl 
1988; K. J. Holsti 1991; Vasquez 1995), but territorial conflicts tend to produce a greater 
likelihood the conflict will resume after settlements are reached, as the belligerent parties 
seek either revenge or stalemate (Hensel 1994; Maoz 1984).   
Contiguity may be important to conflict, but most MIDs between neighbors 
involve commercial interests like fishing grounds or natural resources.  Because 
democracies, as previously noted, are generally better equipped to resolve differences due 
to their open nature (Dixon 1994), they are less likely to allow contentious territorial 
disputes to escalate to the level of a MID.  Democracies normally rely on diplomatic 
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means to resolve their issues (Mitchell and Prins 1999).  Rasler and Thompson (2006) 
disagreed, however, that territorial disputes alone invite MID initiation.  They asserted 
that when territory, contiguity, and strategic rivalry become an interconnected, rather than 
linear, issue, MID initiation is likely.  A simple rivalry is not a sufficient cause.  
Territorial issues can act as vehicles that ignite underlying rivalries into military action, 
particularly when the disputed territory has strategic or ethnic value (Wiegand 2011). 
Senese (1996) found that contiguity and territorial issues are significantly more 
likely to escalate than disputes that are non-territorial.  In addition, the salience of the 
territorial issue is positively correlated with the number of battle deaths.  Senese also 
contended that at lower levels, including displays and threats of force, contiguity plays a 
small role in escalation.  Senese posited that leaders are no more likely to escalate a 
commitment to conflict with neighboring opponents using threats.  Leaders may seek to 
maximize staying in power while pursuing national security goals, integrating domestic 
and international factors.  Seeking to resolve territorial disputes invites domestic unrest, 
but engaging can also divert attention from domestic problems.  Thus, domestic politics 
can initiate, exacerbate, and perpetuate territorial disputes, especially in strategic 
territories rich in natural resources (Huth 1996). 
Revisionist Powers 
The presence of a revisionist power in a dyadic system may increase the rate of 
conflict (Caprioli and Trumbore 2006; J. S. Gowa 1999; Lemke and Reed 2001; 
Schweller 1994).  A revisionist state is one which is “dissatisfied with the existing status 
quo prior to the onset of a militarized interstate dispute” (D. M. Jones, Bremer, and 
Singer 1996, 178).  A revisionist state seeks a change in the status quo, often engaging in 
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behavior that may be considered aggressive and threatening to peace, although without 
necessarily resorting to full scale war (Claude 1988; Stoll 1998).  When faced with the 
dilemma of preventive attack in the face of uncertainty, declining powers may choose to 
attack, especially when the adversary’s motivations and capabilities are unknown (Debs 
and Monteiro 2014; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi 1992; R. Powell 1991, 1996b, 1996a, 1999, 
2002, 2012).  Schweller (1994) noted that expansionist powers attract weaker states as 
bandwagoning partners that are eager to enjoy spoils, and to weaken a declining power.  
Jungblut and Stoll (2002) discovered a connection between conflictive interactions, or 
“the presence of a conflict below the levels at which military force is used,” (527) and the 
chances of MID initiation.  Conflictive interactions may include trade disputes that 
contribute to greater levels of conflict between nations.  Peterson and Drury (2011) built 
on Jungblut and Stoll’s work.  They noted that states that impose economic sanctions 
upon other states to coerce concessions may inadvertently lower prohibitions against 
using violence against the sanctioned state. Such actions open the door to MID initiation 
for third party states. 
Revisionism at the sub-state level may also affect MID initiation.  States that 
experience civil wars may be more likely to become involved in MIDs with other states 
due to the issues surrounding the causes of the civil war:  intervention, externalization, 
and spillover effects which induce international friction (Diehl and Goertz 2002; 
Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008; Salehyan 2008).  Trumbore (2003) observed 
states experiencing ethnic rebellion are more likely to initiate a MID.  The higher the 
level of rebellion, argued Trumbore, the more likely a state will use force first in an 
international dispute.  However, states struggling with ethnic rebellion are much less 
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likely to be the victims of attack from other states as bystander states place a greater 
emphasis on ethnic rescue than violence (Van Evera 1994). 
Armaments 
Finally, the literature addressing the effects of specific armaments on MID 
initiations is mixed.  One body of literature focuses on how arms transfers affect conflict.  
Some argue arms transfers increase military conflict, as increased capabilities on the part 
of the receiver embolden more assertive foreign policies and increase the domestic 
audience’s expectations (Craft 1999; Craft and Smaldone 2002; Intriligator and Brito 
1984; Kinsella 1994, 1995, 2014; Kinsella and Tillema 1995; Mayer 1986; Schrodt 
1983).  Sylvan (1976) noted that not only do arms transfers predict increased conflict and 
decreased cooperation, but that there is a statistically significant two year lag in the time 
between receiving assistance and initiating conflict.  Krause (2004) contended that arms 
transfers outside defense pacts from major powers disrupt information asymmetries, 
making arms recipients more likely to experience MIDs as either target or initiator.   
Not all scholars agree, however, that arms transfers predict MID initiation.  For 
instance, Durch (2001) contended that arms transfers do not explain MID initiation.  
According to Durch, underlying political factors and security dilemmas bear 
responsibility for the correlation between arms transfers and conflict.  Additionally, Diehl 
and Kingston (1987) argued that military buildups are poor predictors of future conflict 
involvement.  Arms increases among rivals do not make the rivals more likely to initiate 
threats or use military force; states increase arms in anticipation of impending conflict.   
The shift in the international order brought about by arms transfers and changes in 
relative power could also increase the likelihood of armed conflict (Gilpin 1981, 1988; 
45 
 
Morgenthau 1948; Wagner 1994).  Bas and Coe (2012) argued that the procurement of 
new military technology can quickly shift the balance of power.  This shift can instigate 
armed conflict, particularly in cases where technology is advanced and adversarial states 
do not yet possess equal capability.  Even the anticipated transfer of advanced military 
technology can influence the weaker state to take preemptive action against its 
adversaries.  The cruise missile’s ability to fly undetected and carry a diverse payload 
presents just such a destabilizing threat, creating an artificial parity between what should 
otherwise be militarily mismatched rivals (Dutra 2004).  This disparity may increase the 
possibility a declining power could attack a rising power to maintain dominance or parity. 
This leads to a general question:  Do specific weapons make MID initiation more likely? 
How weapon systems affect MID initiation directly informs the research I present 
here.  The connection between the possession of advanced weapons, and the 
consequences for international security has a solid place in the literature.  With few 
exceptions, however, much of the scholarship on this subject has focused on nuclear 
weapons.  Some argued that nuclear weapons embolden states to act more belligerently 
(Feaver 1992, 1994; Jervis 1976; Sagan 1985, 1993, 1994).  Other scholars predicted that 
nuclear weapons suppress large scale conflict, making states more willing to initiate 
disputes at lower levels, a stability-instability paradox (Ganguly and Wagner 2004; Kapur 
2003; Rauchhaus 2009; Snyder 1965).  Narang and Mehta (2017) claimed that in 
extended deterrence situations, wherein a client state with no nuclear weapons of its own 
is protected by an ally’s nuclear umbrella, the client state has an increased risk of 
initiating a MID with the expectation of receiving concessions from its target.  Suri 
(2008) noted that nuclear weapons produced peace through deterrence during the Cold 
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War, but found that while these weapons prevented large scale conflict, they ironically 
created the perfect conditions for small scale conflict by muzzling major powers’ ability 
to fully engage in conflict mitigation between states on the global periphery.  Rauchhaus 
(2009) agreed, noting that in asymmetrical nuclear relationships, the chances of military 
conflict increases while symmetrical nuclear relationships decrease conflict.  Horowitz 
(2009) noted that a state’s experience with nuclear weapons affects the likelihood of MID 
initiation.  New nuclear states are more willing to leverage their nuclear weapons in a 
dispute.  They are more likely to reciprocate a MID, but as the state matures, this 
reciprocity happens less frequently suggesting that states learn how to reconcile 
challenges and nuclear weapon possession. 
Not all scholars agree that nuclear weapons increase conflict.  Some argue nuclear 
weapons have a cooling effect, shifting demands and limiting risks associated with 
military aggression as states avoid escalation, the essence of deterrence theory and the 
nuclear taboo (Gaddis 1986; Jervis 1989b; T. V. Paul 1995; R. Powell 1988, 1990; 
Schelling 2008; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Tannenwald 1999; Waltz 1981, 1990).  Asal 
and Beardsley (2007) and Beardsley and Asal (2009) alleged that not only do nuclear 
weapons have little effect on overall crisis occurrence, but adversaries involved in a crisis 
will show more restraint when the participants possess nuclear weapons.  Gartzke and Jo 
(2009) and Bell and Miller (2015) found no significant relationship either way.  They 
argued that when pre-nuclear conflict is controlled, nuclear dyads are not significantly 
more or less likely to fight wars, or more or less likely to initiate lower levels of conflict.  
Bell and Miller qualified their conclusion by noting that expanded global interests that 
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invariably come with being a nuclear-armed state increases the likelihood of initiating a 
dispute against new, non-nuclear, adversaries. 
Some scholars have sought to understand how conventional weapons affect the 
probability a state will initiate a MID, with direct applications to the research at hand.  
Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann (2016) showed that remotely piloted aircraft (aka drones 
or RPAs) “lower the cost of using force by eliminating the risk that pilots will be killed, 
making some states – especially democracies, which may be especially casualty sensitive 
– more likely to carry out targeted attacks against suspected militants.” (9)  However, 
they noted that aside from specific utility as a counterterror weapon or means of 
authoritarian control, RPAs do not significantly influence interstate relations.  Fordham 
(2004) empirically demonstrated that military capabilities influence the decision to use 
force in ways which may predispose a state to use force.  Fordham showed weapons that 
provide advanced military capabilities can offer the decision maker a greater number of 
military options.  He tested this concept by examining American military expenditures 
with incidents in which the United States used force.  He affirmed evidence supporting 
the argument that increases in military capability may make the United States more likely 
to use force.  Other researchers have argued that offensive maneuver strategies, rather 
than specific capabilities, are the primary drivers for initiating a militarized dispute; the 
weapons themselves are secondary (Mearsheimer 1983; Reiter 1999). 
Finally, Mettler and Reiter (2013) examined the relationship between ballistic 
missile proliferation and interstate conflict.  The question of whether ballistic missiles 
increase the prospect of conflict directly informs the question of whether cruise missiles 
influence state behavior.  Mettler and Reiter empirically demonstrated that states armed 
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with ballistic missiles are 266 percent more likely to initiate crisis than those without.  
However, when nuclear weapons are included in a state’s force structure, the opposite is 
true.  States armed with both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are less likely to be 
involved in conflict.   
This discussion reviewed the existing literature applicable to this research’s 
dependent variable, the initiation of military force.  The literature informs what we think 
about reasons states initiate militarized disputes.  In sum, states threaten and use force to 
achieve their political goals depending on regime type and age, wealth, alliances, 
territorial contiguity, revisionism, and the influence of arms transfers and weapons.  
Scholars such as Mettler and Reiter (2013) and Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann (2016) 
have tested the effects of particular weapons on the initiation of militarized disputes, yet 
few have ventured beyond the nuclear discussion to perform a systematic investigation of 
other weapon systems’ effects on conflict.  In the next section, I examine the current 
literature that helps us understand the threat posed by cruise missiles. 
 
The Cruise Missile Literature 
My research adds to the MID initiation body of literature by providing a 
pioneering empirical mixed method test of the cruise missile’s effect on the initiation of 
military force and crises.  The existing relevant scholarship on cruise missiles peaked in 
the 1990s as improved navigational systems, such as satellite navigation, and the 
paradigm of a revolution in military affairs, transformed the way technology was 
perceived to influence foreign affairs (Butfoy 2006; Fortmann and Von Hlatky 2009; P. 
M. Morgan 2000; Murray 1997; O’Hanlon 1998).  Prior to these critical technological 
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developments, this genre of scholarship focused on nuclear weapons, under the 
assumption that conventional weapons posed a relatively minor threat to international 
stability given the bi-polar nature of the Cold War (Carus 1992).   
By the early 1970s, advancements in engine miniaturization, microprocessors, and 
precision autonomous navigation made non-nuclear, long range, cruise missiles possible, 
driving debate about the use, purpose, and consequences of the weapon (Baker 1981; 
Betts 1982; Getler 1980; Huisken 1980; Pfaltzgraff and Davis 1977a, 1977b; Sperling 
1977; Vershbow 1976).  By the 1980s, nuclear cruise missiles largely drove policy 
discussion and arms negotiation between the Soviet Union and the United States (Mustin 
1988).14  The focus changed from nuclear to conventional roles following the well-
publicized display of conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles in the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War.  New missions for cruise missiles were imagined throughout the literature as 
scholars began to explore cruise missiles from different perspectives while more states 
pursued novel, high technology, weapons to fill defense gaps and counter great power 
asymmetric military advantages.  I illustrate the spike in cruise missile literature lasting 
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s in Figure 2.1. 
 As cruise missiles advanced technologically in the 1970s, the need to understand 
their place in national strategy and politics became evident.  Betts (1981, 1982) provided 
the most significant early contributions to this literature by chronicling the role for cruise 
missiles in American national security.  In his edited volume, and later single work, Betts 
carved out an influential niche for the operational possibilities presented by the cruise 
                                                 
14 The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) which banned a 
whole class of nuclear weapons, including American ground launched cruise missiles, 
was one product of these negotiations. 
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missile, albeit with a Cold War nuclear focus, by chronicling a foundation for the way 
future scholars and policy makers would think about cruise missiles. Betts acknowledged 
the primacy of the missile’s Cold War nuclear mission, but predicted that emerging 
technologies would improve accuracy and open the door for more useful conventional 
roles.  By the mid-1980s, military thinkers such as Huisken (1980, 1981) Werrell (1985) 
and Warrell (1989) traced the cruise missile’s lineage, writing definitive accounts of the 
cruise missile’s development and production challenges. However, they tended to 
overlook the possibility of use beyond the nuclear mission, due to limited technology 
available for long-range precision targeting at the time.   
Figure 2. 1 Cruise Missile Publication Volume, 1940-2008 
 
 
Note:  This Google Ngram viewer output depicts the incidence of cruise missile-related 
publications from 1940 to 2008 as a percentage of Google Incorporated’s optical 
character recognition-scanned text corpora (Michel et al. 2011). 
 
Carus (1990, 1992) built on Betts’ (1981) work after a decade of cruise missile 
development, production, and growing proliferation.  Carus (1992) identified growing 
danger in cruise missile proliferation warning, “It now seems inevitable that Third World 
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·- ·- ·- ·- ·- ·- ·- ·- ·- ·- ·- - - - 
- 
( \ 
I 
I \ 
I \ 
I \ - 
I 
I 
/ ' 
51 
 
noted that as technology matured, it became more accessible to a wider range of states 
seeking to augment their military capabilities with relatively inexpensive systems.  This 
was also a concern expressed only a few years earlier by the U.S. House of 
Representatives Armed Services Committee (Committee on Armed Services 1989).  
These entrepreneurial states were discovering inventive ways to field their cruise 
missiles, such as using them as coastal defense weapons, and as chemical and biological 
weapon delivery systems (Kiziah 2003; Mahnken 2005).   
 Echoing Carus’s (1990) concerns, Arnett (1991) warned that cruise missiles posed 
a threat to the international community beyond unconventional uses.  By far the most 
common cruise missiles are sea-launched anti-ship missiles.  Arnett was the first to 
specifically focus on understanding the role of sea-launched cruise missiles on the 
modern battlefield, although still in a Cold War, nuclear context.  He contended that not 
only do these weapons pose a formidable threat to capital ships, but their small size and 
portability make them perfect weapons to conceal aboard ship and to use against coastal 
targets. Arnett corroborated earlier work by Mustin (1988) and Lempert (1989) on the 
dangers of surprise sea-based cruise missile attack.  Arnett presaged work by Vick, 
Moore, Pirnie, and Stillion (2001), Vickers and Martinage (2004) and Koh (2016) on the 
challenges cruise missiles present, even to advanced air forces, such as difficulty in 
detection, speed, and maneuverability. 
 The decades surrounding the turn of the millennium ushered a renaissance in 
cruise missile thought.  Scholars tackled tough issues such as satellite navigation and 
cruise missile proliferation (Lachow 1994, 1995), proliferation in the Third World (J. T. 
Bowen 1997; Gormley and McMahon 1995; E. R. Jones 1997; Story 1995), new uses for 
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cruise missiles as a means of coercion (Brigety II 2007; Sparks 1997), and the growing 
concern over the effects of conventional cruise missiles on global military operations 
(Gormley 1998; Stillion and Orletsky 1999).   
As the specter of superpower confrontation diminished, and the global security 
focus shifted to terrorism and regional confrontation, so too did the cruise missile 
literature.  Thinkers such as Nicholls (2000), Kan (2000), Gormley (2002, 2003a, 2003b), 
Heidenrich and Murray III (2004), Mahnken (2005), and Heidenrich (2006) began to 
question the modern strategic and technical implications of cruise missiles in the 21st 
Century.  They collectively argued that, while the world focuses on weapons of mass 
destruction and ballistic missiles, regional powers such as China and “rogue” states such 
as North Korea quietly continued to develop cruise missile capabilities.  A prime 
motivator to advance this technological edge is to counter what they perceive as an 
American defensive blind spot in cruise missile warfare, while proliferating those 
capabilities to their allies and friends.15  Outside the United States, Gruselle (2006) 
examined both the use of cruise missiles between states, and their use among intra-state 
factions requiring alternative options to a conventional air force.  Lacking the means to 
purchase, organize, and equip an air force of their own, these factions believe that 
purchasing and fielding late model cruise missiles helps boost not only their military 
power, but credibility and prestige as well. 
                                                 
15 The U.S. failed to demonstrate competence in defending against even the most 
rudimentary cruise missiles in the 2003 Iraq War.  On one occasion, the U.S. even shot 
down one of its own aircraft by mistake, thinking it was a cruise missile attack (Gormley, 
Erickson, and Yuan 2014) 
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As the danger posed by conventional cruise missiles became more apparent, the 
literature shifted focus from apprehension over evolving threats, to concern over how to 
control ever-advancing and spreading technology.  Kueter and Kleinberg (2007) surveyed 
advancements in cruise missile technology, warning that the historical barrier to entry – 
expensive and sophisticated precision navigation – is fleeting.  They argued the United 
States must develop the ability to better track and intercept cruise missiles, a capability 
lacking in the 1991 Iraq War.  Echoing the warnings of sea-launched attacks predicted by 
Arnett (1991), they urged the United States to create robust consequence management 
strategies for cruise missile attacks on American soil.   
Gormley’s (1998, 2002, 2008c, 2008b, 2009, 2013; 2014) voluminous work built 
on these themes, having written extensively on the security challenges posed by cruise 
missile proliferation and the political, social, and technical requirements required to 
obtain and maintain a successful and lethal cruise missile program.  He warned of a 
tipping point in which the threat posed by advanced cruise missiles will exceed that of 
ballistic missiles, which command more of the world’s anti-proliferation efforts.  
Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan (2014) cautioned that in their efforts to impose dominance 
over the South China Sea, China raises the potential to destabilize the region by 
augmenting its formidable ballistic missile capability with advanced cruise missiles.  This 
strategy would not only boost Chinese A2/AD capabilities, but counter increasingly 
sophisticated American anti-ballistic missile systems.  Mishra (2011) agreed with these 
assessments, arguing cruise missiles are the under-acknowledged weapon of the future. 
Their evolution and proliferation deserve greater attention. 
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In addition to the scholarly work relating to cruise missile issues, the United 
States has called for studies to capture the danger posed by their spread.  Aside from the 
National Air and Space Intelligence Center’s regularly published annual missile threat 
analysis which chronicles current cruise and ballistic missiles, their capabilities, and 
countries of origin (e.g. Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee 2017), 
the United States Congress holds occasional hearings on cruise missile threats and 
defense.  These hearings echo concerns about cruise missile proliferation, covert 
programs, and the clandestine delivery of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
(Committee on Armed Services 1989; Committee on Governmental Affairs 2002; U.S. 
General Accounting Office 2000).  Additionally, the United States commissions special 
reports on missile threats that examine specific areas of concern such as China’s growing 
cruise missile program (Kan 2000).  In military service schools, senior officers 
occasionally write theses on the general threat posed by cruise missiles, stressing the need 
for defense systems (Tissue et al. 2003), the danger posed by proliferation among poorer 
countries (J. T. Bowen 1997), and the implication for allied operations (A. T. Jones 
2014).  The 2018 United States’ National Security Strategy (Mattis 2018b, 2–3) echoes 
these concerns, warning,  
Both revisionist powers and rogue regimes are competing across all 
dimensions of power. They have increased efforts short of armed conflict 
by expanding coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty, 
exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines between civil and 
military goals.  Challenges to the U.S. military advantage represent 
another shift in the global security environment. For decades the United 
States has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating 
domain.  We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble 
them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every domain 
is contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. 
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The body of literature that examines cruise missiles and their effect on armed 
conflict focuses on the abstract perception that their proliferation and capabilities present 
a military threat.  The advantages and capabilities offered by cruise missiles to the 
modern battlefield are significant.  They are a tool with which states may decide to use 
military alternatives in situations that do not reach the level of full scale warfare; for 
example, they may be deployed in situations in which a state attempts to coerce an 
adversary into changing its behavior (Kartha 1998b, 1998a; Tanks 2000).  As more states 
seek to offset adversarial military power by supplementing their defense capabilities with 
cruise missiles, the need to understand the effects cruise missiles have on international 
conflict will become more pressing.  Although the literature has matured from a Cold 
War perspective to highlighting concerns over proliferation and use among peripheral 
states and the global south, the literature is missing a systematic empirical analysis to 
demonstrate that states with cruise missiles indeed pose a statistically significant 
probability of initiating conflict.  This research into the nature of that relationship fills the 
gap by qualitatively and quantitatively performing an empirical test of the relationship 
between the possession of cruise missiles and the use of military options to coerce 
adversaries.   
 
Coercion as a Theoretical Framework   
The preceding discussion of MID initiation demonstrated that are multiple known 
factors correlated with a state’s decision to initiate military force.  States have a variety of 
means at their disposal to pursue their policy objectives, but some state characteristics 
correlate with an increased propensity to threaten, display, or use military force to 
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achieve these objectives.  Cruise missile literature demonstrates that states in possession 
of these weapons have greater military options available to them.  In the pursuit of these 
options, weaker states have aggressively sought to acquire cruise missiles over the last 
several decades (J. T. Bowen 1997; Committee on Armed Services 1989; Heidenrich 
2006).  One reason for this is that initiating military force against a rival state imposes 
real and potential costs on the challenger, one of which is uncontrolled escalation.   
Here, I borrow from the concept of coercive diplomacy to provide a theoretical 
framework to bridge these two literatures.  Coercive diplomacy explains why states may 
use limited force to achieve their foreign policy objectives.  Alexander George (1991) 
defined coercive diplomacy as, "efforts to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an 
action he is already embarked upon," (5) or a, "defensive strategy that is employed to deal 
with the efforts of an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor." (6)  
This strategy may require the use of military threats to persuade the adversary that the 
state is willing and likely to use violence if its demands are not met, even if those threats 
carry the risk of escalation (Slantchev 2011).  Some situations require going beyond 
threats to what George (1991) called, “exemplary” uses of force.  This type of force is 
typically limited in scope, consisting of only the minimum necessary, at the lowest cost, 
to persuade the adversary to concede the desired political ends (R. E. Osgood 1957, 
1979).  Blechman and Kaplan (1978) noted that since World War II, states have 
increasingly used limited force as an instrument of foreign policy.  When faced with a 
situation where diplomacy is not producing the desired results, limited force as part of a 
strategy of coercive diplomacy may be used to obtain concessions from an adversary with 
little or no use of military force.  Cruise missiles provide a qualitatively different 
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capability that enables a state to use small amounts of force, yet still operate in the 
coercive domain.  However, isolating a single weapon’s effect on state behavior presents 
a research challenge (Van Creveld 1991).  Causality is opaque.   
I do not propose such a bold assertion that cruise missiles alone “cause” a state to 
initiate conflict, much less full-scale war.  Rather, the relationship is one of probability.16  
Making sense of the association in question here requires a theoretical framework to 
provide structure, independent from firsthand experience, upon which we can 
conceptualize the phenomenon at work (Abend 2008).  Kilbourn (2006) noted, 
“interpretations are always filtered through one or more lenses or theoretical perspectives 
that we have for ‘seeing’; reality is not something that we find under a rock.” (545)  For 
this framework, I draw primarily on the coercive theories of George (1991), George, 
Hall, and Simons (1971), Schelling (1956, 1960, 1967, 2008), and Snyder and Diesing 
(1977) to construct a theoretical framework as the lens through which to interpret the 
results of the hypothesis testing in subsequent chapters.   
Coercion relies on the threat of force to compel an adversary into complying with 
one’s demands.  Schelling (2008) instructed us that, “The power to hurt is bargaining 
power.  To exploit it is diplomacy – vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.” (2)  In response 
to what he characterized as theoretical shortcoming in deterrence theory, Schelling 
introduced the concept of compellence between states.  He shifted the initiative for action 
from the deterred adversary to the coercive state in search of target state concessions or a 
change in behavior (Schelling 1956, 1960).  Whereas deterrence seeks to prevent an 
                                                 
16 For more on the different types of causal arguments in the social sciences see Gerring 
(2010, 2012; 2005), Adcock (2007), Goertz and Starr (2002), Spohn (1983) Spirtes, 
Glymour, and Scheines (1991), and Imbens and Rubin (2015). 
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action before its occurrence, compellence is active and seeks to induce an action on the 
part of the target state (Freedman 1998; Schelling 1960).  George, Hall, and Simmons 
(1971) framed deterrence as the first stop on a spectrum of coercive crisis management 
that culminates with persuading an opponent to stop or reverse an action.   
Coercion uses a latent threat of violence to exploit an adversary’s fears and may 
consist of punishment for transgressions or denial of future objectives.  Snyder (1959, 
1961) parsed out the deterrent nature of compellence by drawing distinctions between 
deterrence by punishment or denial.  Punishment acts on an adversary’s possible costs for 
taking an action.  Conversely, denial works by influencing the adversary’s calculations of 
the probability they will achieve their objectives should they act.  Either way, “deterrence 
means discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect 
of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain." (Snyder 1961, 3).   
George, Hall, and Simons (1971) added clarity by introducing coercive 
diplomacy, an instrument of statecraft that integrates, "threats, persuasion, positive 
inducements, and accommodation" (Levy 2008, 539) to be integrated into an overall 
bargaining strategy as an alternative to war or other military solutions to problems.  
Coercive diplomacy’s central task is, "to create in the opponent the expectation of costs 
of sufficient magnitude to erode his motivation to continue what he is doing." (George 
1991, 11)  A coercive diplomatic strategy combines threats and possibly incremental – 
though limited – use of force to convey enough resolve to persuade the adversary to 
comply with demands or negotiate favorable settlements.  At the same time, the strategy 
restricts overall political and material costs to the minimum required to maintain political 
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acceptance.  Coercive devices include ultimatums, tacit ultimatums, try and see 
approaches, and what George (1991) termed, a gradual turning of the screw.   
As Schelling (1966) defined coercion in terms of deterrence and compellence, 
George (1991) identified two forms of coercion, coercive diplomacy and coercive threats.  
Coercive diplomacy includes positive inducements and diplomacy, while coercive threats 
include offensive and defensive uses of violence (e.g. military and/or economic 
punishment).  In this way, the use and intensity of force escalates over time, raising the 
cost of non-compliance.  On its face, this strategy results in a restrained pace, with the 
rhythm of hostilities being set more by diplomacy than battle.  Pape (1996) underscored 
the limited and cost averse nature of coercion noting, “military coercion attempts to 
achieve political goals ‘on the cheap.” (13). 
Using coercive diplomacy as a framework helps us understand why states may 
resort to threats, displays, and uses of force in situations where they are trying to 
persuade an adversary to change or reverse a course of action.  Advanced cruise missiles 
provide many capabilities, such as precision targeting, penetration, and range.  These 
capabilities enable cruise missiles to be used in situations in which larger weapons or 
manned missions would otherwise be impractical to initiate limited force or limit 
escalation, possibly making their use attractive and therefore more likely.  For example, 
in most cases where the United States used cruise missiles since the early 1990s, the use 
of higher profile weapons, such as ballistic missiles would have likely brought 
international scorn and possibly escalated a situation, compared to the relative ease and 
low cost of using cruise missiles to achieve non-critical foreign policy objectives (Tanks 
2000).  As Byman and Waxman (1999) note, “cruise missile attacks, which promise 
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extreme accuracy, have increasingly become the option of first resort when coercive 
force is deemed necessary.” (110)   
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
As I have illustrated thus far, a rich literature links a state’s characteristics (e.g. 
regime type, wealth, territorial contiguity, nuclear weapons) with a state’s propensity to 
use force.  This literature suggests that the use of force is more likely when the risk of 
escalation and political costs are low and its use is supported by domestic audiences.  
Cruise missile literature tells us that advanced capabilities, such as speed, stealth, and 
precision, make these weapons a formidable tool both for great powers and for peripheral 
states seeking to modernize or supplement their military capabilities.  Assuming the 
alternative military solution to a high stakes dispute is costly and that states prefer peace, 
cruise missiles provide a low-cost coercive option throughout the spectrum of conflict 
ranging from threats, to simple one-off strikes, to part of a comprehensive military 
strategy in larger operations.  Finally, coercion theory tells us that the optimal way to use 
force in situations short of war is through limited strikes that supplement diplomatic 
efforts, maximize coercive potential and credibility, and yet minimize political and 
material costs.  Echoing Pape (1996), cruise missiles provide a “cheap” yet credible 
means for a state to pursue its objectives abroad.  They do so using a minimum amount of 
force, commitment, and risk of escalation to alter or reverse an adversary’s undesirable 
course of action or aggressive foreign policies.  In the following section, I use coercive 
diplomacy as a framework to explain why cruise missile possession increases the 
likelihood a state will use military force.  Where appropriate, I use small examples to 
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illustrate.  The section concludes by offering three hypotheses to test this theory’s 
efficacy.   
Preemptive Attacks 
Using Byman and Waxman’s (2002) typology of coercive mechanisms against 
which airpower may be used (direct pressure, denial, weakening, and political 
destabilization) we understand cruise missiles have utility across multiple coercive 
applications.  Cruise missiles provide the possibility of successful, if not always effective, 
preemptive attack, making cruise missiles the first strike weapon of choice in regions 
where the threshold for use may be much lower, and the potential to pull greater powers 
into conflict is much greater (Gormley 2008b).  To illustrate, suppose State A, the 
initiator, observes State B, the defender, preparing to attack State A’s ally, State C.  State 
A would be obligated to come to State C’s aid should hostilities commence between 
States B and C.  State A has attempted diplomatic solutions to the escalating crisis, but to 
no avail.  So, with the intention of deescalating the crisis and avoid the obligation of 
entering a politically unpopular full-scale conflict, State A preemptively attacks key 
limited targets in State B with the intention of forcing State B to back down or concede.  
State A has now demonstrated to State B that it is willing to act to support its ally, while 
avoiding the commitments required of a more overt action.   
Political Resolve 
Cruise missiles provide a means to inflict limited punishment for transgressions in 
anticipation that the punishment will exceed the adversary’s perceived benefits of 
repeated undesirable behavior (Douhet 1983; Pape 1996; Schelling 1960, 1967).  Cruise 
missiles may be used to signal political resolve while weakening an adversary’s ability to 
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pursue undesirable policies.   In this case, State A observes or is the victim of State B’s 
undesirable behavior, which is contrary to State A’s foreign policy objectives.  State A 
does not wish to become entangled in a protracted and possibly escalatory conflict with 
State B, but must punish State B for its actions or risk losing credibility among the 
international community.  So, State A decides to initiate a limited cruise missile attack on 
State B in response to the transgression, effectively punishing State B to deter future 
behavior.   
Assuming states learn from their past interactions with other states (i.e. Fearon 
1995; M. Horowitz 2009), a state using cruise missiles to demonstrate resolve may enjoy 
the appearance of resolution in the short term, but the effect may me fleeting.  Over time, 
the repeated use of cruise missiles as a means of signaling resolve could have the 
opposite effect.  Instead of signaling that the issue is of high consequence or import for 
the initiating state, repeated use of cruise missiles as a low-cost alternative to resolving 
the conflict may signal to the target state that the overall dispute is, in truth, not worth a 
larger expenditure of blood and treasure.  In this case, the target state would have less 
incentive over time to alter its behavior. 
History is replete with examples.  For instance, the 1998 cruise missile attack on 
terrorist targets in Sudan and Afghanistan were launched in response to the Al-Qaeda 
bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.  Similar attacks took place on 
multiple occasions against Iraq for violations of United Nation resolutions in the 1990s 
and again against Iraq as part of an opening salvo of a larger operation at the onset of the 
2003 Iraq war.  In 2017 and 2018, the Syrian regime was accused of using chemical 
weapons against its own people, drawing international condemnation.  On both 
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occasions, the United States used cruise missiles to punish the regime’s use of chemical 
weapons and to weaken the regime’s ability to do so again.  By using cruise missiles, the 
United States and its allies were able to send a credible message of commitment to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention without becoming entangled in the ongoing Syrian Civil 
War. 
Coercive Denial 
Cruise missiles may also be used as part of a greater denial strategy to coerce the 
enemy into believing they have no path to successfully pursue their objective(s).  Such a 
strategy may seek to leverage an adversary’s strategic vulnerabilities (Belkin et al. 2002; 
K. Mueller 1998; Pape 1996).  They also provide a means to prevent stronger states from 
encroaching, or even attacking, an area of interest or a country’s borders.  Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) is a defense strategy by which a state invests in relatively 
short-range weapons, such as cruise and ballistic missiles, capable of denying an 
adversary’s access to key strategic regions or areas.  Cruise missiles may be used in a 
greater A2/AD strategy to threaten competing states in a case where State A wishes to 
expand its sphere of influence among its neighbors, but State B has conflicting economic 
interests in the region.  To coerce State B’s acquiescence, State A threatens State B 
through the installation and testing of anti-ship cruise missiles in key strategic points in 
the disputed region.  State B must now either alter its preferred strategy to counter State 
A’s actions, resulting in less than optimal courses of action, or take no action at all.  In 
practice, land attack cruise missiles are capable of smashing key enemy targets and 
eliminating air defenses while anti-ship cruise missiles may be used in a broader A2/AD 
strategy.  China appears to have adopted this type of A2/AD strategy in the contentious 
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South China Sea; they use cruise missiles developed over the last 30 years to supplement 
their ballistic missile defenses which are otherwise vulnerable to the sea-based anti-
ballistic missile systems commonly deployed by the United States and Japan (Easton 
2009; Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan 2014).  In Chapter Four, I illustrate how Argentina 
attempted to use cruise missiles in the 1982 Falklands Conflict to disrupt the United 
Kingdom’s naval strategy to retake the islands following the Argentine incursion. 
Destabilization 
Cruise missiles may be a vehicle to coerce political destabilization in adversary 
nations.  In this scenario, State A desires regime change in State B, but does not have 
either the means or political support to change State B’s government through invasion 
(e.g. the 2003 Iraq War) and diplomacy alone is not producing results.  State A can 
instead capitalize on State B’s internal unrest by supporting resistance movements in 
State B using cruise missiles to degrade the State B regime’s ability to suppress dissent.  
This course of action could be justified under the auspices of humanitarian protection or 
regional interest.  Either way, State A’s limited use of force can tip the scales in favor of 
a preferred outcome.  The 2011 Libyan Civil War provides an example of cruise missiles’ 
utility as a means of political destabilization.  In 2011, as part of a wider regional 
uprising, Libya found itself in a civil war.  To both protect non-combatants and tacitly 
destabilize the Libyan regime, the United States and its allies launched Operation 
Odyssey Dawn (Goodman 2012).  Although a combined arms effort that included 
manned aircraft, cruise missiles were used heavily in the early days of bombing to clear 
the way for allied aircraft incursions while explicitly keeping the overall American 
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military commitment to a minimum as required by the United States Congress (Boehner 
2011; Macmanus and King 2011).   
Signaling 
When used as a signaling tool, cruise missiles demonstrate capability in the face 
of an adversary and may help satisfy need for action in the mind of the domestic audience 
(Fearon 1994b, 1994a).  For example, State A wishes to hedge against decline or 
demonstrate emerging power.  So, State A overtly attempts to signal to the world that 
they are strong and in possession of advanced weapon capabilities by firing volleys of 
cruise missiles off their coast or near contested waters.  Alternatively, State A may join 
an ongoing dispute in State B, using limited cruise missile strikes as a means of 
demonstrating their capability.  Russia’s use of cruise missiles in the Syrian Civil War 
(2011 -), ostensibly against Islamic State positions with no real defense against more 
traditional means of bombardment, signals their military’s growing technological 
sophistication vis-à-vis the Kalibr cruise missile.  Russia’s eagerness to allow foreign 
journalists to observe these missiles launching from submarines and naval ships, as 
Russia supports its allies in the Syrian government, further ensures the strategic message 
is received by would-be challengers and domestic audiences (Associated Press 2017). 
Although each of these coercive mechanisms are possible in theory, the 
mechanism at work in any given situation is contextually dependent.  The particular 
coercive mechanism(s) at work in a given situation could manifest individually, 
sequentially, or in combination.  One would reasonably expect one or some coercive 
mechanisms to manifest in practice more often than others.  For example, Chapter Four 
demonstrates the cruise missile’s high coercive denial utility.  The ease with which a state 
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can emplace cruise missiles for the purposes for an A2/AD strategy is almost without 
equal.  Once the weapon system is established or in place, a cruise missile’s persistence, 
ease of maintenance, and profile make it a good choice in this role.  As I have noted, 
China has implemented this strategy to some effect in the South China Sea.   
The other most likely coercive mechanism involving cruise missiles is as a means 
of signaling resolve.  Cruise missiles have proven their utility for punishing adversaries 
for undesirable behavior while at the same time signaling to the international community 
and domestic audiences a degree of national resolve.  Chapter Five illustrates how cruise 
missiles can be used to signal resolve, showing how likely this mechanism is to manifest 
in a diverse set of situations.  For the United States, resolve generally manifests in the 
form of punishment for transgressions as was the case against Iraq and Al-Qaeda in the 
1990s and more recently in Syria. 
Hypotheses 
Cruise missiles may become attractive tools in a state’s quest to demonstrate 
resolve to the adversary in the face of sunken costs.  Mobilizing forces, or moving troops 
and equipment into territory to signal resolve to adversary and hedge against loss, carries 
costs.  A state may tie its own hands through the gradual increase of sunken costs over 
the course of mobilizing forces to meet the enemy.  Thus restrained, backing down 
becomes less of an option in the face of mounting costs.  Troops and equipment are not 
easily removed, though once in place the cost of their encampment becomes increasingly 
difficult to justify.  The state must use them or lose them, and to lose them is to also lose 
face in front of the enemy.  Increases in sunk costs strengthens the credibility of threats 
made, and fuels the likelihood of a war that neither side wants (Slantchev 2005).  
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Using cruise missiles to threaten, display, or use force may mitigate or defer some 
sunken costs while indicating resolve by avoiding costly mobilization on a greater scale.  
Instead of mobilizing troops, for instance, a state can position a cruise missile-armed 
naval ship off the coast, a tacit threat whose action may deviate little from the ships usual 
mission.  Gunboat diplomacy, in fact, has a long history because it is an efficient way for 
states to punctuate foreign policy.  A ship is relatively easy to install and keep in place 
and relatively easy to remove should the threat pass, unlike deploying large amounts of 
troops that need a base of operations, complicated logistical lines, and local contracts 
(Cable 1981).  Although placing a ship off the adversary’s coast sends a signal of its own, 
it does not necessarily tie the state’s hands in ways that landing troops most certainly 
would.  Once in place, launching cruise missiles from that ship sends a powerful message 
– helping maintain the state’s reputation through a more credible indication of resolve – 
and a signal that threats will be backed up with action. 
A state is likely to initiate a MID when it is confident it can pursue policy goals 
through the successful use of military power in a way that limits casualties, commitment, 
and conflict duration (Allen 2007; Byman, Waxman, and Larson 1999; Van Evera 1998). 
We can infer the effects of certain advanced weapon systems on the decision to use 
coercive military strategies.  As explained, modern cruise missiles bring not only a 
powerful first strike capability, but their precision enables the user to maximize coercive 
effects ranging from a threat of force to a large-scale bombing campaign (Michael 
Horowitz and Reiter 2001).  Combining these capabilities with speed, stealth, and 
autonomous guidance, a cruise missile provides the initiating state with the confidence it 
needs to successfully increase pressure through limited attack (Van Evera 1998), swaying 
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the state in favor of using military solutions, particularly in cases where the receiver state 
lacks the ability to retaliate or defend itself.  In this case, deciding to threaten, display, or 
use force may maximize expected policy gains by simultaneously lowering the political 
and material cost of acting.  Conversely, states lacking this capability will be less likely 
to use military power as a means of responding to crisis given similar circumstances and 
political pressures to take action (Huth and Russett 1984).  Accordingly, in terms of the 
correlation between the requirements for using force in coercive situations and the 
capabilities provided by cruise missiles, I expect the data analysis to support the 
following primary hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:  States armed with cruise missiles are more likely than states without 
cruise missiles to initiate military force. 
Hypothesis 2:  States armed with cruise missiles are more likely to initiate crises through 
threats and displays of force than states that do not have cruise missiles. 
The unmanned nature of cruise missiles means their use reduces the risk to 
otherwise physically and politically vulnerable manned weapon systems.  Popular 
support for military conflict in democratic states is typically underscored by a low 
tolerance for casualties in the early stages of conflict and a particular sensitivity to 
military casualties (Gartner 2008a; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gartner, Segura, and 
Wilkening 1997; Larson 1996; J. E. Mueller 1973, 1993).  In contrast, although 
authoritarian regimes may not be held to the same electoral accountability, research is 
divided over whether or not they tend to use military force more than democracies, when 
considering domestic pressures from the selectorate and proximity to rivals (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003; Debs and Goemans 2010; Kim 2017; Sechser 2004; J. L. P. Weeks 
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2012).  Regardless, although audience costs may send a strong signal of the strength of a 
democracy’s threat, some models indicate that military threats carry just as much weight, 
regardless of regime type (Slantchev 2005).  When cruise missiles are concerned, 
democracies may not be the only regime that can benefit from missile strikes as a means 
of coercion. 
 The cruise missile’s ability to minimize collateral damage through precision 
strike, and decreased risk to military personnel, increases its attractiveness in coercive 
situations in which an expedient resolution is called for or to satisfy critical domestic 
audiences and support coalitions.  As fewer military and civilian lives are at risk, the 
unmanned nature of cruise missiles may make using force more politically acceptable 
domestically compared to more overtly dangerous methods such as manned bomber 
missions or troop incursions (Allen and Martinez-Machain 2018a; Brigety II 2007; Burk 
1999; Macdonald and Schneider 2017; J. D. Singer 2009).  Considering the emerging 
research on the catalysts and limitations of democratic and authoritarian use of armed 
force, and considering the capabilities cruise missiles provide, we should expect to 
observe:   
Hypothesis 3:   There is no difference between the probabilities that democratic or 
autocratic states with cruise missiles will use military power to achieve foreign policy 
objectives. 
 I submit that a cruise missile provides the state with a coercive tool that either 
directly, through use, or indirectly, by contributing to a greater strategic goal, increases 
the likelihood the state will resort to an exemplary use of force when executing a coercive 
strategy against an adversary.  Coercive theory provides a framework to understand this 
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logic.  Cruise missiles may not only provide a way to demonstrate resolve without greater 
political commitment, but they can embolden a state to embark on more aggressive 
foreign policies with the knowledge that they possess a weapon that increases the chances 
they may deny an adversary’s response through a greater A2/AD strategy.  Cruise 
missiles provide a low-cost means to punish an adversarial state or non-state actor’s 
transgressions.  In this way, cruise missiles offer a means to compel a change in 
adversarial behavior with little risk and few resources required.  Finally, the cruise 
missile provides a means to threaten or display force to either deter another state’s 
behavior or compel them to comply with an otherwise undesirable foreign policy.   
Unlike higher-profile weapons, such as ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons, 
cruise missiles carry less political or psychological gravitas.  For example, when North 
Korea tests its ballistic missiles, it receives international condemnation.  However, when 
North Korea tests cruise missiles, the reaction is often local, even if the test’s intended 
effect is to coerce a change in South Korean behavior (Michishita 2009; Panda 2017).  
These reasons make the modern, technologically sophisticated, cruise missile an 
attractive option for initiating or supporting a militarized interstate dispute or 
international crisis. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter presented a review of the literature that informs this research 
endeavor.  I began by laying out many of the factors known to be associated with a state’s 
propensity to initiate threats, displays, or force against other states.  Then, I examined the 
small, but important and informative, cruise missile literature.  Since the 1980s, scholars 
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have identified the dangers these weapons pose to international security.  However, these 
literatures do not intersect.  To provide a framework upon which to build such a 
synthesis, I presented coercion theory to understand how a single, qualitatively special, 
type of weapon may increase the likelihood of conflict.  I concluded by proposing a 
theory to explain how cruise missiles have this effect and presented three testable 
hypotheses with which to explore the theory. 
In sum, several correlates are associated with a state’s likelihood of using military 
force against its competitors.  These correlates include regime type, state wealth, major 
power status, alliances, territorial contiguity, revisionism, and nuclear weapons.  
Although this literature is rich with descriptions of the various state characteristics that 
may increase the chances of a state initiating military force, a relatively small amount of 
the literature accounts for influence of conventional weapon systems on state behavior.   
Cruise missiles provide a qualitatively different capability to states.  They reduce 
the costs normally associated with initiating an attack on another state in terms of 
commitment, manpower, and casualties on each side.  In addition, they offer a state an 
effective A2/AD capability that may embolden more aggressive defensive or offensive 
postures.  At lower levels of conflict, coercion theory appears to justify a weapon’s 
ability to provide the motive required to use force.   
 Existing cruise missile literature focuses on their capability and military danger. It 
does not systematically test the threat to international stability.  This dissertation 
constitutes the first systematic attempt to understand the cruise missile’s effect on state 
behavior.  Here, I bridge the MID initiation literature and cruise missile literature by 
applying the way we think about the use of force in coercive situations.  Sorting out the 
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effects of cruise missiles on state behavior still presents a research challenge.  In the next 
chapter, I offer a research design to study the weapon’s effect on conflict initiation using 
an explanatory sequential mixed method approach.  After presenting a research design, I 
test the hypotheses through rigorous data analysis, the results of which I illustrate using 
case studies in later chapters.  Finally, I interpret these results in Chapter Six where I 
demonstrate that indeed, by becoming the go-to weapon of exceptional uses of force, the 
cruise missile does affect state behavior. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 In this chapter I present the research design and quantitative data analysis to test 
hypotheses related to the cruise missile’s effect on state behavior.  I employ an 
explanatory sequential mixed method research design, leveraging original data on state 
cruise missile acquisition and explanatory case studies to illustrate the connection 
between cruise missile possession and the likelihood a state will use military options to 
coerce adversaries.  The advantage of the mixed method approach is that it allows the 
researcher to leverage the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative research to fully 
explore answers to pressing research questions (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; 
Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner 2007; Pelto 2015; Plano Clark and Ivankova 2015).  
To begin, I describe the research design in detail.  I then present the quantitative findings 
of the statistical analyses used to test my hypotheses.  Finally, I interpret these 
quantitative results concluding that empirical evidence indeed supports the hypothesis 
that there is an increased probability a state armed with cruise missiles will initiate 
military force.  In the Chapters Four and Five, I present the second phase of research in 
the form of qualitative explanatory case studies. 
Research into the effect of cruise missiles on state behavior is particularly suited 
to a mixed method design, given the diverse correlates of conflict initiation and the use of 
military force in international disputes.  The advantage is twofold.  Quantitative empirical 
data tests for evidence of a propensity to initiate challenges or militarized interstate 
disputes.  Qualitative case studies then illustrate the story behind how and why cruise 
missiles played a role in the decision to use military force for coercive diplomacy.  The 
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mixed method design brings this research closer to uncovering the ever-elusive 
connective tissue that appears to bind these weapons to state behavior. 
I propose that states armed with cruise missiles are more likely to use military 
options to achieve their foreign policy objectives than are states lacking this capability.  
This thesis suggests that states armed with cruise missiles have an increased likelihood of 
initiating a challenge or a militarized interstate dispute against adversaries.  My research 
builds on work by Mettler and Reiter (2013) and Barkley (2008) on ballistic missiles by 
examining a weapon that is becoming more conspicuous on the world stage through its 
increasingly frequent use as a means to coerce adversaries into changing their behavior.  
Using quantitative analysis in this first phase of the mixed methods research design, I 
uncover evidence that cruise missiles significantly increase the probability a state will 
initiate a militarized interstate dispute.  This finding supports the first hypothesis – 
advanced in Chapter Two – that states armed with cruise missiles are more likely to 
exercise military force to coerce their adversaries than states that do not have cruise 
missiles.  The empirical tests also support Hypothesis 2.  I find a significant positive 
relationship between cruise missile possession and the likelihood of engaging in conflict 
at violence and hostility levels below that of full-scale warfare, specifically threats and 
displays of force.  Finally, as postulated by Hypothesis 3, I observe no significant 
difference between the behavior of autocratic or democratic states when either regime 
type possesses cruise missiles.   
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Research Design 
Attributing the effect of any one military weapon system on state behavior 
presents a research challenge.  On its face, one may simply perform a statistical data 
analysis to test the relationship between those states in possession of cruise missiles and 
the initiation of force.  This method is relatively straightforward but lacks a degree of 
fidelity to explain the nature of the relationship.  For the latter, a more comprehensive 
approach is needed.  To confront the problem, this project uses an explanatory sequential 
mixed method design spanning three phases of research that leverage quantitative 
statistics and qualitative case studies (Igo, Kiewra, and Bruning 2008; Ivankova, 
Creswell, and Stick 2006).  Plano Clark and Ivankova (2015) defined mixed methods 
research as, “a process of research in which researchers integrate quantitative and 
qualitative methods of data collection and analysis to best understand a research purpose” 
(4).  A mixed method design involves procedures for collecting, analyzing, and 
integrating both quantitative and qualitative strands of research under the rationale that 
neither strand alone is sufficient for capturing the essence and details of a particular 
research situation (Creswell 2002; Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick 2006; Tashakkori and 
Teddlie 2010).  The advantage of using a mixed method design is that it helps the 
researcher locate stronger evidence for conclusions by leveraging the strengths and 
weaknesses of each strand of research (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004).   
This ex post facto research relies on past events as empirical evidence with the 
understanding the relationships between the variables exist in situ by focusing on existing 
conflict data sets and historical case studies (Kerlinger 1973).  Using an explanatory 
sequential mixed method design, relationships between variables may first be tested by a 
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statistical large-N analysis of panel data.  Then, the large-N investigation is followed by 
small-N case studies of typical examples selected from within the quantitative data set 
that represent successful model predictions of the dependent variable.  This method of 
case selection connects the two strands of research and allows the qualitative strand to 
build upon the quantitative strand’s conclusions (Creswell et al. 2003; Fetters, Curry, and 
Creswell 2013; Lieberman 2005).  Finally, I integrate the quantitative and qualitative 
strands through joint interpretation, using the strengths and weaknesses of each method to 
establish more robust conclusions. 
A method that integrates different approaches is particularly well-suited for this 
project.  While quantitative empirics may provide evidence for the effect of cruise 
missiles on state behavior, this type of data is not explanatory.  To adequately explore 
why an event occurs, a qualitative strand of case study research is needed to uncover the 
causal mechanisms behind the results (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Falleti and Lynch 
2009).  The qualitative strand of research augments the quantitative strand’s weakness in 
explaining how the phenomena operate.  The quantitative strand provides the 
generalizability otherwise lacking in contextually-dependent qualitative case studies 
(Plano Clark and Ivankova 2015).  Each strand of research expands on the other to 
increase the inquiry’s scope so that each component – qualitative and quantitative – is 
used for a specific task (Greene, Caracelli, and Graham 1989).  I operationalize this 
concept by dividing this project’s research effort into a quantitative phase, a qualitative 
phase, and an integrative phase. 
The use of the explanatory sequential mixed method design is well established in 
the mixed method literature (e.g. Creswell 2014; Creswell et al. 2003; Ivankova, 
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Creswell, and Stick 2006; Tashakkori and Teddlie 2010).  Political scientists routinely 
employ the explanatory sequential mixed method design with great success and impact 
(e.g. Blattman 2009; Evertsson 2017; Feaver and Gelpi 2011; Ide 2016; Lieber 2005; 
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994; Steele 2011; Wilkinson 2004).  This type of design 
consists of two straightforward phases of data collection and analysis followed by a third 
phase of integration and synthesis of the findings.  In the first phase, the researcher 
collects and analyzes quantitative data.  This phase is often used to test a theory or 
concept, but because quantitative tests focus more on correlation than causal illustration, 
they generally lack the ability to explain or explore the results in depth (Braumoeller and 
Sartori 2004; Creswell 2008).  The second phase of an explanatory sequential design 
builds on the first phase by collecting and analyzing qualitative data to help explain and 
elaborate on the results from the first phase (Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick 2006).  
Finally, the third phase of the design consists of a concluding integration, synthesis, and 
interpretation of the conclusions from the quantitative and qualitative phases.  For this 
research, I use all three phases of the explanatory sequential design as illustrated in 
Figure 3.1.    
78 
 
Figure 3. 1 Explanatory Sequential Mixed Method Research Design for Studying the 
Effect of Cruise Missiles on State Behavior 
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Phase I 
The purpose of the quantitative analysis phase is to test the research hypotheses 
and to identify exemplar cases for qualitative examination in Phase II.  As the main thrust 
of this research, I evaluate the quantitative empirical support for the effect of cruise 
missiles on state behavior using probit and logit models, employing two different datasets 
to evaluate conflict behavior, using the directed dyad-year at the state level as the unit of 
analysis.  A directed dyad is one in which a pair of states, A and B in a particular year, 
generate two cases for each year:  one dyad covers action from A directed toward B; 
while the other case includes actions from B directed toward A.  In each case, for 
purposes of analysis here, the first state is the potential challenger or initiator state 
(referred to as “State A” in result discussions) and the second state is the defender 
(referred to as “State B” in result discussions).  The use of a directed dyad-year makes it 
possible to take advantage of multiple levels of analysis using control variables not 
possible in higher-level aggregation of data (i.e. the system year).  The directed dyad also 
helps to isolate the conflict initiator and has the advantage of a larger number of control 
variables than can be included in monadic studies (D. S. Bennett and Stam 2000b).17   
                                                 
17 For example, Reiter and Stam (2003) used the directed dyad to clarify Peceny, Beer, 
and Sanchez-Terry’s (2002) work on democracy and non-democracy militarized 
interstate dispute (MID) initiation.  Though Peceny et al. found a relationship between 
divergent regime types and MID initiation, they did not support their argument that 
democracies were more likely to challenge with empirical evidence.  Reiter and Stam 
clarified the relationship, using the directed dyad, to find personalist dictatorships are 
more likely to challenge democracies.  Reiter and Stam’s results were empirical, whereas 
Peceny et al. argued democracies have the greater propensity to initiate MIDs based on 
prior theoretical justification. 
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I test the first and third hypotheses using dyadic International Crisis Behavior 
(ICB) data (Brecher et al. 2017) provided by Mettler and Reiter (2013).  I then compare 
those results with results from a parallel analysis using data from the Militarized 
Interstate Dispute (MID) data set, version 4  (Palmer et al. 2015).  Data set observations 
ranging between the years of 1946 and 2007 establish both initiation rate and likelihood 
of cruise missile-equipped states initiating conflict as opposed to non-equipped states.18  
The advantage of taking a large-N approach that examines all states in the international 
system across a large period of relevant time is that it systematically isolates the effect of 
acquiring cruise missiles on the intensity and frequency of conflict initiation (D. S. 
Bennett and Stam 2000b).  This method does so by observing state behavior both before 
cruise missile acquisition and after cruise missile acquisition as compared to those states 
without cruise missile, but with similar covariates.  Including all dyadic relationships 
between 1946 and 2007 minimizes selection bias when estimating the effect of cruise 
missile possession on state behavior.   
Phase II 
In the second phase, I build on the statistical analysis with explanatory case 
studies derived from the statistical sample to examine the circumstances behind the use of 
military coercion (Lieberman 2005; Morse 1991).  George and Bennett (2005) defined 
the case study approach as, “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode 
                                                 
18 Statistical software limits analysis to include only those observations for which each 
variable has a complete set of observations.  Thus, if an analysis contains 5 variables with 
complete observations ranging from the years 1946 to 2015, but one variable which 
terminates it observations in 2007, the entire analysis will drop those observations from 
2008 to 2015.  Due to limitations in the availability of some variables used in this 
analysis, observations do not go beyond the year 2007. 
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to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.” (5)  
In the study of international relations, prominent areas of study involve the interaction of 
complex strategies and multifaceted variables.  This is particularly true in conflict studies 
as a large number of actors interact across multiple levels of analysis through a dizzying 
array of private information, bluff, and deception (A. Bennett and Elman 2007; Fearon 
1995).  As such, international relations scholars often use the case study method as a 
means of complementing their quantitative and formal research (Bates 1998). 
I purposefully select the case studies from the set of observations in the MID data 
set using case selection strategies identified by Seawright and Gerring (2008) and 
Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick (2006).  These cases exemplify the relationships identified 
in the quantitative strand.  Because the cases are illustrative, and due to the explanatory 
nature of Phase II, I deliberately choose typical cases rather than deviant cases to expand 
upon the quantitative results from Phase I.   
The first case, presented in Chapter Four, focuses on the important role cruise 
missiles played in Falklands Conflict of 1982 between Argentina and the United 
Kingdom.  This conflict explains two dimensions of cruise missile use in conflict.  First, 
Argentina unsuccessfully attempted to maximize the expected utility of capturing the 
Falkland Islands by deterring a British military response using newly-acquired air-
launched anti-ship cruise missile technology to deny the British Navy access to the area.  
However, when deterrence failed, and the United Kingdom assembled a task force to 
reclaim the islands, Argentina successfully used their limited cruise missile capability to 
deny the British Navy unrestricted freedom of maneuver, effectively altering British 
strategy in the conflict.  Additionally, the Falkland case presents a situation in which 
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cruise missiles were not physically used to initiate the use of force nor used in the early 
stages of the conflict.  Instead, their utility came later when expended to deny the British 
Navy unrestricted access to the South Atlantic to conduct operations against Argentina.  
In all, cruise missiles accounted for the sinking of two of six British ships sunk and the 
severe damage of a third.  
The second case examines American cruise missile diplomacy in the 1990s in 
which the United States used cruise missiles extensively as a means of selective 
punishment against norm transgressions.  Missile diplomacy refers to the repeated use of 
cruise missiles during the 1990s (and often beyond) in situations that ordinarily may not 
call for military responses such as in retaliation for an assassination attempt by the Iraqi 
government and as punishment for the bombing of American embassies by terrorist 
organizations.  The use of cruise missiles in the 1990s showed that cruise missiles not 
only provide a means of using force for coercion with little risk to military personnel, but 
also provide a way of sending a strong signal to adversaries that is politically palatable 
and seemingly decisive (Brigety II 2007; Sparks 1997).  This new thinking in how to 
employ cruise missiles, a deviation from Cold War nuclear strategy, stands in contrast to 
roles cruise missiles played in the Falklands Conflict.  No longer were cruise missiles 
simply another weapon, in a cast of weapons, to be leveraged as part of a greater military 
strategy.  Instead, in only a decade, cruise missiles themselves became the go-to weapon 
for coercive diplomacy. 
The cases selected represent instances in which statistical models used in the first 
phase produced a relatively high predicted probability of conflict initiation. The cases 
also represent two distinct periods of cruise missile capability and employment; the first 
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case – The Falklands Conflict – occurs before the open employment of precision land 
attack cruise missiles, while the second case – U.S. Cruise Missile Diplomacy – takes 
place a decade later as states began to understand the technological advantages of 
precision navigation and stealth flourishing in the third phase of cruise missile 
development.  Selecting these typical cases in this research offers a better exploration of 
the mechanisms at work in the quantitative analysis, while parsimoniously representing 
the theoretical mechanisms at work in accounting for the cruise missile’s role in the use 
of force (George and Bennett 2005).   
Phase III 
 In the third phase of this mixed methods design, I conclude my investigation by 
integrating the quantitative and qualitative phases using the weaving approach prescribed 
by Stange, Crabtree, and Miller (2006), Creswell and Tashakkori (2007), and Fetters, 
Curry and Creswell (2013) .  Following the completion of the quantitative and qualitative 
phases of research, I synthesize the results of each strand together to evaluate the 
implications for the given hypotheses using associative inferences (Creswell and Plano 
Clark 2011).  I critically review the results as they applied to coercive theory, seeking and 
elucidating relevant policy implications while weaving each strand together based on 
hypothesis.  Ultimately, I observe that states with cruise missiles are more likely to – and 
do indeed – exercise the use of force at higher rates than do states without cruise missiles.  
Not only are cruise missile states more prone to use military force, regardless of regime 
type, but they initiate threats and displays of force at greater rates as well. 
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Quantitative Data Collection and Operationalization 
In this mixed methods research project, I analyze the independent variable, cruise 
missile possession, with control variables known to be correlated with the use of force to 
understand the weapon’s influence on the dependent variable, the initiation of military 
force.  I use the directed dyad as the unit of measurement to retain the decision to use the 
military as a means of coercion grounded in the actions of individual states by way of the 
decisions of each state to initiate conflict upon another (D. S. Bennett and Stam 2000b; 
Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004).  A directional dyad also clearly defines who is 
attacking whom, information that non-directed dyad and monadic designs fail to provide. 
I derive the non-original quantitative data from multiple sources common to 
political science research.  Overall project data, including dependent, independent, and 
control variables, are based on original data collection plus data from the International 
Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set (Brecher et al. 2017) as operationalized by Mettler and 
Reiter (2013) and the Correlates of War Project’s (CoW) Militarized Interstate Dispute 
data set (MID), version 4 including National Material Capabilities data (Palmer et al. 
2015).  To integrate this data, I use the Expected Utility Generation and Data 
Management Program version 3.21 (D. S. Bennett and Stam 2000a) to create a data shell 
over which I integrated ICB, MID, and regime type data from Cheibub, Gandhi, and 
Vreeland’s (2010) Democracy and Dictatorship data set and data derived from the Polity 
4 Project (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). 
Independent Variables 
The primary independent variable for this research is state cruise missile 
possession based on the year of initial acquisition.  The date of initial cruise missile 
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acquisition is determined through original research by first querying the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database (SIPRI 2015) for 
cruise missile sales.  I sort arms transfers by type (i.e. missiles), determine the year of 
initial purchase by state, and report data from 1954, the first year a modern cruise missile 
is put into operational service, through 2015, the last year of available data.19  The data 
from this query is then cross-referenced with information provided by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies’ Missile Defense Project (2019), the National Defense 
Intelligence Agency (2017), Kueter and Kleinberg (2007), and Werrell (1985) to validate 
the dates and types of cruise missile possession and account for acquisition through 
indigenous programs not captured in the SIPRI data, such as those in the United States, 
China, and the Soviet Union/Russia.  Such indigenous programs are not clearly reflected 
in the SIPRI database unless the country of origin sells the missile, and then only the sale 
is captured, which may occur well after design and fielding.  Table 3.1 summarizes these 
results. 
  
                                                 
19 Although Germany fielded a cruise missile, the V-1 “Vengeance weapon” or “Buzz 
Bomb,” in World War II, for this research I consider this an outlier due to its late use in 
an already complicated conflict.  It was really not until 1954 that the first fully 
operational and persistently fielded cruise missile was brought into service. 
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Table 3. 1 Initial Cruise Missile Acquisition by Year 
Country Year Designation Type Source 
United States of America 1954 MGM-1 Matador LACM Indigenous  
Sweden 1955 RB-315 ASCM Indigenous 
USSR (Russia) 1956 SS-N-3A ASCM Indigenous  
China 1960 P-15/SS-N-2A Styx ASCM USSR 
Indonesia 1961 KS-1/AS-1 ASCM USSR 
Egypt 1961 KS-1/AS-1 ASCM USSR 
Cuba 1962 P-15/SS-N-2A Styx ASCM USSR 
Poland 1963 KS-1/AS-1 ASCM USSR 
Bulgaria 1963 KS-1/AS-1 ASCM USSR 
Syria 1963 P-15/SS-N-2A Styx ASCM USSR 
German Democratic Rep. 1964 P-15/SS-N-2A Styx ASCM USSR 
Romania 1964 P-15/SS-N-2A Styx ASCM USSR 
Yugoslavia 1965 P-15M/SS-N-2A ASCM USSR 
Algeria 1967 P-15U/SS-N-2A Styx ASCM USSR 
North Korea 1968 P-15/SS-N-2A Styx ASCM USSR 
Finland 1969 P-15/SS-N2A Styx ASCM USSR 
Norway 1970 Penguin 1 ASCM Indigenous  
Italy 1971 Sea Killer Mk2 ASCM Indigenous  
Iran 1971 Sea Killer Mk2 ASCM Italy 
India 1971 P-15/SS-N-2A Styx ASCM USSR 
France 1972 MM-38 Exocet ASCM Indigenous  
German Federal Republic 1972 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Greece 1972 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Israel 1972 Gabriel I ASCM Indigenous  
Iraq 1972 P-15U/SS-N-2B Styx ASCM USSR 
South Korea 1972 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Singapore 1972 Gabriel 1 ASCM Israel 
Vietnam 1972 P-15U/SS-N-2A Styx ASCM USSR 
United Kingdom 1973 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Chile 1974 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Somalia 1975 P-15U/SS-N-2B Styx ASCM USSR 
Turkey 1975 Penguin 1 ASCM Norway 
Pakistan 1975 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Peru 1976 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Argentina 1976 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Denmark 1976 RGM-84 Harpoon ASCM USA 
Libya 1976 P-15U/SS-N-2B Styx ASCM USSR 
Thailand 1976 Gabriel 1 ASCM Israel 
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South Africa 1977 Gabriel II ASCM Israel 
Belgium 1978 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Brazil 1978 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Netherlands 1978 RGM-84 Harpoon ASCM USA 
Ethiopia 1978 P-15/SS-N-2B Styx ASCM USSR 
Oman 1978 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Brunei 1978 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Spain 1979 RGM-84 Harpoon ASCM USA 
Yemen People's Republic 1979 P-15U/SS-N-2B Styx ASCM USSR 
Malaysia 1979 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Venezuela 1980 Otomat-2 ASCM Italy 
Ecuador 1980 Gabriel II ASCM Israel 
Nigeria 1980 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Saudi Arabia 1980 RGM-84 Harpoon ASCM USA 
United Arab Emirates 1980 MM-40 Exocet ASCM France 
Taiwan 1980 Hsiung-Feng 1 ASCM Indigenous  
Japan 1980 RGM-84 Harpoon ASCM USA 
Morocco 1981 MM-38 Exocet ASCM France 
Australia 1981 RGM-84 Harpoon ASCM USA 
Kenya 1982 Gabriel II ASCM Israel 
Angola 1982 P-15U/SS-N-2B Styx ASCM USSR 
Yemen Arab Republic 1982 P-15U/SS-N-2B Styx ASCM USSR 
Kuwait 1982 MM-40 Exocet ASCM France 
Qatar 1982 MM-40 Exocet ASCM France 
Colombia 1983 MM-40 Exocet ASCM France 
Bangladesh 1983 Hy-2 Silkworm ASCM China 
Cameroon 1984 MM-40 Exocet ASCM France 
Bahrain 1984 MM-40 Exocet ASCM France 
Tunisia 1985 MM-40 Exocet ASCM France 
Canada 1989 RGM-84 Harpoon ASCM USA 
Yemen 1990 P-15/SS-N-2B Styx ASCM USSR 
Portugal 1991 RGM-84 Harpoon ASCM USA 
Cyprus 1994 MM-40 Exocet ASCM France 
Albania 1995 Hy-2 Silkworm ASCM China 
Myanmar 1995 C-801/CSS-N-4 ASCM China 
Georgia 1999 P-15M/SS-N-2C ASCM Ukraine 
Sri Lanka 2000 Gabriel II ASCM Israel 
Mexico 2004 Gabriel II ASCM Israel 
Turkmenistan 2011 Kh-35/SS-N-25 ASCM Russia 
New Zealand 2014 Penguin 2 ASCM Australia 
Note:  LACM - Land Attack Cruise Missile; ASCM - Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
88 
 
 Not all cruise missiles are created equal.  The diverse types, ranges, and payloads 
found in the panoply of cruise missiles in use since their conception make coding for 
possession a research challenge.  Some cruise missiles launch from either ship, 
submarines, or aircraft to targets deep in enemy territory while navigating around enemy 
air defense systems and terrain.  Others, such as the Russian Styx or French Exocet, are 
primarily designed to attack ships at sea, although they are often modified ad-hoc for 
land-based targets.  Each variant has different ranges, capabilities, accuracy, and methods 
of navigation specific to their function.  However, unlike fixed systems such as ballistic 
missiles, cruise missiles are easily transported within range of their target on land or sea. 
Some are perhaps even moved via deceptively innocuous platforms such as shipping 
containers or civilian aircraft, rather than depend on a fixed or semi-fixed locations 
within friendly borders (Heidenrich 2006).20  In October 2016, Iranian-backed Houthi 
forces attacked American warships off the coast of Yemen using modified cruise missiles 
fired from the back of makeshift mobile land platforms (LaGrone 2016).  This flexibility 
means the weapon defies assumptions about proximity and use.  As such, when coding 
for cruise missile possession, I treat cruise missile type, range, payload, and speed as 
homogenous. 
I identify the primary independent variable, cruise missile possession, in two 
ways.  First, I define cruise missiles according to the oft-used Toomay (1981) definition:  
“an unmanned, expendable, armed, aerodynamic air-breathing, autonomous vehicle.” 
                                                 
20 Some ballistic missiles, such as the Russian RT-2PM Topol (NATO designation SS-25 
Sickle), have some limited mobility.  They are capable of being transported to their 
launch sites via a transporter, erector, launcher heavy vehicle.  However, they are still 
limited in their range of mobility and launch location. 
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(31)  This definition includes, but is not limited to, Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) 
and their variants such the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx, the Chinese HY-2 Silkworm, the U.S. 
RGM-84 Harpoon, and the French MM-38 Exocet as well as Land Attack Cruise 
Missiles (LACM) and their variants such as the Indian BrahMmos, the U.S. BGM-109 
Tomahawk, and the United Kingdom’s Storm Shadow.  Second, I assign countries in 
possession of cruise missiles a score of 1 for each year the missiles are in the state’s 
possession, regardless of operational status, and 0 otherwise using the dichotomous 
variable cruisea(t-1) for State A and cruiseb(t-1) for State B.  This variable is based on the 
date of initial cruise missile acquisition and lagged one year in the statistical calculations 
to account for the temporality of the data to ensure I test for the cruise missile’s influence 
on conflict and not conflict’s influence on the acquisition of cruise missiles.  I separately 
code the dichotomous possession of land attack cruise missiles, lagged, to capture any 
specific and separate effects of possessing the more advanced capabilities these cruise 
missiles provide as lacma(t-1) for State A and lacmb(t-1) for State B.  I establish land attack 
cruise missile possession based on information provided by Werrell (1985, 1989), 
Defense Industry Daily (2005), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 
Arms Transfer Database (2015), The Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis 
Committee (2017), The Center for Strategic and International Studies (2018), and the 
Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (2018). 
Dependent Variables 
I use two dependent variables to capture the cruise missile’s effect on state 
behavior:  the use of military force and the use of threats or displays of force.  The 
primary dependent variable for Hypothesis 1 is the use of military force.   I capture the 
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use of force in two ways, using two popular conflict data sets, the ICB data set and MID 
data set, to replicate my findings using different measurements of conflict.  First, 
borrowing from Mettler and Reiter’s (2013) converted ICB data set, I code for their 
variable, chall, using the initiation of an ICB challenge in an international crisis with the 
variable, ICBchallenge, as my first dependent variable.  The ICB Project identifies two 
conditions of an international crisis.  First, a crisis constitutes, “a change in type and/or an 
increase in intensity of disruptive, that is, hostile verbal or physical, interactions between 
two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities.” (Brecher and 
Wilkenfeld 2000, 4).  The second condition notes that military hostility, “destabilizes 
their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system – global, 
dominant, or subsystem.” (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000, 5).   
The ICB data set neither identifies conflictual dyads nor identifies the challenger.  
This lack of fidelity requires a unique coding scheme to properly identify which state 
initiates the challenge and which state is the defender.  As such, I follow Mettler and 
Reiter’s coding to distinguish between challenger and defender. 21  The challenger, or 
initiator, (State A) is the state that first threatened, mobilized forces, or used violence 
against the defender (State B).  In situations in which a state initiates force against 
another state in response to a priori sub-state acts of violence on its territory, the first 
state is coded as the challenger.  In situations in which a state challenges another state 
and a third state intervenes on the second state’s behalf, the third state is also coded as a 
                                                 
21 For details about the ICB-derived coding used in this research, including alterations to 
adjust for the non-dyadic nature of the ICB data set in accordance with Rousseau, Gelpi, 
Reiter, and Huth (1996) and Gelpi and Greico (2001), reference Mettler and Reiter 
(2013). 
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dyadic challenger to the first state.  I drop ICB crises that involved only intrastate 
violence. 
In addition to employing dyad-clustered robust standard errors, to ensure the 
robustness of these results  I duplicate my analysis using MID data supplied by the 
Correlates of War Project (Palmer et al. 2015).  Projects based on either MID or ICB data 
rarely have divergent findings.  However, differences do arise when accounting for the 
importance of state parity (as in MID data) or the connection between capabilities and 
crisis escalation (Vasquez 2000).  Considering these differences, the use of MID data, in 
parallel with ICB data to cross-check the strength of the results, strengthens the validity 
of the empirical results.   
For the MID data,  I follow Lai and Slater (2006), Weeks (2012, 2014), and Kim 
(2017) by coding a MID dependent variable, MIDinitiation, for dispute initiation from the 
conflict years identified by the MID data set and coded using the Expected Utility 
Generation and Data Management Program v3.212 (EUGene) (D. S. Bennett and Stam 
2000a; Palmer et al. 2015).  Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996) defined a militarized 
interstate dispute as, “united historical cases in which the threat, display or use of military 
force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, 
official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state.” (168)  The 
MID-derived dependent variable, MIDinitiation, captures this definition by coding for 
actions that include the threat to use force, the display of force, the use of force (not 
including war), and war (Palmer et al. 2015).  In the MID data set, this includes hostilities 
coded for the MID variable, HostLev, as a 2 (threat to use force) or greater.  I code the 
variable, hostility, to capture values indicating no militarized action equal to one for the 
92 
 
multinomial logistic regression model.  Although the dispute initiator is clearly coded, 
this may not be the side directly responsible for the conflict as a whole, as each case is 
context dependent and vulnerable to perceptions, third party influences, and political 
biases (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004).   
 I use a second dependent variable to measure threats and displays of force to test 
whether cruise missile effects are limited to the use of military force, or whether their 
possession also heightens the risk conflict at lower levels of hostility.  The second 
hypothesis posits that cruise missile possession increases the likelihood states will initiate 
crisis through the threat or display of force.  To test this proposition, I use the MID 
variable, hostility, as a categorical dependent variable in a multinomial logit model to 
measure the hostility level reached in each dyadic dispute.  The variable is coded 1 for no 
militarized action, 2 for threats to use force, 3 for displays of force, 4 for the use of force 
short of war, and 5 for war (Palmer et al. 2015).  Definition and coding rules for each 
hostility level are in accordance with Jones et al. (1996).  Threats include explicit threats 
to use armed force.  Displays include mobilization of forces.  Use of force is defined as, 
“armed force, but short of the sustained combat that characterized as war.” (D. M. Jones, 
Bremer, and Singer 1996, 167).  Finally, war includes those disputes involving sustained 
overt combat operations resulting in over 1,000 battle deaths between two states. 
Hypothesis 3 is a null hypothesis that predicts there is no difference between the 
probabilities that democratic or autocratic states with cruise missiles will use military 
power to achieve foreign policy objectives.  To test this hypothesis, I again utilize the 
ICB – derived ICBchallenge dependent variable with the addition of the MID – derived 
MIDinitiation dependent variable as a robustness check.  The independent variables, 
93 
 
regime type and cruise missile possession, are defined and coded using the dichotomous 
variable, democracy, derived from the Democracy-Dictatorship data set (Cheibub, 
Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010) in interaction with the dichotomous cruise(t-1) variable to 
identify democracies and autocracies who are with and without cruise missiles.  The 
minimalist approach taken by the Democracy-Dictatorship data set emphasizes the 
capacity of domestic institutions to remove governments from power by parsimoniously 
grounding its coding of regime type in the ability of contested elections to remove 
executive and legislative officers from power.  The advantage of using this data set 
instead of the Polity 4 data set (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016), used to control for 
joint democratic dyads in the general force initiation model (see below), is that the 
observational nature of the data makes it more reproducible across different objectives 
and its coding system consists of attributes that are identifiable and considered important 
by many researchers (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). 
Control Variables 
In addition to the hypothesized dependent and independent variables, I include 
control variables widely considered standard in research regarding militarized disputes 
between states in building a behavioral model.  These control variables approximate 
factors generally accepted in conflict studies to influence the use of military force to 
achieve foreign policy objectives.  The regressors include ballistic missile and nuclear 
weapon possession; major power status; economic development; geographic contiguity; 
regime type; and the number of years since the last conflict transpired.   
Mettler and Reiter (2013) uncovered a positive relationship between possession of 
ballistic missiles and conflict initiation.  They noted that both the military capabilities, 
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increased striking power, and prestige associated with the possession of ballistic missile 
technology place the possessor in a greater bargaining position.  Mettler and Reiter found 
ballistic missile possession is associated with a 266 percent greater likelihood that a state 
will initiate a crisis as compared to states without ballistic missiles.  Therefore, I control 
for a state’s possession of ballistic missiles within range of their dyadic partner using the 
variable BallisticMissile(A), for the initiator state, and BallisticMissile(B) for the defender 
state to represent the years the states possessed ballistic missiles capable of striking each 
other. 
Although debate exists (e.g. Sagan and Waltz 2013), researchers have found 
nuclear states are more willing to act belligerently (Feaver 1992, 1995; Jervis 1976; 
Sagan 1994), while others have found a shift in the demands and limited risks associated 
with military aggression when nuclear weapons are involved (Gaddis 1986; Jervis 1989b, 
1989a, 1989c, R. Powell 1988, 1990; Schelling 2008; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Waltz 
1990).  Still others believed nuclear weapons push conflict initiation to lower levels, 
driving a stability-instability paradox (Ganguly and Wagner 2004; Kapur 2005; V. 
Narang 2009; Rauchhaus 2009; Snyder 1965).  States with nuclear weapons may also 
decide to procure cruise missiles as delivery vehicles.  For this research, I control for 
nuclear weapon possession using the dichotomous variable Nuclear(A), for the initiator 
state, and Nuclear(B) for the defender state to represent the years the state possessed 
nuclear weapons, lagged by 1 year.  I use nuclear weapon proliferation data assembled 
and coded by Gartzke and Kroenig (2009) to establish acquisition and forfeiture.  I code 
nuclear possession as the year a state first assembles a weapon capable of being used 
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against an enemy target until the year they began dismantling their program (e.g. South 
Africa, 1982 to 1990) 
Wealthier states and states capable of projecting power define their interests 
globally, tending to invest in military capabilities to protect their interests.  Consequently, 
a high level of material capability and resources are a strong predictor of crisis 
involvement (Boulding 1962; Bremer 1992; Schultz 2001).  I capture each of these 
confounds using four distinct variables.  Major power status for the initiating state is 
controlled using the CoW dummy variable, MajorPower.  I code the power parity 
between states, PowerParity, using the Mettler and Reiter (2013)  cincparity variable.  
This variable ranged from 0 to 1 and is measured using the CoW Composite Index of 
National Capability (CINC) scores from CoW’s National Material Capabilities data set, 
version 4.0.   
The physical distance from adversaries may also play a role in state behavior 
(Joyce and Braithwaite 2013; Owsiak and Rider 2013; Rider and Owsiak 2015; Vasquez 
1995; Vasquez and Henehan 2001).  Geographic contiguity is controlled using the CoW 
categorical variable, contig, which captures states who share a border within politically 
relevant intervals of distances up to 400 miles to capture immediate borders and second 
and third order borders such as regions (Diehl 1985; Huth 1996; Kocs 1995; O’Loughlin 
1986; Reed and Chiba 2010; Stinnett et al. 2002).  Contiguity is coded 1 if a land border 
connects the dyadic state pairs, 2 if 1-12 miles of water separate the states, 3 if 13-24, 4 if 
25-150, 5 if 151-400 miles of water, and 6 if the states are not at all connected.  
Additionally, assuming the greater the overall distance between states, the less the 
likelihood of conflict given the greater resources required to project power (Boulding 
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1962; Bueno de Mesquita 1983; Joyce and Braithwaite 2013), I capture the minimum 
distance between states with the variable, distance, based on the Mettler and Reiter 
(2013) variable, sqrtcmindist, coded as the square root of the minimum distance between 
states as measured by the CShapes data set (Weidmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch 2010).   
Regime type may also affect conflict propensity.  Autocracies may be more likely 
to use military force than democracies (Bremer 1992; Debs and Goemans 2010; Kim 
2017; J. L. P. Weeks 2012), although variations in institutional constraints may better 
explain a state’s conflict propensity (Dixon 1994; Fearon 1998; Maoz and Russett 1993; 
T. C. Morgan and Campbell 1991; Reiter and Stam 1998; B. Russett et al. 1995; B. M. 
Russett 1990, 1993).  To control for regime type in the general force initiation model, I 
follow Mettler and Reiter’s (2013) use of the variable, jointdemocracy, to measure 
whether each state in the dyad was coded greater than 6 using the Polity 4 data set 
variable, polity2, the revised and combined measure of regime type variability for time 
series analysis (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016).  By choosing Mettler and Reiter’s 
measurement of joint democratic dyads as a control variable, rather than the democracy 
independent variable I use to test Hypothesis 3, I can consistently compare my results 
using cruise missile variables with their findings using ballistic missile variables.  With 
this method, I can more reliably identify inconsistencies and draw conclusions between 
my research and Mettler and Reiter’s.   
The probability of crisis initiation in any given year may be a product of how 
recently the dyad last experienced a crisis.  The length of time since the last crisis is 
proportionally related to the whether a state will engage in its next conflict.  States 
recently concluding a conflict should be less likely to engage in a new conflict (Beck, 
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Katz, and Tucker 1998).  Failing to account for the effects of time may result in bias by 
underestimating the true standard errors (Magee and Massoud 2011; Schultz 2001).  To 
account for this potential confounding variable, I exercise Carter and Signorino’s (2010) 
alternative to Beck, Katz, and Tucker’s (1998) method of modeling time dependence 
using splined time in logistic regression.  This alternative uses a cubic polynomial 
approximation to capture the change in phenomena over time.  For my model, I code for 
peace years, or the number of years since the last dyadic crisis, by including variables for 
the number of peace years, peace years squared, and peace years cubed. 
Endogeneity 
Finally, given that cruise missiles do not proliferate randomly throughout the 
world and states may obtain cruise missiles for reasons related to conflict itself, the 
problem of endogeneity must be addressed.  To account for possible selection effects 
arising from the non-random selection of variables, I use a multivariate probit model to 
predict the potential challenger’s and defender’s acquisition of cruise missiles.  By 
accounting for factors relating to the acquisition of weapon systems, I endogenize the 
procurement process to predict with greater confidence that the cruise missiles were not 
the result of a priori decisions to use military force for a future coercion scenario.  I use 
four regressors to predict the challenger’s and defender’s acquisition of cruise missiles. 
The first regressor for predicting cruise missile acquisition accounts for 
membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).  The purpose of the 
MTCR is to, “limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons), by controlling [weapon] transfers that could make a 
contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.” 
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(Government of Canada 2017, 8)  As a non-binding agreement between member states, 
the MTCR accomplishes its goal of limiting proliferation by monitoring and restricting 
the trade of known delivery systems such as ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.  
Membership in the MTCR ideally constrains the proliferation of cruise missiles and 
associated dual-use technology (W. Q. Bowen 1997; Mistry 1997, 2002, 2003).  To 
account for this factor, I use Barkley’s (2008) and Mettler and Reiter’s (2013) method of 
measuring the fraction of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) that is accounted for 
by members of the MTCR with the variable mtcr. 
Next, I account for states’ economic development.  States that acquired cruise 
missiles require a sufficient scientific and industrial base to operate and maintain these 
weapons, at a minimum, and at higher ends of economic development, create indigenous 
programs (Gormley 2008b).  Comparable to Jackman’s (1973) use of logging GDP per 
capita, the variable used in each equation to factor for economic development is 
capabilities, which I base on the Mettler and Reiter (2013) variable, lnencapa.  The 
capabilities variable is the logged per capita energy consumption of the challenger and 
defender. 
The third variable used to regress cruise missile acquisition approximates major 
power status.  States with the ability to project power tend to define their interests 
globally requiring weapons capable of such power projection (Schultz 2001).  China’s 
exploitation of cruise missiles to assert territorial claims in the South China Sea 
exemplifies this concept (Blair 2008; Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan 2014; Heginbotham 
et al. 2015; U.S. Department of Defense 2013).  In cruise missile acquisition equations 
for both the potential challenger and defender, I use the CoW major power status 
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variable, coded as MajorPower(A), to capture major power status of State A, or 
MajorPower(B)  for State B (Correlates of War Project 2017). 
The final variable used to estimate cruise missile acquisition is whether the state 
has nuclear weapons.  Some cruise missiles can deliver nuclear weapons.  Consequently, 
states armed with nuclear weapons may have an increased desire to possess delivery 
systems such as cruise missiles.  Their importance in this mission is evident when 
observing their role in nuclear negotiation between the United States and the Soviet union 
in the 1980s and the recent concern that Russia is violating the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) by fielding a new prohibited class of cruise missile 
(Pleitgen, Eshchenko, and Smith-Spark 2017).  I use the state’s nuclear weapon status in 
acquisition equations for both the potential challenger and defender. 
 
Phase I Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 3.2 displays the summary statistics for the general model of cruise missile 
possession and conflict.  The data set consists of 1.1 million ICB and MID dyad-years 
spanning 1946 to 2007.  During this time, the ICB data set records 378 challenges; the 
CoW MID data set records 2,742 MID initiations.  Although these numbers may seem 
impressive, conflict is a rare event.  In this data set, ICB challenges comprised only .03 
percent of the total ICB observations.  MID initiations comprised .2 percent of the total 
MID observations.  States possessed cruise missiles in 28 percent of the total 
observations, far outpacing the possession of ballistic missiles which comprise 2.7 
percent of observations.  Notably, the ICB challenge variables terminated in 2007, while 
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the MID data reflecting militarized initiations of conflict terminated in 2010.  Cruise 
missile, major power status, and regime type data extended into 2015.  However, due to 
limitations in how the statistical software analyzes data, I base my conclusions on only 
those observations for which there exists complete data.  Therefore, these summary 
statistics include only those data ranging from 1946 to 2007.   
Table 3. 2 Summary Statistics for the Cruise Missile Conflict Models, 1946-2007 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ICB Challenge 1,108,572 0.0003 0.0181 0 1 
MID Initiation 1,108,572 0.0023 0.0474 0 1 
Cruise Missiles, State A 1,108,572 0.2802 0.4491 0 1 
Cruise Missiles, State B 1,108,572 0.2734 0.4491 0 1 
Ballistic Missiles, State A 1,108,572 0.0266 0.1609 0 1 
Ballistic Missiles, State B 1,108,572 0.0266 0.1609 0 1 
Nuc. Weapons, State A 1,108,572 0.0368 0.1884 0 1 
Nuc. Weapons, State B 1,108,572 0.0368 0.1884 0 1 
Distance 1,108,572 76.3648 29.9547 0 139 
Contiguity 1,108,572 5.8675 0.7554 1 6 
Power Parity 1,108,572 0.2439 0.2681 2.08-6 1 
Major Power, State A 1,108,572 0.036 0.1864 0 1 
Joint Democracy 1,108,572 0.1521 0.3591 0 1 
Note:  Peace year variables are omitted. 
 
In addition to the logit and probit analysis that follows, I examine descriptive 
statistic contingency tables to explore differences, if any, in the incidence of conflict 
initiation between cruise missile-equipped and non-cruise missile-equipped states.  Table 
3.3 shows the contingency table for both the ICB challenge and MID initiation dependent 
variables by whether states possess cruise missiles.  As hypothesized, there is a 
significant and positive relationship between cruise missile possession and the ICB 
challenges, X2 (1) = 120.339, p < .001.  Additionally, consistent with the ICB-derived 
results, there is a significant and positive relationship between cruise missile possession 
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and MID initiations, X2 (1) = 822.047, p < .001.  States possessing cruise missiles have a 
greater incidence of force initiation than states without cruise missiles.  Most striking, 
states possessing cruise missiles initiate conflict at a rate 2.8 times greater than that of 
non-cruise missile states for ICB challenges and MID initiations.   
Table 3. 3 Force Initiation and Cruise Missile Possession 
ICB 
Challenge 
Non-cruise 
missile state 
Cruise 
missile state 
MID 
Initiation 
Non-cruise 
missile state 
Cruise 
missile 
state 
No  
challenge 906262*** 376218*** 
No 
initiation 1015685*** 426492*** 
 (99.98) (99.94)  (99.873) (99.642) 
Challenge 181*** 216*** Initiation 1296*** 1534*** 
 (0.02) (0.057)  (0.127) (0.358) 
Total 906443 376434 Total 1016981 428026 
Note:  *** p<.001, Percentages in parentheses. 
 
We can also explore the relationship for states that possess land attack cruise 
missiles.  Since the early 1990s, the use of land attack cruise missiles has increased 
commensurate with advances in navigation, stealth, and precision targeting.  To 
determine whether the more advanced and capable land attack cruise missiles may be 
correlated with conflict initiation, I examine contingency tables.  Table 3.4 shows the 
contingency table for both the ICB challenge and MID initiation variables as compared to 
states in possession and not in possession of land attack cruise missiles.  There is a clear 
positive relationship between possession and force initiation with land attack cruise 
missiles using both the ICB challenge dependent variable, X2 (1) = 360.88, p < .001, and 
the MID initiation dependent variable, X2 (1) =952.705, p < .001.  Therefore, based on 
the descriptive statistics, states armed with land attack cruise missiles initiate ICB 
challenges 9.7 times more often and MID initiations 5.6 times more often than states 
without these missiles. 
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Table 3. 4 Force Initiation and Land Attack Cruise Missile Possession 
ICB 
Challenge 
Non-LACM 
state 
LACM 
state 
MID 
Initiation 
Non-LACM 
state 
LACM 
state 
No 
challenge 1261896*** 20,584*** 
No 
initiation 1414451*** 27726*** 
 (99.973) (99.738)   (99.82) (99.00) 
Challenge 343*** 54*** Initiation 2549*** 281*** 
 (0.027) (0.262)   (0.18) (1.00) 
Total 1262000 20638 Total 1417000 28007 
Note:  *** p<.001.  Percentages in parentheses. 
 
Regression Models of Force Initiation 
 I turn now to models that can accommodate controls for potential confounds, and 
accordingly use probit, logistic regression (logit), and fixed effects models to test the 
validity of Hypothesis 1, that states armed with cruise missiles are more likely to exercise 
military force to coerce their adversaries than states that do not have cruise missiles.  
Table 3.5 presents the results of the three models in which the dependent variable is an 
ICB challenge.  I replicate these models for robustness using the alternative dependent 
variable, MID initiation, in Table 3.6.  Because I follow Mettler and Reiter’s (2013) 
models and use of control variables, I use a probit analysis in the first model to maintain 
comparability to that research, but compare these results with logit and fixed effects 
models in subsequent tests while testing for multicollinearity using a correlation matrix.  
Probit and logit models differ in how they define the function of the logistic distribution, 
yet generally yield substantively similar, though not identical, results.  Though probit 
models are popular in political science, logit models produce coefficients that can be 
interpreted in terms of odds ratios and smaller Chi-squared sampling errors (Berkson 
1946, 1951).  To compare and cross check the results of each model, I report both.   
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I estimate fixed effects models (using the dyad as the unit of analysis) in order to 
control for cross-unit heterogeneity.22  This method allows for the control of all stable 
characteristics among the dyads in the data set, even those which could not be measured 
(Allison and Christakis 2006; Chamberlain 1979; Katz 2001).  To test whether cruise 
missile states are more likely to engage in an ICB challenge, I compare the coefficients of 
each variable, reporting the associated p-value of the two-tailed Wald tests to assess the 
statistical significance of the differences at the bottom of the table.   
As hypothesized, each of the three models using the ICB dependent variable in 
Table 3.5 indicate there was a positive and significant relationship between State A’s 
possession of cruise missiles and the probability of exercising military force.  Using odds 
ratios derived from Model 2, states in possession of cruise missiles are at 2.42 times 
greater odds of initiating an ICB challenge compared to states that do not possess cruise 
missiles (p < .001).    A marginal effects analysis of Models 1 and 2 shows the 
probability of an ICB challenge when State A does not have cruise missiles is .02 
percent, but when State A acquires cruise missiles, this probability almost triples to .05 
percent (p <.001).  As expected, State A ballistic missile possession has positive and 
statistically significant coefficients, and negative and statistically significant coefficients 
for State B, consistent with existing research (Mettler and Reiter 2013).  Multicollinearity 
tests using a correlation matrix contain no indication of error due to covariates.  
 
                                                 
22 Results for the Hausman Specification Test (Hausman 1978), used to determine 
whether a fixed or random effects model is appropriate based on retention or rejection of 
the test’s null hypothesis, indicated the fixed effects model is appropriate for analyzing 
these models using either the ICB (X2 (13)=226.45, p < .001) and MID (X2 (11)=2158.42 
p < .001) dependent variables. 
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Table 3. 5 The Effects of Cruise Missiles on ICB Challenges, 1946-2007 
 
Model 1  
Probit 
Model 2  
Logit 
Model 3  
Fixed Effects 
Cruise Missiles, State A 0.296*** 0.882*** 0.352** 
 (0.048) (0.142) (0.162) 
Cruise Missiles, State B 0.120** 0.370** -0.305 
 (0.057) (0.171) (0.159) 
Ballistic Missiles, State A 0.263*** 0.713*** 0.660*** 
 (0.069) (0.191) (0.218) 
Ballistic Missiles, State B -0.341** -1.147*** -0.931*** 
 (0.103) (0.343) (0.245) 
Nuc. Weapons, State A 0.050 0.084 -0.829*** 
 (0.145) (0.413) (0.305) 
Nuc. Weapons, State B 0.575*** 1.516*** -0.167 
 (0.093) (0.322) (0.326) 
Distance -0.012*** -0.044*** -0.121** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.048) 
Contiguity -0.108*** -0.253*** 0.067 
 (0.020) (0.071) (0.138) 
Power Parity 0.100 0.234 -1.297** 
 (0.080) (0.242) (0.561) 
Major Power, State A 0.280 0.748 0.061 
 (0.152) (0.441) (0.397) 
Joint Democracy -0.398*** -1.196*** -0.359 
 (0.099) (0.334) (0.322) 
Additional Controls … … … 
Constant -2.030*** -3.783***  
 (0.075) (0.207)  
Log Likelihood -2325.778 -2342.5594 -1362.9344 
Chi-Square (14) 1138.60*** 1563.90*** 163.20*** 
Pseudo-R2 .29 .29 .06 
Observations 1,108,572 1,108,572 16,875 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to the control variables 
reported in the table, each model includes temporal controls for the years since the last 
conflict initiation and cubic splines of that variable. 
Significance:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05 using a two-tailed test. 
 
I replicate the results of the ICB analysis with MID data in Table 3.6.  The MID 
data set contains 2,742 positive observations for a militarized initiation of force as 
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compared to the 378 ICB challenges.  One reason for this discrepancy in the number of 
observations, besides the slightly different measurements of the dependent variable, is 
that the MID data set often codes initiators and hostility level data for each year of a 
conflict as situations change, whereas the ICB data set may only code for the most 
significant challenge in the event.  As a result, the MID data set may provide more 
granular data and consequently more observations.  For example, between 1982 and 
1988, the MID data set codes each year of the American involvement in the Nicaragua’s 
Contra War, varying between initiators depending on each year’s situation.  However, the 
ICB data set only codes one year, 1984, as a challenge.  In this year, the United States 
increased the number and visibility of nearby military exercises in response to a 
suspected shipment of advanced fighter aircraft from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua.  
This display of force coerced the Soviet Union to cancel the shipment (Brecher et al. 
2017).23  American signals of imminent invasion instigated a crisis for Sandinista 
government and recorded as a data point for the ICB data set.  By replicating the models 
for each measurement of the dependent variable across the two data sets, we may be 
assured of the results by accounting for both single instances of an ICB challenge, or 
granular MID initiations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 As it turns out, the Soviet Union did not ship the aircraft as suspected, diffusing the 
situation.   
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Table 3. 6 The Effects of Cruise Missiles on MID Initiations, 1946-2007 
 
Model 4  
Probit 
Model 5  
Logit 
Model 6  
Fixed Effects 
Cruise Missiles, State A 0.355*** 0.913*** 0.583*** 
 (0.033) (0.093) (0.065) 
Cruise Missiles, State B 0.190*** 0.505*** -0.050 
 (0.036) (0.098) (0.065) 
Ballistic Missiles, State A 0.094 0.177 0.209** 
 (0.077) (0.194) (0.090) 
Ballistic Missiles, State B -0.056 -0.218 -0.327*** 
 (0.071) (0.189) (0.096) 
Nuc. Weapons, State A -0.102 -0.080 -0.529*** 
 (0.132) (0.382) (0.127) 
Nuc. Weapons, State B 0.468*** 0.935*** -0.479*** 
 (0.083) (0.243) (0.130) 
Distance -0.009*** -0.031*** 0.028** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.011) 
Contiguity -0.157*** -0.315*** -0.013 
 (0.015) (0.042) (0.058) 
Power Parity 0.287*** 0.650*** -0.121 
 (0.067) (0.190) (0.191) 
Major Power, State A 0.656*** 1.369*** 0.054 
 (0.138) (0.402) (0.140) 
Joint Democracy -0.409*** -1.099*** 0.120 
 (0.059) (0.183) (0.117) 
Additional Controls … … … 
Constant -1.337*** -2.233***  
 (0.075) (0.181)  
Log Likelihood -12584.691 -12708.308 -7456.3698 
Chi-Square (14) 1437.37*** 1859.73*** 472.25*** 
Pseudo-R2 .29 .28 .03 
Observations 1,108,572 1,108,572 50,720 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to the control variables 
reported in the table, each model includes temporal controls for the years since the last 
conflict initiation and cubic splines of that variable. 
Significance:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05 using a two-tailed test. 
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As hypothesized and consistent with the ICB models in Table 3.5, each of the 
three models using the MID dependent variable in Table 3.6 indicate there is a positive 
and significant relationship between State A’s possession of cruise missiles and that 
state’s likelihood of initiating a MID to coerce adversaries.  Commensurate with the 
results from the ICB models (Model 2 of Table 3.5), states in possession of cruise 
missiles are 2.49 times more likely to initiate a MID than states that do not possess cruise 
missiles (p < .001).  A marginal effects analysis of Models 4 and 5 shows the probability 
of a MID initiation before State A acquires cruise missiles is .2 percent, but that 
probability doubles to .4 percent (p < .001) after acquisition.  In step with previous 
results, there is a positive, though weaker, and significant relationship associated with 
State B’s possession of cruise missiles in the probit and logit models.  However, the 
coefficient loses significance in the fixed effects model.  Surprisingly, ballistic missile 
possession by State A and B lost significance in the probit and logit models, challenging 
Mettler and Reiter’s (2013) ICB-based conclusions.  As before, multicollinearity tests 
indicate a low likelihood of error due to covariates. 
 To specifically capture effects from the less prolific land attack cruise missile, I 
replicate the cruise missile models using original data collected for land attack cruise 
missile possession.  For this model, I use a probit model to test both ICB and MID data.  
Although there is a positive and significant correlation between land attack cruise 
missiles and ICB challenges in Model 7, Model 9 is not significant when using the MID 
initiation dependent variable. 
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Table 3. 7 The Effects of Land Attack Cruise Missiles on Conflict, 1946-2007 
 
Model 7  
 
ICB 
Probit 
Model 8  
ICB Pen. 
Likelihood 
Logit 
Model 9 
 
MID  
Probit 
Model 10  
MID Pen. 
Likelihood 
Logit 
LACM, State A 0.242** 0.528** 0.111 0.259** 
 (0.112) (0.217) (0.087) (0.098) 
LACM, State B 0.042 -0.160 0.369*** 0.848*** 
 (0.164) (0.319) (0.101) (0.118) 
Ballistic Missiles, State A 0.406*** 1.183*** 0.268** 0.649*** 
 (0.073) (0.178) (0.081) (0.080) 
Ballistic Missiles, State B -0.261** -0.867*** 0.020 0.036 
 (0.105) (0.235) (0.080) (0.088) 
Nuc. Weapons, State A 0.070 0.241 -0.057 0.102 
 (0.153) (0.293) (0.139) (0.126) 
Nuc. Weapons, State B 0.570*** 1.586*** 0.360*** 0.679*** 
 (0.100) (0.236) (0.087) (0.105) 
Distance -0.012*** -0.044*** -0.009*** -0.032*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Contiguity -0.105*** -0.250*** -0.151*** -0.306*** 
 (0.020) (0.040) (0.015) (0.015) 
Power Parity 0.099 0.267 0.289*** 0.675*** 
 (0.080) (0.189) (0.067) (0.072) 
Major Power, State A 0.191 0.475 0.596*** 1.139*** 
 (0.157) (0.276) (0.149) (0.114) 
Joint Democracy -0.386*** -1.143*** -0.394*** -1.045*** 
 (0.103) (0.239) (0.061) (0.082) 
Additional Controls … … … … 
Constant -1.973*** -3.596*** -1.275*** -2.050*** 
 (0.078) (0.171) (0.076) (0.071) 
Log Likelihood -2349.037 -2316.036 -12780.447 -12840.618 
Chi-Square (14) 1198.45*** 1748.34*** 1425.01*** 10102.49*** 
Pseudo-R2 .28  .28  
Observations 1,108,572 1,108,572 1,108,572 1,108,572 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to the control variables 
reported in the table, each model includes temporal controls for the years since the last 
conflict initiation and cubic splines of that variable. 
Significance:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05 using a two-tailed test. 
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As noted, only eleven states in our sample possessed land attack cruise missiles in 
the period 1946 to 2007.  The low percentage of observations could constitute a threat to 
inference.  To account for potential bias due to the limited number of cruise missile states 
as compared to the greater number of MID initiations, I used a penalized maximum 
likelihood logistic regression (Firth 1993; King and Zeng 2001; Tomz, King, and Zeng 
2001).  These results, displayed in Table 3.7, are significant, positively signed, and 
commensurate with the other models used here.  Correcting for bias, the positive and 
significant results suggest the possession of land attack cruise missiles also increase the 
likelihood a state will initiate conflict.   
Threats, Displays, and Uses of Force 
 A state does not necessarily need to physically attack an adversary to coerce the 
adversary into yielding to the state’s will.  Instead, the state may use its power at lower 
levels of violence including threats, displays, or uses of military force (D. M. Jones, 
Bremer, and Singer 1996; Slantchev 2006b, 2011).  Having established that states with 
cruise missiles are more likely to use force, Hypothesis 2 expands on this concept by 
positing that cruise missile possession not only increases the likelihood of force, but also 
predicts whether states might initiate crisis at lower levels, or through the threat or 
display of force.  To test this hypothesis, I use a multinomial logistic regression model.  
The multinomial logistic regression model enables the analysis of each predictor variable 
referenced to a response variable and its associated model.  In this model, I reference 
each level of hostility against a base level of no militarized action using the hostility 
variable.  This method makes it possible to predict a state’s preference to use threats or 
displays of force instead of no militarized action, given the proposed cruise missile 
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possession model used in this research.  However, unlike the other analyses used here, I 
do not replicate these results using ICB data.  The ICB data set does not contain variables 
measuring threats or displays of force.  Rather, the ICB data set uses various 
measurements of violence (e.g. minor clashes, serious clashes, full-scale war), which do 
not capture the less-than-violent definitions used in Hypothesis 2. 
Table 3. 8 Cruise Missile Possession and MID Hostility Level, 1946-2007 
Dependent Variable: 
Model 11 
Threat to 
use force 
Model 12 
Display of 
force 
Model 13 
Use 
of force 
Model 14 
 
War 
Base:  No Mil. Action     
Cruise Missiles, State A 0.836** 0.955*** 0.740*** 0.641*** 
 (0.346) (0.126) (0.085) (0.154) 
 2.306 2.599 2.096 1.898 
Cruise Missiles, State B 0.853** 0.992*** 0.749*** 0.702*** 
 (0.358) (0.128) (0.086) (0.158) 
 2.348 2.697 2.114 2.017 
Ballistic Missiles, State A 0.629 0.158 -0.236 0.021 
 (0.382) (0.201) (0.164) (0.314) 
 1.875 1.171 0.79 1.021 
Ballistic Missiles, State B 0.871** 0.456** 0.009 0.533* 
 (0.350) (0.185) (0.153) (0.296) 
 2.388 1.578 1.009 1.703 
Nuc. Weapons, State A -0.809 -0.215 0.171 -0.759* 
 (0.708) (0.298) (0.302) (0.412) 
 0.445 0.806 1.186 0.468 
Nuc. Weapons, State B 0.210 0.965*** 1.072*** 0.955*** 
 (0.488) (0.234) (0.191) (0.367) 
 1.234 2.625 2.920 2.6 
Distance -0.045*** -0.040*** -0.033*** -0.022*** 
 (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
 0.956 0.961 0.967 0.979 
Contiguity -0.052 -0.271*** -0.377*** -0.197*** 
 (0.154) (0.050) (0.051) (0.076) 
 0.949 0.763 0.686 0.821 
Power Parity 0.055 0.740** 0.503** 1.418*** 
 (0.608) (0.288) (0.217) (0.326) 
 1.056 2.095 1.653 4.129 
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Major Power, State A 1.375** 1.642*** 1.260*** 2.475*** 
 (0.656) (0.299) (0.313) (0.409) 
 3.954 5.167 3.525 11.88 
Joint Democracy -0.773 -0.619*** -1.246*** -1.600*** 
 (0.742) (0.232) (0.231) (0.398) 
 0.462 0.539 0.288 0.202 
Additional Controls … … … … 
Constant -6.510*** -3.787*** -1.544*** -4.096*** 
 (0.746) (0.258) (0.200) (0.423) 
     
Observations 1,108,572 1,108,572 1,108,572 1,108,572 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  A Relative Risk Ratio (in italics) score 
>1 indicates the outcome is more likely (at greater risk) to result in the DV outcome 
than the base group (no militarized action).  In addition to the control variables reported 
in the table, each model includes temporal controls for the years since the last conflict 
initiation and cubic splines of that variable. 
Significance:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05 using a two-tailed test.   
X2 (56) = 3120.29, p < .001 
 
 As hypothesized, cruise missile possession has a positive and significant effect on 
the use of threats or displays of force, as reported in Table 3.8.  Furthermore, the 
multinomial logistic regression model also confirms the previously established 
correlation between cruise missile possession and the use of force in a militarized 
interstate dispute.  Separate analysis of the reported relative risk ratios for the cruise 
missile possession variable confirms that across all measurements of MID hostility, states 
with cruise missiles are more likely than states without cruise missiles to choose threats, 
displays of force, force, or war to no militarized action at all.  Relative risk ratios are, 
“the likelihood of [an] occurrence after exposure to a risk variable as compared with the 
likelihood of its occurrence in a control or reference group.” (Chittaranjan 2015, 858).  
Specifically, when a state acquires cruise missiles, its risk of resorting to threats increases 
231 percent.  The risk of displaying force increases 260 percent.  Additionally, the risk of 
resorting to force or going to war is approximately two times as high as a state without 
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cruise missiles.  Notably, the significant negative coefficient and low relative risk ratio 
score on the joint democracy variable also provides some support for the  
democratic peace theory.24  However, as was the case in the previous analysis, Mettler 
and Reiter’s (2013) findings continue to struggle using MID data for the dependent 
variable.  Ballistic missile possession by the initiating state is not significantly correlated 
with threats, displays, uses of force, or war.  On the other hand, target states with ballistic 
missiles may be at a statistically significant risk of being the target of threats and display 
of force.  This risk could be attributed to counter ballistic missile proliferation efforts by 
other states. 
Endogeneity and Selection Effects 
 Having established empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that states armed 
with cruise missiles are more likely to use military force than states that do not have 
cruise missiles, I next investigate the possibility that the models suffer from endogeneity 
bias.  Endogeneity may occur when treatments, in this case cruise missile acquisition, are 
not randomly assigned to the population.  Sample selection bias may occur for two 
reasons (Heckman 1979).  First, the individuals under investigation may self-select into 
the sample.  Second, sample selection decisions by the researcher may operate to parallel 
the results of self-selection into the sample.  The observations used in this panel data 
were not randomly assigned.  Therefore, it is important to determine if states who acquire 
cruise missiles are not significantly predisposed to initiating conflict, regardless of their 
possession of cruise missiles.  To separate the decision to acquire cruise missiles from the 
                                                 
24 For more on democratic peace, the theory that democracies tend to not make war on 
one another, see Babst (1964), Doyle (1983b, 1983a), Russett (1995), and Maoz and 
Russett (1993).  For critiques, see Gowa (1998; 1999) and Rosato (2003).  
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decision to initiate militarized conflict, I follow Mettler and Reiter’s (2013) strategy of 
endogenizing weapon acquisition.  I use a three-equation multivariate probit model to 
first endogenize State A and State B’s decision to acquire cruise missiles, then predict 
State A’s likelihood of initiating a challenge (Chib and Greenberg 1998).   
Table 3. 9 Three Equation Probit Model of Cruise Missile Acquisition and Conflict 
  
Model 15  
ICB Challenge 
Model 16 
MID Initiation 
ICB Challenge / MID Initiation DV   
Cruise Missiles, State A 0.293*** 0.348*** 
 (0.048) (0.033) 
Cruise Missiles, State B 0.111** 0.183*** 
 (0.057) (0.036) 
Ballistic Missiles, State A 0.263*** 0.092 
 (0.069) (0.077) 
Ballistic Missiles, State B -0.341*** -0.051 
 (0.103) (0.071) 
Nuc. Weapons, State A 0.041 -0.097 
 (0.146) (0.134) 
Nuc. Weapons, State B 0.577*** 0.470*** 
 (0.093) (0.083) 
Distance -0.012*** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Contiguity -0.108*** -0.156*** 
 (0.020) (0.015) 
Power Parity 0.089 0.288*** 
 (0.081) (0.067) 
Major Power, State A 0.287* 0.654*** 
 (0.152) (0.141) 
Joint Democracy -0.402*** -0.408*** 
 (0.099) (0.059) 
Additional Controls … … 
Constant -2.008*** -1.324*** 
 (0.076) (0.074) 
Cruise Missiles, State A DV   
MTCR 0.528*** 0.528*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Development, State A 0.367*** 0.367*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
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Major Power, State A -0.024 -0.024 
 (0.036) (0.036) 
Nuc. Weapons, State A 1.436*** 1.436*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) 
Constant -0.923*** -0.923*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Cruise Missiles, State B DV   
MTCR 0.528*** 0.528*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Development, State B 0.367*** 0.367*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Major Power, State B -0.024 -0.024 
 (0.036) (0.036) 
Nuc. Weapons, State B 1.436*** 1.436*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant -0.924*** -0.924*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Rho 21 0.001 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Rho 31 0.003 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Rho 32 0.058*** 0.059*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Log Likelihood -1001798.2 -1011935.3 
Chi-Square (22) 28069.72*** 28566.82*** 
Observations 1,094,164 1,094,164 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to the control variables 
reported in the table, each model includes temporal controls for the years since the last 
conflict initiation and cubic splines of that variable. 
Significance:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05 using a two-tailed test. 
 Table 3.9 displays the results of the three-equation multivariate probit model.  
Again, I replicated the conflict models using the alternate dependent variables of ICB 
challenges (Model 15) and MID initiations (Model 16).  Consistent with previous results, 
there was little difference between the multi-variate probit models and previously 
modeled probit, logit, and fixed effects models.  Whether testing for the ICB challenge or 
MID initiation dependent variable, the result of the three-equation probit indicate that 
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even when endogenizing the acquisition of cruise missiles by both the initiator and 
defender, the direction and significance of the independent variable coefficients remain 
the same, with only a slight drop in coefficient strength.   
Unlike Mettler and Reiter’s (2013) surprising conclusion that there is no 
correlation between MTCR membership and ballistic missile acquisition, membership in 
the MTCR appears to be positively correlated with cruise missile acquisition.  This result 
also runs counter to Barkley’s (2008) assertion that MTCR membership is negatively and 
significantly correlated with ballistic missile acquisition.25  The MTCR is designed to 
curb the proliferation of weapons capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.  
Therefore, it follows for both ballistic missile and cruise missile proliferation to be 
negatively associated with regime membership.  There appears to be different 
mechanisms at work in cruise missile proliferation as compared to ballistic missile 
proliferation. 
The positive correlation between cruise missile acquisition and the MTCR 
variable suggests membership in the regime makes it easier for member states to acquire 
these weapons.  Unlike their physically larger and outranged cousins – ballistic missiles – 
cruise missiles do not hold as prominent a place in the MTCR (Government of Canada 
2017).  They are included in the technology transfer annexes of the regime, however, 
because sophisticated technology associated with cruise missile design and fielding 
constitute a barrier to acquisition for technologically weaker states.  As such, these states 
generally must rely on more technologically adept states to pass on their cruise missile 
                                                 
25 Barkley (2008) proposes the negative and significant correlation between MTCR 
membership and ballistic missile acquisition suggests the international norms influenced 
by the MTCR negatively impact the incidence of ballistic missile proliferation. 
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technology (Mistry 2002).  Paradoxically, these results suggest that membership in the 
regime signals the likely strengthening of export controls on the part of the receiving 
states, reducing the perceived risk that the state will, in turn, pass on newly purchased 
controlled technology to other, possibly rogue, states (Joshi 2016).   
One example of MTCR membership encouraging proliferation in practice is 
India’s 2016 induction into the MTCR (Joshi 2016).  Membership appears to have 
already boosted India’s efforts to acquire armed Predator drones from the United States.26  
Their involvement appeared to have paved the way for India to export its own BrahMos 
cruise missile to friendly states, provided the missiles’ capabilities fall below the 300 
kilometer/500 kilogram range to payload threshold required by MTCR Category I 
requirements (Government of Canada 2017; Joshi 2016; Mitra 2018).  Regardless of the 
complexities, membership in the regime is voluntary and non-binding, though the 
possibility that there is a significant and positive relationship between membership and 
proliferation should give arms control policy makers a moment of pause. 
Regime Type, Cruise Missiles, and the Use of Force 
 Having established empirical support for the hypothesis that states armed with 
cruise missiles are more likely to threaten, display, and use military force to coerce their 
adversaries than those states without cruise missiles, the question of regime type becomes 
a consideration.  As noted, previous research tends to tie the likelihood of using military 
force to popular support, vis-à-vis electoral accountability, in democracies and domestic 
                                                 
26 Though multiple states have obtained Predator drones from the U.S., these are typically 
the unarmed surveillance versions.  Only MTCR states, such as Italy, have been able to 
purchase the armed versions of the remotely piloted aircraft (Joshi 2016). 
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support, vis-à-vis the selectorate, and proximity to rivals in autocracies.27  Given the 
plethora of endogenous pressures, is there any difference between how cruise missiles 
affect the behavior of autocracies and democracies?  Hypothesis 3 posits there is no 
difference between the probabilities that democratic or autocratic states with cruise 
missiles will use military power to achieve foreign policy objectives. 
To examine the interaction between regime type, cruise missiles, and the use of 
force, I employ a logistic regression to compare the interaction effects between 
autocracies and democracies who are with and without cruise missiles.  Interactive 
models help researchers examine the difference in the effect on a dependent variable 
when independent variables are used in combination.  This method is helpful when the 
researcher’s objective is to understand the effect of one independent variable on the 
dependent variable when the size of the independent variable’s effect may be dependent 
on the magnitude of another, discrete, independent variable (Norton, Want, and Ai 2004).  
For example, Francis and Payne (1977) used this method in their examination of British 
voting behavior, noting differences between combinations of various independent 
variable coding consisting of demographic factors (i.e. age, gender, wealth) influenced 
their dichotomous dependent variable of whether or not an individual voted for the 
Labour or Conservative parties in British elections.  Having examined interaction effects, 
I further test the results of my model using marginal statistics to compare the difference, 
                                                 
27 For more on the nuances of regime type and the use of force, see Babst (1964), Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. (1999), Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995), Doyle (Doyle 1983b, 
1983a, 1986, 2005), Gartner (1998, 2008b, 2008a), Gartner and Segura (1998, 2000), 
Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening (1997), Larson (1996), Mueller (1973, 1993, 1994, 
2005), Russet et al. (1995), Belkin and Schofer (2003), Debs and Goemans (2010), Kim 
(2017), and Weeks (2012, 2014). 
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if any, between the probabilities an autocratic state with cruise missiles or a democratic 
state with cruise missiles will initiate an ICB challenge militarized interstate dispute. 
 
 I present the results of this analysis in Table 3.10.  As hypothesized, there was no 
significant difference in the probability a democratic state armed with cruise missiles or 
an autocratic state armed with cruise missiles will use military power to achieve their 
foreign policy objectives.  I replicate each interactive result with both the ICB challenge 
(Model 17) and MID initiation (Model 18) dependent variables.  Using the democratic 
state possessing cruise missiles as the baseline independent variable against which the 
listed pairs of independent variables are compared, Table 3.10 shows that although the 
coefficients for each dependent variable are negative, they are not statistically significant.  
Table 3. 10 Regime Type and Cruise Missile Possession 
  
Model 17  
ICB Logit of 
Interactions 
Model 18  
MID Logit of 
Interactions 
Autocracy with cruise missiles -0.079 -0.185 
 (0.258) (0.155) 
Democracy without cruise missiles -1.019** -1.257*** 
 (0.409) (0.174) 
Autocracy without cruise missiles -0.188 -1.141*** 
 (0.305) (0.157) 
Additional Controls … … 
Constant -1.718*** -0.973*** 
 (0.368) (0.241) 
Chi-Square (15) 51.25*** 2070.87*** 
Observations 2,390 1,101,110 
Note:  Results are based on the reference category, democracy with cruise missiles.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to the control variables reported in the 
table, each model includes temporal controls for the years since the last conflict initiation 
and cubic splines of that variable, ballistic missile possession, nuclear weapon 
possession, distance between states, geographic contiguity, power parity, major power 
status of State A, and joint democracy. 
Significance:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05 using a two-tailed test. 
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This indicates the effect is likely random, therefore we must retain the null hypothesis.  
Hence, the likelihood an autocratic regime with cruise missiles will use force in an ICB 
or MID situation is not significantly different from the likelihood a democratic 
government with cruise missiles will do the same.   
 When considering an ICB challenge, there is no significant difference between an 
autocracy without cruise missiles and a democracy with cruise missiles, although there 
does appear to be a significant difference between democracies without cruise missiles 
and democracies with cruise missiles, supporting my earlier findings that missile 
possession affects state behavior.  Because democracies and autocracies without cruise 
missiles are significantly different from democracies and autocracies with cruise missiles, 
using the MID initiation dependent variable it is safe to infer cruise missiles play a 
greater interactive role with regime type in a situation in which the outcome is polarized 
toward military outcomes, as in the MID data set, rather than general crisis outcomes 
which may or may not include military action, as in the ICB data set.  Similar 
incongruent results were observed elsewhere in this research regarding the standard 
control variables used between the ICB and MID dependent variables.  Finally, marginal 
effect analysis confirmed these observations.  There is little difference between the 
probability an autocratic state or a democratic state with cruise missile will initiate either 
an ICB challenge (9.93% and 10.04%, p < .001, respectively) or militarized interstate 
dispute (.49% and .32%, p < .001, respectively). 
 In practice, we have observed this null hypothesis in action.  For example, 
between 2014 and 2018, the United States and Russia became involved with the Syrian 
Civil war.  Each side in the conflict, American, Syrian, and Russian, possesses its own 
120 
 
cruise missile capabilities.  However, upon militarily entering the conflict, the United 
States and Russian sides have shown little reluctance to use cruise missiles to coerce their 
adversaries.  Russian cruise missile use has been a regular, though not exclusive, feature 
of their conventional attack strategy against alleged terrorist and anti-Syrian government 
forces.  The reason may be two-fold.  First, the Russians could be eager to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of their relatively new Kalibr sea-launched land attack cruise missile.  
Second, consistent usage of the Kalibr cruise missile in combat has provided the Russian 
military with needed reliability metrics to make future improvements in the design and 
use of the missile.  In the first few days of use, many Kalibr missiles launched from 
Russian ships in the Caspian Sea allegedly landed short in Iran, a blow to the missile’s 
credibility.   
American employment of cruise missiles in the Syrian conflict is more 
complicated.  Under the Obama administration, the United States, weary of further 
military entanglements in the Middle East, was reluctant to commit significant military 
forces to the region to support Syrian rebels.  However, following a chemical attack by 
the Assad regime on its own people in early 2017, the new American President, Donald 
Trump, ordered a limited scale cruise missile attack on a Syrian airbase (Conway 2017).  
When chemical attacks resumed, the United States, with the assistance of Great Britain 
and France, launched a larger attack the following year.  Though United States military 
involvement has not been as extensive as Russian involvement, each country has been 
willing to commit military force to achieve their objectives in the region.  Cruise missiles 
played a prominent role in each state’s military strategy. 
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Conclusion 
This research uses an explanatory sequential mixed method design to explore the 
possibility that states which acquire cruise missiles are more likely to use force to achieve 
their foreign policy objectives.  Over the course of three distinct phases of inquiry, the 
mixed method design includes quantitative data analysis, qualitative explanatory case 
studies, and integration.  This chapter constituted the empirical investigation of the 
quantitative phase of research by presenting the results of large-N analyses of original 
data collected on cruise missile possession combined with commonly-used conflict data 
sets.  Subsequent chapters build and expand on the results of the quantitative analysis 
through two nested case studies.  These case studies illustrate the mechanisms behind 
phenomena found in the quantitative phase of research.  They also help explain why 
cruise missiles represent a qualitatively different capability than most other military 
assets, effectively influencing how states approach foreign policy problems. 
The most important outcome in this analysis is the degree to which cruise missile 
possession appears to affect a state’s use of force.  Descriptive statistics and regression 
analysis supported the hypothesis that states armed with cruise missiles are more likely to 
use military force to achieve their foreign policy objectives.  Using both ICB and MID 
measurements of crisis and dispute initiation, correlation between possession is not only 
statistically significant, but substantively important as well.  These results held under 
closer scrutiny when controlling for endogeneity in a multivariate probit analysis of 
cruise missile acquisition and conflict.   
To explore whether the effect pertains to cruise missiles, in general, or is driven 
more by the often-used land attack cruise missiles, I performed separate analyses of land 
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attack cruise missile possession.  The results were surprising.  Although only eleven 
states possessed land attack cruise missiles during the period in question (1946-2007), 
there was a significant, though weaker, correlation between land attack cruise missile 
possession and crisis initiation.   
Having established a connection between cruise missile possession and the 
initiation of military force, I next turned to the effect of cruise missile possession on 
degrees of conflict short of force.  As George (1991), George, Hall, and Simmons (1971), 
Schelling (1956, 1960, 1967, 2008), Slantchev (2005, 2006b, 2009, 2011), and Snyder 
and Diesing (1977) advised, though coercion may involve brute force as a last resort, 
often military options will be limited to those actions which increase the credibility of 
threats such as displays of force.  In this chapter, I found empirical evidence to support 
the hypothesis that states armed with cruise missiles are more likely to use threats and 
displays of force to coerce adversaries.  Cruise missile states are approximately 2.5 times 
more likely to use threats and displays of force than non-cruise-missile states.   
North Korea’s behavior in the Yellow Sea, and China’s South China Sea 
incursions illustrate the ways cruise missiles are deployed to display force.  North Korea 
continues to back up threats of retaliation for perceived encroachments with the 
deployment of dated – though effective – anti-ship cruise missiles.  China has reinforced 
its South China Sea policy with the deployment of sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles 
on artificial islands.  These installations fill potential gaps left in their ballistic missile 
systems by advancements in western anti-ballistic missile defenses and send a clear 
signal that interference with China’s regional strategy may be costly (Bodeen 2018; 
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Goldstein 2015; Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan 2014; Michishita 2009; Panda 2017; 
Reuters 2018a). 
Finally, I examined the empirical evidence to determine if the interaction between 
regime type and cruise missile possession affects state behavior.  As hypothesized, I 
found no evidence to suggest cruise missiles change the probability that either a 
democratic or autocratic state will initiate armed force differently.  Instead, after 
accounting for regime type, missile possession, and state behavior, the interactive effects 
were negligible – less than one percent – whether I measured for ICB challenges or MID 
initiations. There were no significant differences in the coefficients between democracies 
with cruise missiles and autocracies with cruise missiles. The data indicates that cruise 
missile possession affects disparate types of governments relatively equally.  
Some weapons provide such a powerful military capability that it is important to 
understand how their possession affects the relationship between states.  The goal of this 
research is to investigate how cruise missiles affect the likelihood a state will use force to 
coerce its adversaries.  Empirical evidence in this chapter demonstrated the connection 
between state possession of cruise missiles and conflict initiation. There is a significant 
statistical correlation between having cruise missile capability and initiating conflict.  The 
proliferation of these weapons should alarm national leaders seeking to abate 
international conflict.  As large-scale warfare between major powers declines, the 
capabilities provided by cruise missiles may entice peripheral states who continue to be 
embroiled in small-scale conflict.   
In Chapter Four, I begin the qualitative phase of this research by examining the 
case of the Falklands Conflict.  Argentina entered the 1980s with a flagging military junta 
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in that some believe sought to mitigate domestic problems by capturing the long- 
contested Falkland Islands from Great Britain (Arquilla and Rasmussen 2001; DeRouen 
2000; Levy and Vakili 1992; R. A. Miller 1995, 1999; R. A. Miller and Elgün 2011; 
Mitchell and Prins 2004; Oakes 2006; Tarar 2006).  I posit the acquisition of air-launched 
Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles offered the denial element needed to dissuade the British 
from retaking the islands.  The bold move by Argentina failed.  Though the cruise 
missiles worked as intended, inflicting heavy damage on the British fleet and forcing 
changes to naval strategy, they were not enough to prevent the British from recapturing 
the islands.    
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CHAPTER FOUR:  THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT, 1982 
 
 
 This case study illustrates the conclusions highlighted in the quantitative strand of 
the analysis in Chapter Three through an examination of the role cruise missiles played in 
the Falklands Conflict of 1982.  The Falklands Conflict erupted when a recently-installed 
military junta in Argentina used armed force to reclaim the Falkland Islands from the 
United Kingdom.  The Falkland (or Malvinas) Island archipelago is a small cluster of 
windswept islands roughly 300 miles east of Argentina. 28  Since the 1700s, the United 
Kingdom has claimed the islands as a sovereign British territory, much to the 
consternation of the Argentine government, who claims historical dominion over the 
islands.  The islands’ contested status remained relatively stable until the Argentine 
military invaded in 1982 to reclaim them for Argentina.  This case study illustrates how 
Argentine cruise missile possession increased the probability that Argentina would 
abandon diplomacy in favor of a military solution to coerce the United Kingdom into 
abandoning this south Atlantic territory.  
I assert that cruise missile availability influenced Argentina’s leaders to initiate a 
conflict in the belief that their missile arsenal would deter a British military response.  I 
begin with a brief discussion of my case study selection strategy.  Then, I present the 
history of the dispute over the Falkland Islands, demonstrating that given the long history 
                                                 
28 Aside from the dispute over dominion, the name of the island chain is also in dispute 
even after the termination of the conflict under study.  The United Kingdom, under which 
the islands currently fall, calls the 6,000 square mile archipelago the Falkland Islands.  
Argentina, who also claims possession in right, if not in fact, calls the islands the Islas 
Malvinas.  For simplicity and continuity, this case study refers to the islands alternately 
as the Falkland Islands, or simply, the Falklands, and the overall conflict as the Falklands 
Conflict. 
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of conflicting claims, it was unlikely Argentina would resort to force to annex the islands.  
Next, I explain Argentina’s decision to go to war and the role cruise missiles played in 
that decision.  Finally, I discuss how the possession of new cruise missile capabilities 
contributed to Argentina’s decision to initiate the conflict.  This case study illustrates 
that, all things being equal, Argentine cruise missile possession increased the likelihood 
that Argentina would use force to occupy the islands. 
 
Case Selection 
Case study analysis allows the researcher to complement large-N statistical 
analysis by examining the circumstances behind phenomena in question through in-depth 
study.  Merriam (2009) defines a case study as, “an in-depth description and analysis of a 
bounded system.” (40)   Both case studies in this mixed method research project provided 
a description and analysis of the unique role played by cruise missiles.  The quantitative 
analysis in Chapter Three provided the empirical evidence for the general effect of cruise 
missiles on militarized conflict initiation, therefore I do not seek to uncover causality 
with this case study (Crasnow 2012).  The cases presented here and in Chapter Five 
illustrate how the qualitatively unique capabilities provided by cruise missiles increase 
the likelihood a state will resort to the use of force in pursuit of foreign policy objectives.   
Both cases in this research represent an instance in which the model used in the 
quantitative phase produced a high predicted probability of militarized conflict initiation 
that proved consistent with the historical record.29  The quantitative phase both identified 
                                                 
29 In Stata 15.1, this was accomplished using the predict command to create predictions 
for the sample on which the models from Chapter Three were fit using logistic 
regression. 
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cases that best fit the theoretical model (on-the-line cases) and tested the proposed 
hypotheses from Chapter Two for empirical support (A. Bennett and Elman 2007; 
George and Bennett 2005).  The purpose of the mixed method strategy used here is to 
improve conceptualization and increase confidence in the study’s overall findings by 
illustrating the quantitative phase’s conclusions (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; 
Lieberman 2005; Munck and Snyder 2007).   
The Falklands Conflict explains the cruise missile’s effect on state behavior in 
two ways.  First, cruise missiles increased the odds that Argentina would initiate armed 
conflict by providing a formidable anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capability. 30  The 
Argentine government mistakenly assumed the United Kingdom had lost interest in the 
region.  They believed their newly acquired A2/AD capability vis-à-vis air-launched 
Exocet cruise missiles would effectively deter the United Kingdom from attempting to 
recapture the islands by force.  Instead, the British, not fully aware of the operational 
status of Argentine cruise missiles and more intent on keeping the island territory than 
their strategic messaging indicated, mounted a strong military response.  Second, 
although Argentine cruise missiles did not effectively deter a British military response, 
their successful use against the British Navy had profound implications for British 
military strategy.  The missiles essentially forced the British Navy to keep their ships 
                                                 
30 This concept, Anti-Access/Area Denial or A2/AD, posits that adversarial forces can be 
successfully coerced to abandon a strategy by denying effective use and/or transit of an 
area.  This denial of access can span across military, economic, and political domains.  In 
military terms, this can mean denial of basing, transit, or overflight using long-rang 
weapon systems like cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, submarines, and space assets 
(Freier 2012). 
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beyond the range of Argentine aircraft, imposing significant logistical and operational 
challenges for the islands’ recapture.  
The Falklands Conflict case exposes how cruise missile possession can increase 
the chances of conflict by altering the initiating state’s probability of success.  Each 
situation’s strategic context must be taken into consideration along with other relevant 
factors in assessing conflict potential such as leadership assumptions and political 
ideologies (Bueno de Mesquita 1980).  States must consider many factors when deciding 
to initiate a conflict including systemic, dyadic, and unit level variables (Huth, Bennett, 
and Gelpi 1992).  System variables, such as the number of states involved in the situation 
and the concentration of military capability, produce uncertainty.  Dyadic variables, such 
as rival’s past behavior and military capabilities, affect the expected payoff of a military 
confrontation.  Finally, unit level variables such as domestic political considerations 
affect risk propensity.  Misperceptions, uncertainty, and resolve may set the conditions 
for changes in state behavior to the point that biased decisions are made based on 
preconceived notions about the adversary’s motives (Jervis 1968, 1976; Morrow 1989). 
Conflict, otherwise in neither state’s best interest, may come as the end product of 
a state’s pursuit of objectives through coercion when decisions are grounded in 
misperceptions about the adversary (Fearon 1995; Jervis 1968).  In the case of Argentina, 
misperceptions of British resolve met with British uncertainty over Argentine 
capabilities.  The resulting crisis produced the conditions Argentina needed to rationalize 
an invasion.  The Argentinians expected the payoff from forcibly taking the islands 
would outweigh the risk of provoking a great power.  The A2/AD capabilities provided 
by Argentina’s newly acquired Exocet air-launched cruise missiles contributed to this 
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rationale.  The Falklands Conflict illustrates how qualitatively different weapons can 
influence decisions to initiate conflict by offering the initiating state a denial capability 
sufficient enough that opponents might be dissuaded from, or unable to, respond with 
force (Belkin et al. 2002; K. Mueller 1998; Pape 1996).   
The Falkland Crisis offers a unique opportunity to examine the specific nature of 
the relationship between cruise missiles and conflict initiation.  The case is an example of 
a limited conflict in which a peripheral power, Argentina, attacked a great power, the 
United Kingdom.  The objectives sought were limited, as were the weapons employed.  
The use of limited weapons provided the ideal backdrop to examine how cruise missiles 
might be considered in the context of coercion (Freedman 1982; R. E. Osgood 1957).  
The case study demonstrates that cruise missiles played a significant role in increasing 
the probability Argentina would use force to capture the Falkland Islands while also 
increasing the likelihood the United Kingdom would be forced to incur great losses to 
reclaim them.  Furthermore, the Falklands case contributes to the overall large-N analysis 
by helping to clarify the directionality of the relationship between cruise missiles and 
conflict initiation (Maniruzzaman 1992).   
The statistical tests used in Chapter Three to estimate the causal direction of the 
relationship between the independent variable, cruise missile possession, and the 
dependent variable, militarized interstate dispute and crisis initiation, used lagged 
variables and multivariate probit analysis to control for the temporal order of acquisition 
and conflict.  The Falkland Conflict case highlights the importance of timing in 
estimating the effects of cruise missiles on conflict initiation.  The time between 
obtaining a relevant cruise missile capability and the decision to initiate conflict occurred 
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sequentially, over a relatively brief timeframe.  By providing an occasion to investigate 
the history of the dispute, we can explore the context surrounding the purchase and use of 
these weapons and their ancillary support systems (e.g. aircraft, technical assistance) in 
the late 1970s, and the surprising initiation of a militarized crisis in 1982.   
The case study begins by briefly presenting the historical context of the conflict 
from the archipelago’s European discovery and colonization in the 15th Century to the 
conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982.  Context in this case is key.  
Though possession of the islands was a clear point of contention between Argentina and 
the United Kingdom for more than 150 years, there was little indication that the South 
American country would attempt to take the islands by force until a confluence of events 
in the early 1980s created the conditions for invasion.  While the case study presented 
here does not provide a blow by blow account of the various battles that occurred 
between April and June of 1982, it does focus on the role cruise missiles played in both 
the lead-up to hostilities and the conflict.  The case study concludes by illustrating how 
the possession of these cruise missiles increased the probability that Argentina would 
change 150 years of non-violent strategy to attempt to take the islands by force. 
 
The Falkland Islands 
 The Falklands are an austere cluster of islands in the South Atlantic, 300 miles 
from the coast of Argentina, and near the Antarctic Circle.  Although claimed by the 
United Kingdom, they are more than 7,500 miles away.  The archipelago in which they 
lie covers over 6,000 miles, but the main landmass consists of two large islands, East and 
West Falkland, divided by a narrow sound.  The Falklands’ proximity to the Antarctic 
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Circle makes for a bleak climate, with an annual average temperature of 43 degrees 
Fahrenheit.  There are few trees on the rocky, windswept islands.  Most trees grow in the 
public park at the center of Stanley, the capital and population center (Hoffmann and 
Hoffmann 1984).   
The demographic and economic makeup of the islands is markedly British.  The 
British government named the islands in the honor of Viscount Falkland, the Royal Navy 
treasurer, in 1690.  At the time of the Argentine invasion in April 1982, the islands were 
home to 1,849 people (Dillon 1989).  All but five percent of the population were 
descendants of British colonists; the remainder were Argentinian, Chilean, and North 
American (Freedman 2005a; Hoffmann and Hoffmann 1984).  Sheep farming drives the 
local economy, though in the 1970s the prospect of nearby oil was beginning to drive 
exploration off the coasts.  However, by the early 1980s, the one billion barrels of oil in 
the region had yet to be discovered (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.; Critchlow 2015).  
Prior to 1982, the most significant military action in the Falkland Islands was a remote 
battle between the British and German navies in 1914 (Freedman 2005a).  To understand 
the calculus behind the Argentina invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982, it is important 
to understand the contested history of the islands’ possession. 
 
Falkland Island History 1502-1976 
 The central political problem in the Falkland Islands now as it was in 1982 is the 
250-year-old dispute over the islands’ ownership (Freedman 2005a).  Though several 
countries throughout history have claimed the islands for their own, for the last 150 years 
the international community has recognized the islands as British territory.  During this 
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time, however, Argentina, and its political ancestors, have disputed this claim.  
Regardless, despite the long and contentious history, there had been few serious attempts 
by Argentina to reclaim the islands.  Both the British and Argentine claims of ownership 
are based on a complex history of discovery, settlement, and treaty as outlined in Table 
4.1. 
The British claim Captain John Davies, aboard the HMS Desire in 1592, was the 
first to discover the islands.  Conversely, Argentina claims Italian explorer Amerigo 
Vespucci (and others) first sighted the islands in 1502.  But none of these discoveries 
involved going ashore.  The first landing attempts would not come until 1690 when 
British Naval Captain John Strong disembarked on the islands.  In 1748, having 
recognized the islands’ strategic significance as a base to interdict Spanish naval 
communications, the British attempted to establish a more permanent settlement.  Spain 
objected, citing treaties that appeared to grant them sovereignty over the region.31  
Although the British refuted the claims, they canceled the expedition to settle the islands.   
Later, following the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), France tried to use East 
Falkland to rebuild their colonial power by establishing a settlement.  Again, Spain 
contested French claims to the islands, and like the British before them, France 
abandoned the islands in the face of protest.  Spain then incorporated the would-be 
French settlement on East Falkland under the authority of the Captaincy General of 
Buenos Aires.  Immediately prior to the settlement between France and Spain, the British 
again arrived in West Falkland claiming the island for the King George III, ignorant of 
                                                 
31 The 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1604, the Treaties of 
Madrid of 1670, and the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 reinforced Spanish claims to the 
region. 
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both the deal between France and Spain and their adjacent settlements (Freedman 2005a).  
This time, however, Spain allowed the British to remain, although they failed to resolve 
the issue of sovereignty.  In 1774, political pressure and increasing expenses due to the 
rebellious North American colonies forced the United Kingdom to abandon their 
settlement plans once again; instead they left behind a lead plaque to announce their 
claim to the islands. 
 In the 1780s, Spain encroached on the abandoned British settlement and used it as 
a prison camp. The Spanish removed the plaque left behind by the British and established 
a foothold on the island to prevent British return.  Spain then tried to block future 
settlement of the islands through the 1790 Saint Lawrence Convention, which conceded 
navigation and fishing rights to the British in the Pacific Ocean, but prohibited settlement 
in the South Atlantic.  In 1806, the British mounted two failed military expeditions to 
capture Buenos Aires, and to retrieve their previously removed plaque. This forced the 
Spanish Governor to flee the Falklands (Freedman 2005a; Hoffmann and Hoffmann 
1984).  In 1811, the Spanish abandoned the island altogether with the ascendency of the 
Government of Buenos Aires for the United Provinces, the precursor of the modern state 
of Argentina.   
The Government of Buenos Aires claimed the islands as an inheritance from the 
Spanish and sent an expedition to establish a settlement in 1820 (Freedman 1982).  This 
new settlement, largely a private venture, was a commercial success prompting the 
Government of Buenos Aires to issue a decree in 1829 declaring dominion over all the 
former Spanish territories in the area.  Along with this decree, the government established 
a formal presence on East Falkland and the first formal military outpost.  The British, 
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however, having never abandoned their claim to the islands, expelled the Argentineans32 
by force in 1833, taking advantage of a falling out in relations between Argentina and the 
United States.  The United Kingdom established and maintained control of the islands 
from this point forward. 
 Argentina never abandoned its claims to the islands after 1833, but took no active 
measures to reclaim them by force for the next 150 years.  This reluctance to aggressively 
assert their claim can be attributed, in part, to the close economic relationship between 
the two states, resulting in British regional economic dominance by the late 1800s 
(Hoffmann and Hoffmann 1984).  In fact, between 1849 and 1884, Argentina lodged no 
formal protest against the United Kingdom for control of the islands at all, leading the 
British to believe they had abandoned their claims (Bluth 1987).  It was not until the early 
20th Century that Argentina, suspecting they were quietly becoming a British economic 
dependency, began to mount a stronger diplomatic campaign to establish their claim to 
the islands.   Even these protests were mild compared to an increase in interest in the 
islands’ disposition after World War II (Hoffmann and Hoffmann 1984).  
 In 1947, the Argentine government mounted a campaign to reduce British 
influence in its economy.  A new government, led by President Juan Perón, sought to 
nationalize the economy, beginning with seizing the national railway system from the 
British government.  President Perón also sent delegates to an inter-American conference 
in Rió de Janeiro to suggest the establishment of a hemispheric defense zone to prevent 
outside attack in the region.  This treaty zone included the Falkland Islands.  For the next 
                                                 
32 During this time, Buenos Aires suffered a series of governmental turnovers 
culminating in a civil war which ended in the establishment of the Argentine 
Confederation in 1831 (Lewis 2003). 
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decade, Argentina continued to lobby patiently for Falkland repatriation (D. Anderson 
2002). 
Table 4. 1 Falkland Islands Dispute Timeline, 1494-1982 
Date Event 
1494 Treaty of Tordesillas divides the Americas between Spain and Portugal 
1502 Argentina claims Amerigo Vespucci discovers the Falkland Islands 
1592 British claim Captain John Davies discovers the Falkland Islands  
1690 First recorded person, British Captain John Strong, lands on the island 
1748 British send an expedition to establish a settlement 
1764 French arrive on West Falkland and claim it for France 
1765 British establish a settlement on East Falkland  
1766 France and Spain broker a deal removing the French from the islands 
1774 British abandon their East Falkland settlement  
1780 Spain uses the former British settlement as a prison camp 
1790 St. Lawrence Convention prohibits British settlement in the South Atlantic 
1806 British launch two failed military expeditions to capture Buenos Aires 
1811 Spanish abandon islands, replaced by the Government of Buenos Aires 
1820 Government of Buenos Aires establishes the first commercial settlement 
1829 Government of Buenos Aires inherits Spanish claims in the South Atlantic 
1831 Government of Buenos Aires replaced by the Argentine Confederation  
1833 British expel Argentinian troops from the Falklands, reestablish settlement 
1947 Argentina attempts to reduce British influence on its economy 
1965 United Nations Resolution 2065 calling for Argentine/British negotiations 
1975 British send Lord Shackleton on an economic survey mission of the islands 
1976 Military junta takes power in Argentina   
1976 Argentina imports Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles from France 
1982 Argentina invades the Falkland Islands to retake possession 
1982 Exocets sink HMS Sheffield, SS Atlantic Conveyor: damage HMS Glamorgan 
Note:   Information for this timeline derived from Anderson (2002), Bluth (1987), 
Freedman (2005a, 2005b), and Hoffman and Hoffman (1984). 
 
In the 1960s, the United Nations took note of Argentina’s protests against British 
colonialism in the Western Hemisphere.  In November, 1965, the United Nations passed 
Resolution 2065, calling for the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to 
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begin serious negotiations over the disposition of the islands (United Nations General 
Assembly 1965).  The resolution called for “the Governments of Argentina and [the 
United Kingdom] to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by 
Special Committee on the Situation … with a view toward finding a peaceful solution to 
the problem, bearing in mind the … interests of the population of the Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas).” (United Nations General Assembly 1965, 57)  The United Kingdom began a 
slow campaign to discourage British investment in the islands, with an eventual goal of 
transferring sovereignty back to Argentina through negotiations.   A small but powerful 
political lobby in the British Parliament hindered diplomatic progress on the grounds that 
the United Kingdom should not abandon British subjects living on the island to 
Argentina.  By the 1970s, although the islands had become a drain on the British 
economy, the islanders wished to remain under British control, particularly given the 
social and political instability that characterized Argentina at the time.  Seeing little 
progress in the negotiations over Falkland sovereignty, Argentina grew impatient (D. 
Anderson 2002).  
 It is important to note at this point that since 1833 Argentina developed a 
consistent pattern of steady, yet peaceful, negotiation with the United Kingdom over the 
Falkland Island question.  At no time during the 150-year period between the final British 
occupation of the islands in 1833 and the Argentine invasion of 1982 did the use of force 
to recapture the islands appear significantly in Argentine political discourse.  Rather, 
island repatriation was a point of national pride for nostalgic and anti-colonialist reasons.  
Despite a chilling in relations following World War II, the history of close economic ties 
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created with United Kingdom since the early 1800s formed an incentive for Argentina to 
press for a firm, but peaceful solution to the Falklands issue. 
In the mid-1970s, Canada and the United States requested permission from the 
United Kingdom to explore for oil along the continental shelf in the waters surrounding 
the Falklands.  The possibility of oil in the Falkland Islands re-invigorated Argentine 
attempts to negotiate with the British over the islands’ sovereignty.  The British seized 
the opportunity to exploit oil resources off the islands’ coast in the hopes of mitigating 
the declining economic situation on the islands (Franks 1983); the prospect of 
sustainability provided an incentive for the British to further delay negotiations with the 
Argentine government (Hoffmann and Hoffmann 1984).   
To get a better understanding of the economic situation in the Falklands, Britain 
sent a survey team headed by Lord Shackleton33 to the islands in 1975.  The team’s 
report, An Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands (1976) painted a grim picture of the 
islands’ economic and social situation.  Shackleton’s report constituted an indictment of 
British colonial structure.  Exploitation of a single crop, sheep’s wool, resulted in a quasi-
feudal community rife with economic divestment and depopulation (Dillon 1989).  The 
report exposed a problem with the Falkland’s economy that the British Parliament had 
already begun to understand.  The Falkland Islands were a drain on the economy and a 
peripheral political interest.  The report highlighted to the British that the islands were 
almost solely dependent on Argentina for their communications and completely 
dependent on Argentina for their air transportation (Tugendhat 1976).  The authors 
asserted that the islands could be made economically viable without pushing the political 
                                                 
33 Lord Shackleton was the son of Sir Earnest Shackleton of Antarctic exploration fame. 
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fate of the islanders closer to Argentina (Freedman 2005a).  The survey recommended 
steps be taken to assure economic growth in the islands.  Specific recommendations 
included exploring for oil, building a permanent air strip that could accommodate longer-
ranged flights to countries other than Argentina, and to assist in improving lines of 
logistics and communication for the islanders (Calvert 1982). 
The British survey, and its subsequent report, increased Argentine suspicions that 
the British were not taking negotiations seriously.  The Argentine government refused to 
allow members of the survey team to transit Argentina in-route to the islands.  This 
stubbornness forced the survey team to arrive aboard the HMS Endurance, the only semi-
permanent British naval presence in the region.  In February, 1976, the government in 
Buenos Aires escalated their coercive strategy toward the Falkland question by 
threatening forcible seizure of the RRS Shackleton, a ship connected to the expedition, if 
it came within 200 miles of the Argentine coast.  The 200-mile limit included waters 
surrounding the Falkland Islands. On February 4th, an Argentine destroyer intercepted 
and fired warning shots at the RRS Shackleton in what would be the first significant 
military confrontation between the two countries in nearly 150 years.  Unbeknownst to 
Argentina, the incident drove the British to review their regional military policy, which 
up until this time had signaled a significant withdrawal from the South Atlantic.  As a 
result, the British decided to keep the HMS Endurance, the only armed warship in the 
region, near the Falklands for a year longer than planned (Dillon 1989; Freedman 2005a).   
The political environment in Argentina changed in 1976 following a coup in 
which a military junta replaced the democratically elected government.  Exasperated 
from years of social unrest, guerrilla warfare, and hyperinflation, the Argentine people 
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accepted the military’s ninth intervention in Argentine politics since 1900 (Gomez 2001).  
The military junta, led by the Argentine Army’s commander, General Jorge Videla, 
seized control of Argentina and began a “Dirty War” in which Argentinians suffered 
severe political oppression, mass disappearances, and steep economic decline.  With the 
coup came a new direction for Argentina, resulting in severe social, economic, and 
military consequences (Makin 1983). 
Huntington (1968) called Argentina a “praetorian society” for its high capacity for 
corruption and violence to superficially correct social malaise.  In 1976-1983 Argentina 
embodied this praetorianism by putting an end to what the military junta perceived to be 
political and social chaos through torture, kidnappings, and extrajudicial executions.  
During this time, it was not uncommon for decapitated, anonymous, bodies to wash up on 
the beaches of Buenos Aires, having been tossed from naval vessels offshore (Schmidli 
2011).  Much of the turmoil stemmed from the new military government’s primary 
weaknesses:  inter-service rivalries and divided internal politics (Calvert 1982).  By 1982, 
however, the government was on the verge of insolvency due to burgeoning domestic and 
foreign debt.  The substantial debt not only limited Argentina’s ability to enact needed 
economic reforms, but also restricted the funding of widespread domestic oppression the 
junta believed was needed to suppress the population (Oakes 2006). 
 
The Decision to Escalate the Dispute 
 By the early 1980s, the United Kingdom had no clear strategy for the South 
Atlantic.  On the one hand, it was sending strong signals that they were no longer 
interested in maintaining a presence in the South Atlantic.  On the other hand, the United 
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Kingdom seemed intent on safeguarding the rights of the British citizens on the islands 
(Bratton and Thies 2011).  The scheduled removal of the HMS Endurance would 
essentially eliminate any significant British military presence in the region (Dillon 1989).  
The ship was to be replaced by a small contingent of 70 Royal Marines on East Falkland 
in 1981 (Freedman 1982).  The same year, the British cancelled a new military barracks 
project in Port Stanley (Bratton and Thies 2011).  The removal of the HMS Endurance 
and the installation of the small Royal Marine contingent left no appreciable British 
military presence in the South Atlantic.  Furthermore, as a member of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) with a flagging domestic economy, the United Kingdom 
had largely divested itself of its force projection capabilities.  Instead, NATO ally 
countries were increasingly relied upon to conduct expeditionary operations outside 
Europe.  The British were steadily divesting themselves of the ability to significantly 
conduct military operations beyond Europe. 
 On 10 and 11 September, 1980, the British Minister of State, Nicholas Ridley, 
Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister, Comodoro Cavandoli, and Commandante Bloomer-
Reeve,34 held secret meetings in Geneva, Switzerland, to discuss the future disposition of 
the Falkland islands (Falklands: FCO record of Anglo-Argentine Ministerial talks on the 
Falklands [declassified 2010] 1980).  At the meeting in which, “It was agreed … that 
complete secrecy was essential to both sides,” (1) the British and Argentine 
representatives discussed the possibility of gradually transitioning Falkland sovereignty 
to Argentina.  The meeting was considered so secret that Mr. Ridley’s presence in 
                                                 
34 Commandante Bloomer-Reeve would become the post-invasion civil administrator in 
the Falkland Islands. 
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Switzerland was scheduled under the guise of a painting holiday and the Argentine 
representatives were officially believed to be in Rome (Briley 2005).  At the meeting, the 
British emphasized the islanders’ hostility to Argentine rule, fearing they would be forced 
change their way of life and face economic and social uncertainty.  At the same time, the 
islanders were concerned over competing claims of sovereignty fearing, “armed clash 
could never be ruled out.” (Falklands: FCO record of Anglo-Argentine Ministerial talks 
on the Falklands [declassified 2010] 1980, 1).  Mr. Ridley proposed reducing islander 
anxiety through a 200-year leaseback arrangement to transfer ultimate control to 
Argentina.  Over that time, the Argentine government would have the opportunity to 
engage with the islanders over economic and municipal affairs, bringing their relationship 
closer.   
The Argentine representatives were receptive to the proposal of a leaseback 
arrangement, but objected to a 200-year lease period.  They understood a shorter period 
(e.g. 20 years) would be too soon to ensure a successful and compete transition, and so 
offered 75 years as a compromise.  The Argentine representatives also proposed the 
immediate removal of the Royal Marines garrisoned on the island as a demonstration of 
good faith.  In the exploratory proposal handed to the Argentinians at the meeting’s 
conclusion, the British suggested a 99-year leaseback which included flying the 
Argentine and British flags side by side on the island.  Though the leaseback proposal 
would be met with hostility from both the British Parliament and the Argentine people 
(Briley 2005), the message to Argentina was clear in 1980.  The British were willing, 
under the right circumstances, to give up the islands. 
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By 1981, the Argentine government became increasingly convinced that the 
United Kingdom was no longer taking the defense of the Falkland Islands seriously 
(Calvert 1982).  The British reinforced this misconception with the planned removal of 
the HMS Endurance, the closure of an Antarctic survey base on South Georgia, and 
lessons learned from seventeen years of steady negotiations.  With a weak Argentine 
economy and support for the junta flagging, the government examined the feasibility of 
occupying the islands by force.  If the United Kingdom was already sending signals that 
they were uninterested in the islands, an occupation may coerce the British to finally give 
up the islands.  The Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr. Nicanor Costa Mendez, believed the 
British would be “too civilized” (quoted in Calvert 1982, 59) to respond to such an 
incursion with force for such a peripheral interest.  The Argentine government decided to 
test this hypothesis by probing the British response to a minor incursion (Arquilla and 
Rasmussen 2001). 
On 19 March 1982, an Argentine naval transport, ARA Bahia Buen Suceso, 
landed 41 Argentine contractors on South Georgia island where they hoisted an 
Argentine flag (Bratton and Thies 2011).  The group was ostensibly on a mission to 
recycle metal from a defunct whaling station.  The plan, code named “Project Alpha” by 
the Argentine military, was a plot to use subterfuge to quietly intermingle Argentine 
troops with the civilian contractors, use naval vessels to regularly transport logistics, and 
quietly establish a permanent presence on the recently abandoned island (Freedman 
2005a).  The British government protested, calling the incursion unannounced and illegal.  
They demanded the Argentine workers leave the island.  The Argentine navy dispatched 
two ships to lie offshore as protection while the metalworkers remained on the island 
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(Calvert 1982).  The HMS Endurance, scheduled soon to be withdrawn from the area, 
was dispatched with Royal Marines to remove the workers (Hopple 1984).  By the time 
the HMS Endurance arrived at South Georgia on 21 March, it appeared the Argentine 
vessels had departed with the shore party and the crisis was over (Freedman 2005a).35 
For the Argentine government, however, the British reaction to the South Georgia 
incident was troubling.  They did not anticipate such outrage from the British.  On 24 
March, the Argentine military ordered two missile corvettes to position themselves 
between the Falkland Islands and South Georgia, but did not order them to intercept the 
HMS Endurance.  The same day, the junta met to discuss the issue.  They requested the 
military plans to take the islands by force be presented (Freedman 2005a).  
The junta met several times prior to the incident to discuss a possible incursion.  
In January, they decided that if the current round of negotiations, taking place in New 
York, should fail, they should consider taking the islands by force during the winter of 
1982.  The plan, codenamed “Operation Rosario,” operated under two assumptions 
(Bratton and Thies 2011).  The first assumption was that the Argentine military could 
take the islands by surprise in a bloodless attack, making the islands’ capture more 
palatable to the international community.  The second assumption, given apparent British 
willingness to surrender the islands over the long term, was that the British would not use 
force to remove the Argentine occupation forces from the islands.  However, with the 
unexpected British response to the South Georgia incident, the junta was concerned that 
they may have inadvertently provoked the British to reinforce their island defenses.  
                                                 
35 In fact, some salvage workers remained on the island, unbeknownst to the British 
(Freedman 2005a). 
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Therefore, if action was to be taken, it would need to be taken soon and be backed by a 
A2/AD capability sufficient enough to deter or deny a British military response (Bratton 
and Thies 2011).  Thus, the junta decided to launch Operation Rosario on 2 April, months 
ahead of the original timeline and, ironically, the best possible time for a British response 
(Hopple 1984).36 
 
The Exocet Factor 
By the 1970s, Argentina, like some other peripheral states, began procuring cruise 
missiles as a way to augment gaps in their naval defenses (J. T. Bowen 1997).  In the 
early years of the Cold War, cruise missiles presented a way to surmount the 
technological challenges posed by ballistic missile technology to deliver nuclear 
weapons.  By 1960, however, many of those challenges had been overcome and cruise 
missiles were relegated to the role of naval defense weapon (Betts 1981).  The Soviets, 
falling behind the United States in naval capability, needed a low-cost weapon that could 
put American capital ships at risk.  This requirement led to a special emphasis on the 
development of anti-ship cruise missiles in the 1950s.  Prior to the Falkland Conflict, the 
                                                 
36 If Argentina adhered to its original extended timeline, the invasion may have gone 
uncontested.  As it was, the British fleet was concentrated at home for the Easter holiday, 
making a Falkland contingency deployment logistically simple.  Moreover, if Argentina 
had waited even longer, the British would have lacked critical aircraft carrier support.  
The Royal Navy’s two aircraft carriers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, were to be 
sold to Australia the following year, leaving the navy with limited power projection 
capabilities.  Finally, a delay of only a few months would have seen arms purchases and 
Argentine readiness issues completed and addressed (Dabat and Lorenzano 1984).  This 
disregard for seemingly basic strategic considerations provides strong evidence that the 
Argentine government did not believe the British would send a military response to end 
the incursion (Hopple 1984). 
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most notable cruise missile accomplishment was the 1967 sinking of the Israeli destroyer, 
INS Eilat, by a small Egyptian gunboat armed with Soviet P-15 Termit anti-ship cruise 
missiles, known in the West as the Styx missile.  The INS Eilat incident demonstrated the 
power of cruise missiles to level asymmetric naval playing fields, signaling to the world 
that smaller, less advanced, or poorly funded navies can seriously threaten, and possibly 
defeat, more capable navies.  The incident triggered a demand for anti-ship cruise missile 
technology, especially in militarily weaker, peripheral, states.  The Exocet anti-ship 
cruise missile was a product of this demand.  Its relatively low cost and ease of 
procurement made the Exocet one of the most popular anti-ship cruise missiles in the 
world (Associated Press 1987; Farenkopf 2016). 
In 1976, Argentina began receiving its first shipment of Exocet cruise missiles 
from France (SIPRI 2015).  The AM-39 Exocet, designed by Emile Stauff for the French 
company Aerospatiale, is an air-launched anti-ship cruise missile.  It is a standoff weapon 
capable of launching from an aircraft to an ocean-going target up to 50 kilometers away.    
The Argentine military ordered ten air-launched Exocets and their corresponding delivery 
aircraft, the Super Etendard, from France in 1979 to complement their MM-38 sea-
launched Exocets received in 1976 (Figure 4.1).37  By 1982 five of the aircraft and 
missiles had been delivered (Eddy, Linklater, and Gillman 1982).  The Exocet is a cruise 
missile of modest capability.  Its range is unremarkable, and its payload, 165 kilograms 
of explosives, is not particularly large (Arnett 1991).   
                                                 
37 The MM 38 sea-launched Exocet variant was only used once in the conflict, to little 
effect, when launched from a makeshift shore battery against the HMS Glamorgan on the 
last day of the conflict (Freedman 2005b). 
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The Exocet’s real value is revealed when attacking enemy shipping.  The French 
advertised the AM 39 Exocet to the Argentinians as a “fire and forget” weapon (Gerding 
Figure reprinted from The Falklands War, by Paul Eddy, Magnus Linklater, 
and Peter Gillman, 1982, Copyright 1982 by Andre Deutsch. 
Figure 4. 1  The Super Etendard Exocet 
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2002).  From beyond the visual range (BVR), an aircraft can select the target from a radar 
display, fire the missile, then run to safety.  Once launched, the missile skims the ocean’s 
surface, while the internal navigation system – consisting of an active radar system – 
autonomously seeks out the target on the horizon.  This makes the Exocet well-suited to 
the job of denying an enemy access to a contested area.  The task of locating the target is 
simplified on the ocean’s surface where the only radar return on the horizon is usually a 
high-profile enemy ship. 
While the air-launched Exocet may be “fire and forget,” the weapon system is 
certainly not “purchase and forget.”  In addition to the missiles and aircraft, the Exocet 
system purchased by Argentina required everything from spare parts for the missiles and 
delivery aircraft to pilots trained to proficiently shoot the missiles.  In such an endeavor, 
Argentina needed to acquire and maintain both tacit and explicit knowledge of the Exocet 
system.  Tacit knowledge is, “the product of a uniquely fertile social and intellectual 
environment composed of mentors and proteges.” (Gormley 2008b, 6).  Conversely, 
explicit knowledge consists of, “engineering or formulations that can be recorded and 
passed easily from one place to another.” (Gormley 2008b, 6).  In short, tacit knowledge 
is cultural and organizational and explicit knowledge is mechanical, technical, and 
portable.  Developing expertise in Exocet operations would be challenging for pilots and 
maintenance personnel alike.  The Argentine military activated a new naval squadron, the 
Second Attack Squadron, and sent their best pilots to France for familiarization training.  
By 1981, Argentina had not only obtained five of their ten Exocets ordered from the 
French, but also had pilots trained to use them (Eddy, Linklater, and Gillman 1982). 
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 While the Argentine military may have had five missiles and delivery aircraft, the 
system was not fully functional at the close of 1981.  One of the final requirements for 
the Exocets to become operational was the physical act of mating the missiles to the 
Super Etendard aircraft.  The Argentine Air Force and Navy still lacked the tacit 
expertise to surmount technical difficulties encountered in the mating process; they were 
forced to ask France for a support team/crew to assist them.  The French dispatched their 
team from the French aerospace company, Aerospatiale, in November 1981, only five 
months prior to the Falkland invasion.  The French team proved invaluable in the early 
days of the conflict by helping properly mate the missiles to the aircraft and run critical 
function tests beyond the capabilities of Argentine technicians (Thomson 2012).  Without 
the French team’s help, Argentina’s ability to use the Exocets during the conflict would 
have been doubtful (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1991).   
 By mid-April, 1982, it became clear to the Argentine government that the British 
would send a military response to the incursion. Argentina actively pursued ways to 
receive the additional five undelivered missiles, knowing each Exocet would play an 
important role in the defense of the newly held islands.  However, when hostilities 
commenced in April 1982, the United Kingdom requested its NATO allies impose an 
arms embargo on Argentina, putting pressure on France to cancel or delay the shipment 
of the last five missiles to Argentina (D’Odorico 1994).   
Despite the embargo and pledges of solidarity with the British, the French made a 
covert attempt to ship the five remaining Exocets through Peru (Coles 1982; Tweedie 
2012).  The British, understanding these missiles were likely destined for Argentina, sent 
a strongly worded telegram to France stating that shipment of the missiles would have, “a 
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devastating effect on the relationship between [the] two countries.” (Thatcher 1982, 3).  
There is additional evidence Argentina attempted to obtain their missiles through Libya.  
The British also discovered this plot, though it never came to fruition.  The Exocets so 
concerned the British that they even attempted a clandestine raid by Special Air Service 
commandos on the Argentine mainland to eliminate Argentina’s Exocets on the runway 
(Harding 1981; Southby-Tailyour 2014; Taylor 2017). 
 Argentina ultimately never received shipment of the final five Exocets they 
anticipated before the end of the conflict in June 1982.  However, the Argentine Navy 
used the five Exocets they did have to deadly effect against the British.  When the British 
dispatched warships to the South Atlantic, they did so with the understanding that 
Argentina still could not properly mate its Exocets to the Super Etendards.  Unbeknownst 
to the British fleet, the French assistance team had already dispatched to Argentina to 
correct the mating problem (Eddy, Linklater, and Gillman 1982).  On 4 May 1982, two 
Argentine Super Etendards each fired an Exocet missile at British warships.  One hit the 
ocean, while the other hit the HMS Sheffield with devastating effect.   
The British Royal Navy deployed the HMS Sheffield, a Type 42 destroyer, in an 
anti-submarine capacity to protect the British fleet’s two aircraft carriers.  When the 
Argentine Super Etendards fired their Exocets, they did so beyond the visual range of the 
ship and at such a low altitude, the aircraft themselves went undetected.  When the HMS 
Sheffield’s crew finally realized that they were under attack, it was only seconds before 
the missile impacted the ship (Watson and Dunn 1984).  Although the official British 
investigation claimed the 165-kilogram warhead on the Exocet failed to explode (a 
common problem for conventional munitions used by the Argentinians throughout the 
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conflict), officers aboard the Sheffield claimed the warhead did explode, contributing to 
the 20 dead and 27 injured sailors.  Regardless of which account is accurate, a massive 
fire broke out, likely caused by the Exocet’s onboard fuel, forcing the crew to abandon 
the ship.  The HMS Sheffield eventually sunk on 10 May.   
The British inability to detect and effectively defend themselves against a weapon 
flying only meters above the ocean, at near the speed of sound, contributed to Argentina’s 
success (Corum 2002; Freedman 2005b).  The HMS Sheffield’s sinking was the first time 
since 1945 a major Western navy would come under sustained air attack, and was a 
sobering experience for the British who now clearly understood the threat the Exocet’s 
posed (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1991; Speller 2002).  The use of Exocet anti-
ship cruise missiles forced the British fleet to alter operational tactics, reassess their naval 
strategy in the Falklands, and develop ad hoc countermeasures (Armstrong 1982; Pereyra 
2006). 
 With two of five Exocets expended, the Argentine military needed to choose their 
targets carefully.  The sinking of the HMS Sheffield boosted flagging Argentine morale.  
Several days prior to the HMS Sheffield’s sinking, the nuclear submarine HMS 
Conqueror, sank the Argentine naval cruiser, ARA General Belgrano.  This incident 
resulted in the loss of 321 Argentine sailors, nearly half the total loss of life on both sides 
of the conflict (Bluth 1987).  On 25 May, Argentina struck another major blow to the 
British fleet with the sinking of the container ship, SS Atlantic Conveyor.  On a mission 
to attack one of the two British aircraft carriers operating in the region, two Argentine 
Super Etendards each fired Exocets from long range at what they thought was one of the 
two carriers (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1991).  Instead, the HMS Ambuscade, a 
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British destroyer, detected the launch and began to lay down a chaff pattern to confuse 
the incoming missiles (Omand 1982).38  On this day, the chaff disbursed from the HMS 
Ambuscade confused the Exocets, sending them through the clouds to reemerge on the 
other side and lock on to another large target in the region, the SS Atlantic Conveyor, a 
civilian cargo vessel stocked with equipment intended for the eventual island invasion.  
Like the HMS Sheffield, the SS Atlantic Conveyor was destroyed by fire and sank, 
killing 12 sailors (Watson and Dunn 1984). 
 The final victim of Argentine Exocet attack would not meet such an ignominious 
fate.  After the ARA General Belgrano was sunk, the Argentine Navy largely withdrew 
their fleet to the mainland.  The sea-launched Exocets were then unusable (Bluth, 1987), 
but on 12 June, the final day of the conflict, the Argentine Army fired two sea-launched 
Exocets at the HMS Glamorgan from an improvised shore battery, which they created by 
attaching launch cannisters to a truck trailer..39  The Exocet battery previously attempted 
an attack on 2 June, but one of the two Exocets failed to leave the canister and the other 
missed its target, falling harmlessly into the sea (Freedman 2005b).  On 12 June however, 
one of these improvised batteries successfully fired one Exocet, in the third of three 
attempts, hitting the HMS Glamorgan in its helicopter hangar.  This caused relatively 
minor structural damage, but killed 14 sailors.  The Royal Navy attributed the resulting 
good luck to the actions of the ship’s navigator who, at the last minute, altered the HMS 
                                                 
38 After the sinking of the HMS Sheffield, the Royal Navy discovered, with French 
assistance, that they could use chaff – small strands of radar-reflective foil – to confuse 
the Exocet’s targeting system.  When dispersed in metallic clouds, the Exocet’s targeting 
radar confuses the chaff cloud for a ship and reorients itself (Rivers 2001).   
39 Iranian-backed Houthi-forces would use a similarly improvised system in 2016, firing 
modified Chinese CSS-N-8 Saccade cruise missiles from Yemeni shores at American 
naval ships. 
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Glamorgan’s course.  This decisions caused the missile to miss the ship’s center, instead 
hitting an area where it would to the least damage (Inskip 2012; Watson and Dunn 1984). 
The HMS Glamorgan was the last of three ships struck and damaged out of three 
successful Exocet attacks.  Following the sinking of the HMS Sheffield, William Perry, 
then the American Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and future 
Secretary of Defense, suggested that the sinking of the HMS Sheffield would confirm the 
lessons of the INS Eliat a decade prior.  In his view, surface warfare ships had become 
remarkably vulnerable to precision guided weapons, changing the nature of military 
operations (Wicker 1982).  By the 1990s, anti-ship cruise missiles would become the 
most important naval weapons in most countries’ inventories due to their destructive 
capability and the ease with which they can be transported by both aircraft and even the 
smallest naval vessels to inflict reliable damage on their targets (Carus 1992). 
 
Discussion 
 This chapter illustrates the role of cruise missiles in the Argentine decision to 
capture the Falkland Islands by force.  I selected this case because it represents an 
example in which the models used in Chapter Three produced a relatively high predicted 
probability of militarized conflict initiation on the primary independent variable, cruise 
missile possession.  The case study also identified several relevant issues that are worth 
noting regarding the lead-up to the Falkland Conflict.  First, an enduring feature of the 
islands’ history for 250 years was contention over which country held sovereignty over 
the archipelago.  The United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Argentina have all claimed the 
islands for their own, but at no time in their history did they attempt to use appreciable 
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military force to assert those claims.  Second, for 150 years prior to the Argentine 
incursion, the status quo political disposition of the islands was largely undisputed.  It 
was not until after World War II that post-colonial sentiments in the United Nations and 
historical nostalgia in Argentina prompted a serious effort to negotiate an Argentine 
repatriation.  Third, negotiations between the United Kingdom and Argentina in the years 
prior to 1982 appeared to indicate a British willingness, largely driven by economic 
concerns, to return the islands to Argentina.  These three factors would indicate that the 
prospect of a military solution to the question of Falkland sovereignty was unlikely prior 
to the invasion.   
However, as this case study illustrates, several factors converged to make 
invasion more likely.  I argue that one of these factors was the Argentine procurement of 
air-launched Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles in the late 1970s, which offered the ability 
to deny a successful British military response to invasion.  The Argentinians may have 
overestimated the effect these missiles would have on British calculations to respond with 
force.  British military and political statements after the conflict indicate that British 
leadership underestimated Argentine military capability, especially where cruise missiles 
were concerned, and failed to offer a focused policy toward the Falkland Islands’ political 
disposition.  This British misperception contributed to an unwillingness to offer 
concessions in pre-invasion negotiations with Argentina.  Argentine misperceptions 
provided room for the government to believe the capabilities provided by their newly 
acquired Exocets may provide the military advantage needed to dissuade British military 
retaliation.   
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The purchase of Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles influenced Argentine behavior 
by increasing the chances that they would use force to achieve their foreign and domestic 
political goals.  When combined with the domestic political context, Exocet cruise 
missiles played an important role in Argentina’s strategic calculations.  The advanced 
missiles allowed Argentina’s military to expand their coercive options and strengthen the 
Argentine belief that an invasion would be successful.  Knowing the only military option 
for the United Kingdom lay with the British Navy, possession of a weapon that could 
successfully deny or degrade British naval strategy promised to be a decisive factor 
should a response come to fruition.  Ultimately, only a few more Exocets in the 
Argentine quiver may have been enough to thwart the British counter invasion, as later 
suggested by the commander of the British task force, Admiral Sandy Woodward (1992).  
The vigorous effort to make the missile systems fully operational immediately prior to 
the initiation of the conflict illustrates the important role the missiles played in the 
ultimate decision to invade.  Despite only having a handful of these missiles ready, their 
unique capability to defend against enemy naval attack made the air-launched Exocets a 
key component of Argentine strategic calculations, increasing the likelihood of Argentine 
success in the face of flagging British resolve. 
Recent events reinforced Argentine hopes of military success in several ways.  
First, the Shackleton Report exposed the reality that the islands were an economic drag 
on the United Kingdom, and though there may have been potential to exploit the yet-to-
be discovered offshore oil deposits, reversing the economic trend would have been costly.  
Second, there was international pressure on the United Kingdom to settle the matter.  
U.N. Resolution 2065 gave Argentina a legitimate forum with which to press the issue 
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with the United Kingdom.  The spirit of anti-colonialism in which the United Nations 
drafted the resolution may have given Argentina the perception of achieving the moral 
high ground.  Finally, clandestine negotiations in which the British provided detailed 
proposals for transfers in sovereignty provided a solid indication to the Argentine 
government that the United Kingdom was interested in turning over the islands.   
The United Kingdom’s military posture in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
indicated a lack of resolve, and possible lack of ability, to respond to a military incursion 
in the Falklands.  The British had already began executing plans to significantly reduce, if 
not eliminate, their South Atlantic military presence.  With the sale of the Royal Navy’s 
aircraft carriers, they would soon lose the ability to respond to an out of area crisis with 
appreciable naval airpower.  The perceived lack of resolve was only reinforced when 
Argentina adopted an apparent “try and see” coercive strategy when the Argentine 
government successfully landed a pseudo-military party on South Georgia Island in 1981, 
ostensibly testing British resolve over reclaiming the small territory (George 1991; 
George, Hall, and Simons 1971).  Though the action provoked a British response, it was 
lukewarm, consisting of a small artic patrol vessel and 22 Royal Marines.   
The final element that reinforced Argentina’s belief that the United Kingdom 
would not respond to an Argentine incursion related to the possession of the cruise 
missiles themselves.  Having obtained both sea and air-launched Exocet cruise missiles, 
Argentina would have been reasonably confident that an attempt by the United Kingdom 
to retake the islands by force would be extremely costly for the Royal Navy in terms of 
men and material.  Figure 4.2 illustrates Argentina’s some of the key factors that went 
into Argentina’s decision to initiate conflict. 
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 The Argentine junta had considerable reason to believe that they would increase 
their political capital with an armed takeover of the Falkland Islands.  Domestic strife, 
social unrest, and a flagging economy pointed to a need to initiate a diversionary foreign 
conflict to bolster support for the military junta.  In the face of a low extractive capacity 
that reduced the junta’s ability to maintain sustained oppression, options less risky than 
the use of military force were unavailable (Oakes 2006).  Successfully claiming the 
islands for Argentina after 150 years of British occupation would also resolve a 150-year 
cultural blight on Argentina’s colonial history.  Finally, though not yet substantiated, the 
belief since the early 1970s that oil reserves existed in the waters surrounding the islands 
promised a probable economic boon for both Argentina and the United Kingdom.  This 
potential may itself have been a strong economic incentive to increase the vigor over 
which the two nations decide the matter of sovereignty.  Oil revenues would inject a 
much-needed stimulus in both economies, and enable the Argentine government to pay 
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Figure 4. 2  Key Factors in Argentina’s Decision to Invade  
 
Note:  A2/AD = Anti-Access/Area Denial.  Adapted from Oakes, Amy. 2006. 
“Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands.” Security 
Studies 15(3): 431–63 (2006) 
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for required economic and social reforms to stabilize the turbulent domestic political 
situation. 
 The Argentine government, through selective strategic assumptions, believed the 
United Kingdom had low political utility in the South Atlantic (Hopple 1984).  Since the 
1965 U.N. referendum, the British government faced increasing international pressure to 
resolve the sovereignty issue in the Falklands.  Economically, the Falklands had become 
a lead balloon.  British citizens were increasingly disenchanted with paying to subsidize 
the island and the British government had been losing money on the islands for some 
time (Hoffmann and Hoffmann 1984).  Militarily, the United Kingdom in the 1970s and 
early 1980s was executing a policy of global withdrawal.  In the South Atlantic they 
signaled military abandonment with plans to remove and scrap the HMS Endurance and 
the cancellation of military improvement projects such as a new barracks and runway 
extensions in Port Stanley.  Finally, the disinterested way in which the British conducted 
negotiations over the islands, in addition to secret entreaties for ways to hand over the 
islands and still save political face, further signaled a desire to pass the islands back to 
Argentina.  
 These considerations notwithstanding, actual British resolve was not public 
information.  The most significant problem faced by the Argentine military, therefore, 
was the possibility that the British would decide to send a fleet to retake the islands.  
Although Argentina believed they would simply occupy the islands and the British would 
protest to little effect – as had happened often in the 1970s – the possibility of a naval 
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confrontation loomed.40  By obtaining ship-launched MM 38 and air-launched MM 39 
Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles, the Argentinians believed they raised the potential 
military costs for the Royal Navy, lessening the risk of a military response and improving 
their bargaining position (Fearon 1995).  What was uncertain in the Argentine military 
was just how much weight that cost would have in the British government.   
Given the Argentine perception that the British were not likely to respond 
militarily to an incursion to the islands, the threat of anti-ship cruise missiles, especially 
the more dangerous air-launched MM 39 Exocets, may have been just enough to increase 
the probability that the British would not respond.  What is clear is that the British, for 
their part, not only believed Argentina lacked the capability to deliver their air-launched 
cruise missiles to a target, but also severely underestimated the damage the Exocets could 
inflict on the British fleet (Eddy, Linklater, and Gillman 1982).  This misunderstanding of 
key pieces of strategic information helped to negate any effect the Exocets may have had 
on Argentina’s ability to extract a better outcome from the dispute.  However, once the 
conflict was under way, the Exocet’s capabilities became clear to the British Navy, 
forcing significant changes to their operational strategy.  In fact, Admiral Sandy 
Woodward, the Royal Navy force commander in charge of Falkland operations, stated 
after the war that, had one of the Exocets hit a British aircraft carrier, the British mission 
would have likely been over (Woodward 1992).   
                                                 
40 In the 1970s, multiple islands had been taken by force with little or no repercussions.  
Iran seized several islands in the Persian Gulf, China occupied the Paracels, Vietnam 
seized the Spratleys, Indonesia took East Timor, and Turkey occupied a portion of 
Cyprus.  While each of these incidents garnered international attention and often 
condemnation, in the end, they were successful (Hopple 1984). 
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Thus, in the case of the Falklands Conflict, Argentina’s private knowledge of the 
Exocet’s capability likely increased the probability that Argentina, a state that tolerated 
British occupation of the islands for 150 years, would choose to initiate an armed 
confrontation with the United Kingdom over the islands.  In turn, the Britain’s 
intelligence failure regarding Argentina’s actual cruise missile capability made the former 
more likely to opt for a military response to the Argentine invasion.  Combined, these 
two conditions helped to escalate the long-simmering Falklands dispute into a militarized 
interstate crisis.  
 The Falklands Conflict provides an ideal example of how cruise missile 
possession may increase the likelihood of conflict initiation.  This case demonstrates that 
a dispute that simmered relatively peacefully for a century and a half could suddenly 
come to a boil, in part influenced by the introduction of the potential anti-access/area 
denial capabilities provided by cruise missiles.  By increasing the chances of success, 
Argentina’s possession of cruise missiles helped rationalize the Argentine junta’s 
decision to occupy the islands by force, believing that the British, suffering from an 
incoherent foreign policy and their own domestic problems, would likely not opt to 
enforce their sovereignty claims.  It is important to point out that the cruise missiles alone 
did not cause the conflict or provide such an overwhelming incentive that invasion would 
prove irresistible or inevitable.  Generally, increases in military capability would produce 
the opposite effect, by simply allowing the state with growing capability to extract a 
better bargain, avoiding war altogether (Fearon 1995; Signorino 1999).  However, rapid 
shifts in the distribution of power – especially those which are essentially private 
information to one party – can increase the likelihood of conflict if the opposing state is 
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unaware of that shift (R. Powell 2012).  The latter appears to have played a role in the 
Falklands Conflict.  
The argument presented above is that cruise missiles increased the probability that 
Argentina would initiate the use of military force by providing a qualitatively important 
capability – unrecognized by the British – that convinced the Argentine government that 
invasion was worth the risk.  Next, I expand on these findings by illustrating another way 
cruise missiles may influence how states act in coercive bargaining situations.  In Chapter 
Five, I present the case of “missile diplomacy” exercised by the Unites States following 
the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  The American case typifies the “new” utility of cruise 
missiles in the third phase of cruise missile development whereby advancements in 
precision navigation provide a capability to exercise military force as coercion and/or 
punishment in situations in which the states may desire to limit commitment or resources 
to further international policy.   
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CHAPTER FIVE:  U.S. CRUISE MISSILE DIPLOMACY, 1992 – 2000 
 
 
 Like Chapter Four, this case study illustrates the quantitative results from Chapter 
Three.  It presents a qualitative example of how the possession of advanced land attack 
cruise missiles increased the probability the United States would use military force by 
providing viable coercive options to address security challenges while lowering the risk 
to troops and minimizing collateral damage.  Unlike the case study presented in Chapter 
Four, which represented a relatively narrow timeframe centered around a specific 
incident, the 1982 Falkland Conflict, this case study spans a greater timeframe 
encompassing several instances identified by Chapter Three’s data analysis as having a 
high predicted probability of occurrence.  Specifically, I examine the “Tomahawk 
Diplomacy” (Pretsch 1999, 1) that characterized American foreign policy from 1992-
2000.  During this time, the United States increasingly favored the Tomahawk land attack 
cruise missile as a means to resolve foreign policy challenges.  Throughout the 1990s, the 
United States launched Tomahawks on eight separate occasions against a variety of state 
and non-state adversaries.  Though this chapter focuses on the cruise missile events of the 
1990s, it is worth noting that the United States continues to rely on land attack cruise 
missiles, attacking adversaries on nine occasions over eighteen years.  In other words, in 
the 27 years since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States has initiated military 
force – using cruise missiles – at an average rate of more than once every other year. 
The examples presented here demonstrate that a state armed with cruise missiles, 
particularly modern and technologically sophisticated derivatives such as the American 
Tomahawk, Indian BrahMos, or Russian Kalibr missiles, may employ force as a coercive 
foreign policy tool in ways states without these missiles cannot.  These states may not 
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only maintain the ability to attack an adversary’s targets with stealth and precision, but 
exploit these attacks as a means of threatening and demonstrating punishment for future 
transgressions.  The purpose of this case study is to examine how the United States, 
armed with cruise missiles, lowered its threshold for the exemplary use of force to punish 
undesirable adversarial behavior, not otherwise meeting the level of vital state interest; 
compel changes in the status quo or reverse a state’s actions; and deter future 
transgressions (Byman, Waxman, and Larson 1999; George 1991; George, Hall, and 
Simons 1971; Schelling 2008). 
The United States, seizing upon a revolution in military affairs,41 discovered a 
new role for cruise missiles following the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  Cruise missiles 
promised an innovative way to exercise coercive diplomacy and punishment abroad 
while reducing the risk to troops and lowering the degree of commitment associated with 
military force deployments (Brigety II 2007; Butfoy 2006; Sparks 1997).  Twenty years 
after the Vietnam experience, which continued to haunt the American psyche, the public 
sustained a resistance to long wars with substantial casualties (Hendrickson 2002b; T. C. 
Morgan and Campbell 1991).  President William J. Clinton capitalized on the cruise 
missile as a way to demonstrate resolve in a post-Cold War world increasingly 
punctuated by small conflicts, terrorism, and genocide while avoiding the entanglements 
that come with long term conflicts (Luttwak 1994).  Late in President Clinton’s 
                                                 
41 The idea of a “revolution in military affairs” is derived from Soviet military analysts of 
the 1970s and 1980s who foresaw a coming shift in battlefield operations driven by 
advances in military technology. Future militaries would no longer be dependent on 
massive troop deployments and kinetic effects.  Instead, future conflict would be marked 
by a movement toward improved command and control, electronic and information 
warfare, and non-lethal methods of conflict (Metz and Kievit 1995). 
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administration, General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that 
when presented with a panoply of retaliatory options, President Clinton, “went straight 
for the cruise missile option” (Quoted in Zenko 2010, 69) to limit civilian casualties. 
Although the United States possessed cruise missiles for a half century prior to 
the 1990s, technological limitations such as imprecise and complicated navigation 
systems and nuclear-focused missions constrained the ways in which national leaders and 
military strategists thought about these weapons (Betts 1982; Mustin 1988).  But in the 
1990s, the cruise missiles’ technical and political value changed after the missile’s 
success in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  Technical improvements to accuracy, navigation, 
and range increased operational control.  Increased control took the cruise missile beyond 
its nuclear-focused mission, enabling new and previously impractical conventional 
missions.  Politically, the fall of the Soviet Union allowed new approaches to using force 
in foreign policy without the fear of inciting a conflict between the superpowers 
(Pfaltzgraff and Shultz 1992).  Cruise missiles offered the ability to strike at foreign 
targets while avoiding the risk of generating unpopular military casualties; miring the 
state in nebulous and open-ended foreign military commitments; and eroding popular 
support for foreign conflicts.  This case study seeks to understand these changes to 
explore how the capabilities cruise missiles offer may increase the likelihood a state will 
engage in a militarized interstate dispute. 
The case study proceeds in three parts.  First, I explain how casualties and 
collateral damage affect American public opinion and domestic support for armed 
conflicts.  Using survey data from the end of the Cold War, I reveal how the American 
domestic political environment in the 1990s shaped a need to avoid collateral damage, in 
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general, and military casualties, specifically.  Second, I introduce the Tomahawk land-
attack cruise missile.  A leap forward in technology, the Tomahawk became known for its 
success and capabilities in the 1991 Gulf War, quickly becoming, “‘the weapon of 
choice’ and the primary means of delivering a military punch to achieve political gain.” 
(Sparks 1997, xix).42  Third, I examine incidents of cruise missile use from the end of the 
1991 Persian Gulf War to the 1999 Operation Desert Strike in Iraq.  I show that the 
Clinton Administration felt political pressure to act decisively when faced with security 
threats, but the lessons learned from unpopular quasi-military adventures of the early 
1990s constrained their choice of politically acceptable actions (e.g. the humanitarian 
intervention in Somalia).  Thus, the administration found cruise missiles to be the optimal 
means of using military force in a politically acceptable way (Adler 2000; Hendrickson 
2002b; O’Hanlon 2003).  Post-Cold War American presidents face popular and personal 
moral pressures to avoid casualties to both American troops and foreign civilian 
populations when considering military options.  The modern cruise missile, through 
flexibility, precision, and reliability, makes a military response to security concerns a 
viable and attractive option, and perhaps the only politically tenable military option 
available. 
 
                                                 
42 The air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) used by the U.S. Air Force, and the sea-
launched cruise missile (SLCM), or Tomahawk, used by the U.S. Navy are derivatives of 
the same basic design with the major difference between the two relating to the types of 
warheads they can carry.  The ALCM can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads, 
while the SLCM carries conventional munitions only.  Because the SLCM can launch 
from nearby naval vessels; whereas the bomber aircraft carrying the ALCM require long 
flights, refueling, and possible basing options; the SLCM is usually the preferred weapon.  
Therefore, in this chapter, I focus on the SLCM using its common moniker, 
“Tomahawk,” though either weapon may be used, depending on mission requirements. 
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Casualties and Public Opinion 
Research on the effect of casualties on public opinion varies considerably.  It 
appears public support for conflict goes beyond policy objectives and simple calls for 
revenge.  Morgenthau (1948), speaking of the profound influence world public opinion 
can have on the actions of a nation, put it best: 
Whenever the government of any nation proclaims a certain policy or 
takes a certain action on the international scene, which contravenes the 
opinion of mankind, humanity will rise regardless of national affiliations 
and at least try to impose its will through spontaneous sanctions upon the 
recalcitrant government. The latter, then, finds itself in about the same 
position as an individual or a group of individuals who have violated the 
mores of their national society or of one of its subdivisions and are by 
society's pressure either compelled to conform with its standards or be 
ostracized. (198) 
 
Although international power would seemingly be served in the reduction, or elimination, 
of the enemy’s population, postulated Morgenthau, ethical limitations built into the 
international framework keep such options in check, delivering an incentive to limit 
casualties in the name of legitimacy.  As war between nations became increasingly about 
contesting armies, the moral imperative to avoid killing noncombatants became a duty, 
culminating in the Hague conventions in 1899 and 1907 (Morgenthau 1948). 
In his examination of the Vietnam and Korean conflicts, Mueller (1973) 
uncovered evidence that Americans are more sensitive to relatively small losses in the 
early stages of a conflict, but over time, sensitivity to casualties erodes, requiring larger 
and larger losses to sway public opinion.  Mueller noted that the American populace uses 
heuristics based on the attitude of the president, the position of the individual’s political 
party, and predisposed ideologies (i.e. hawks vs. doves) when forming their opinions on 
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whether the United States should be engaged in a conflict and whether the conflict was 
ultimately worthwhile.   
Conversely, Jentleson (1992) and Jentleson and Britton (1998) asserted that 
variations in public support are better explained by the conflict’s public policy objective.  
These researchers demonstrated that there are three categories of principle policy 
objectives that purposively shape opinion:  foreign policy restraint; internal political 
change; and humanitarian intervention.  People are more likely to support military action 
to force or coerce an enemy acting aggressively against the United States or its interests 
than they are to exercise force to engineer political change in another country.  A third 
type of military intervention, humanitarian operations, demand clear strategies and 
multilateralism to sustain a positive public opinion in the wake of unsuccessful 
interventions such as the 1993 American intervention in Somalia.   
Larson (1996) and Larson and Savych (2007) built on this work, showing that the 
public support for military force employment is largely contingent on the government’s 
and its allies’ efforts to avoid casualties.  Those collateral casualties that do result, which 
some studies show are generally accepted as part of doing military operations (Berinsky 
2009; Dieck 2015; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009; J. E. 
Mueller 1973; K. A. Osgood and Frank 2010), are only tolerated when the costs and 
benefits of the operation, as opposed to the expected casualties, are understood and 
efforts are made by the government to avoid collateral damage as much as possible.   
The 1991 Persian Gulf War punctuated the end of the Cold War.  Public concerns 
about American casualties and collateral damage increased in light of the newfound 
realization that precision weapons could reduce both military and civilian casualties, 
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while still meeting military objectives (Larson and Savych 2007).  This increased concern 
constrains the President’s ability to use armed force, shaping the type of military 
operations regarded to be politically possible (Byman, Waxman, and Larson 1999).  Part 
of the reason for this aversion to casualties may be, paradoxically, a result of the Persian 
Gulf War’s overwhelming military success, demonstrating the power of precision high 
technology weapons.  Although battle deaths on the American side were projected to be 
in the thousands, a number deemed acceptable to the public at the time given the 
importance of the political objective, only 294 American were killed, and of these only 
149 deaths were battle related (O. R. Holsti 2011; J. E. Mueller 1993).  Consequently, 
American popular support for the intervention remained high throughout the conflict, 
even if it was to drop in the long run with many Americans believing the United States 
should have removed Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq (CBS Staff 2001).43   
Aside from arguably superior training and doctrine, American technological 
superiority was largely credited with the scant loss of life on the side of the allied 
coalition sent to expel Iraq from Kuwait … and the huge loss of life on the Iraqi side 
(Houlahan 1999).  Effectively, the 1991 Gulf War led domestic audiences to expect few 
casualties in future conflicts.  Table 5.1 shows that by 1999, the number of American 
lives that might be lost in a conflict was an overwhelming factor (86%) for support for 
any future military actions, followed closely by the number of civilians who may be 
killed (79%) (Larson and Savych 2007).    
                                                 
43 A CBS News poll conducted in 2003 found that public opinion as to whether or not the 
Gulf War had been worth it dropped from a 60% approval rating in 1993 to 51% in 2003 
(CBS Staff 2001). 
168 
 
 
The Clinton administration inherited an American public who increasingly 
expected low American casualties.  Elected under a domestic platform, critics worried 
President Clinton would be reluctant to continue the international engagement that 
characterized his predecessors, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.  But by 2000, 
Clinton’s presidency would be marked by a number of limited military operations 
including multiple strikes in Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kosovo (Butfoy 2006).  Aided 
by new technologies, a changed international political landscape, and a Congress willing 
to defer war powers to the president (Hendrickson 2002b), the conditions were set for 
President Clinton to embark on a proactive international agenda.   
Table 5. 1 Importance to Americans of Civilian Deaths Using the Military 
“No one wants our nation to get into any conflicts in the future, but as 
in the past, our leaders might someday decide to use our armed forces 
in hostilities because our interests are jeopardized.  I know that this is a 
tough question, but if you had to make a decision about using the 
American military, how important would each of the following factors 
be to you?” 
Affirmative 
Responses 
(Percentage) 
Number of American lives that might be lost 86 
Number of civilians who might be killed 79 
Whether American people will support 71 
Involvement by major power (e.g. USSR PRC) 69 
Length of time fighting 61 
Possibility of failure 56 
Whether allies/other nations will support 56 
Fact that we might break international laws or treaties 55 
Cost in dollars 45 
Source:  Americans Talk Security #9 poll conducted September 7-18, 1999, N=1005.  
Quoted in Larson and Savych (2007, 4) and Larson (1996, 7).  
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Marking a drastic change from his predecessors who governed in the context of 
collective defense and containing communism, Clinton’s national security strategy 
reflected a new direction, engagement and enlargement (Clinton 1994; Harden 1995).  
Clinton was not bound by the strategic limits of Cold War bipolarity, but was free to 
firmly establish a new role for the United States as global hegemon willing to exact 
punishment day or night at a time and place of its choosing, while images of precision 
smart bombs guided through enemy windows played on American television sets. 
 
The Clinton Presidency and a Revolution in Military Affairs 
Long range precision bombing presented a revolution in military affairs.  This 
technological revolution promised to deliver low casualties as technological superiority 
increased (Metz and Kievit 1995).  The strategy for defeating a country from the air had 
evolved since General Giulio Douhet’s (1983) treatise on aerial warfare, The Command 
of the Air, in 1921.  Air power strategy no longer called for a state’s cities to be 
decimated to bend the people’s will.  Instead, precision strikes could make pinpoint 
attacks on specific enemy centers of gravity to disrupt the enemy’s ability to operate as 
occurred in the Persian Gulf War (Lambeth 1997; Warden III 1988).  By 1990, new 
technologies largely corrected the deficiencies of earlier airpower theories, making it 
possible to strike at the enemy’s vital centers at an acceptable risk to the attacker (Mets 
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1998).44  Cruise missiles embodied the concept of “risk free” and decisive military action 
(Sparks 1997).  Their high-profile use in the Persian Gulf War demonstrated that they are 
versatile weapons able to strike a target, with little or no risk to military personnel, day or 
night and in any weather (Cohen 1993).  While F-117 stealth fighter aircraft attacked 
under a cloak of darkness, American cruise missiles, flying below enemy radar, attacked 
Iraqi targets during the day resulting in an around the clock bombardment throughout the 
air campaign.   
A quick study of the technological lessons learned from the Gulf War, President 
Clinton wanted to appear decisive abroad (Figure 5.1), while still adhering to his political 
platform of domestic reform (K. A. Osgood and Frank 2010).  The ability to wage limited 
warfare, with limited objectives, resources, and commitment, seemed tailor-made for the 
revolution in military affairs and the unmanned, precision weapons that came with it (R. 
E. Osgood 1957).  The nature of warfare was transformed in a way it had not been since 
the creation of nuclear weapons.  Events abroad no longer required states to commit 
troops, material, and political capital to extol punishment for international transgressions.  
Instead, a state needed only a ship nearby, with the proper weapons to attack a handful of 
symbolic targets to send a coercive message, all the while limiting collateral damage 
                                                 
44 For example, in the interwar years between World War I and World War II, airpower 
strategy in the United States was dominated by the theories produced by the Air Corps 
Tactical School in Montgomery, Alabama, and inspired by General Billy Mitchell’s 
thoughts on the use of airpower in combat from World War I.  Breaking from the 
previous doctrine that relegated airpower to the tactical support of ground troops on the 
front lines, these theories proposed strategic strikes on enemy vital centers, such as 
industry and civilian morale, as a means of bypassing front-line warfare.  The combined 
bomber offensive in Europe during World War II was largely the product of this thinking.  
But due to the limited navigational and targeting technology of the time, this strategy was 
incredibly inefficient and costly in terms of lives and material.   
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through precision strikes.  Zenko (2010) dubbed these types of operations “Discrete 
Military Operations” or “a single or serial physical use of kinetic military force to achieve 
a defined military and political goal by inflicting casualties or causing destruction, 
without seeking to conquer an opposing army or capture or control territory.” (2)  These 
limited operations typified American military conflict in the 1990s. 
 
The revolution in military affairs also exposed a troubling change in the 
international order.  With the increasing automation and digitization of warfare, a gap 
began to widen between states who “have” advanced military technology and states who 
“have not,” exposing a growing a rift between the United States and just about every 
other state after the fall of the Soviet Union (Butfoy 2006).  This gap increased the 
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importance of paying attention to purpose, strategy, doctrine, and adaptation before 
throwing time and resources into “silver bullet” (Cooper 1997, v) weapon technology 
without considering the strategic implications.  But in 1991, following the successes of 
the Gulf War and frustrations over Somalia that would see public support plummet in the 
wake of peripheral conflicts that result in high profile American casualties (Burk 1999), 
the Clinton administration would embrace just such as silver bullet.  The Tomahawk 
cruise missile promised to not only limit political commitment, but to limit casualties 
while appearing decisive on the domestic and international fronts (Harden 1995).  As 
weapon precision increased, the force to be applied became more “humane” and therefore 
more acceptable (Brigety II 2007; Coker 2001). 
 The United States entered the last decade of the Twentieth Century in a changing 
world.  The Soviet Union would soon be gone leaving a unipolar global political 
environment ostensibly led by the remaining superpower.  But this was a world 
increasingly marked by a resurgence of animosities and regional conflicts, great powers 
unwilling to risk soldiers in combat, and an American political discourse increasingly 
concerned with military casualties (Luttwak 1994, 1996).  In this emerging context, the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided an opportunity to highlight new weapons and doctrine 
that leveraged the revolution in military affairs by significantly reducing collateral 
damage.  The revolution provided the impetus for an expectation that future conflicts, 
limited in scope, would entail little risk to American troops.  Precision autonomous 
weapons brought the belief that targets could not only be attacked at will, but attacked in 
such a way as to leave a reasonable expectation that civilian collateral damage would be 
held to a minimum.  Cruise missiles were a key weapon in this context.  Given this 
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framework, the next section will discuss the cruise missiles the Clinton administration 
had at its disposal in the 1990s. 
 
The Tomahawk’s Role in U.S. Coercive Strategy 
The highest profile cruise missile in the 1990s was the sea-launched Tomahawk 
Land Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM).  The Tomahawk presented an evolutionary leap in 
cruise missile capability, breaking from the cruise missile’s historical role as a relatively 
unsophisticated anti-ship missiles to that of a highly accurate and maneuverable weapon 
with revolutionary area penetration capability.  With the change in attention from nuclear 
firepower to conventional accuracy and range toward the end of the Cold War, the 
Tomahawk’s production stood to transform the way the United States thought about the 
strategic application of force.45   No longer focused solely on the nuclear mission, yet 
fighting limited conflicts like those in Vietnam, Korea, and Grenada, American 
policymakers finally had a weapon that could fill a strategic gap.  Missiles provided a 
rapid response to limited threats that required a choice between inaction.  They also 
minimized the risk of appearing weak or irresolute, and helped avoid action that could 
escalate into larger, unwanted, conflicts (Brigety II 2007).   
The Tomahawk provided the American military with the capability to strike deep 
behind the enemy’s borders at will, bypassing defensive systems, and disrupting 
                                                 
45 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the threat of mutually assured destruction abated 
driving the U.S. political and military focus to shift to non-nuclear regional conflicts and 
threats, such as those exemplified by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991.  Such a 
change in focus away from strategies involving nuclear weapons required new thinking in 
conventional deterrence and global strategy (Alston 2008; Gerson 2009; T. Paul 1995; T. 
V. Paul 1995; Tannenwald 1999) 
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equilibrium.  It could do all this while virtually denying the enemy’s ability to neutralize 
those costs or respond in kind (Byman, Waxman, and Larson 1999).  In short, the 
Tomahawk’s ability to strike deep in enemy territory to directly affect the adversary’s 
center of gravity was, and remains, the embodiment of the B.H. Liddell Hart’s “indirect 
approach” (Hart 1991).  Table 5.2 presents the Tomahawk’s technical specifications.   
Table 5. 2 Consolidated Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile Specifications 
Initial Operational Capability 1984 
Length 6.25 meters 
Wingspan 2.67 meters 
Speed 880 kilometers/hour 
Range 1250-1600 kilometers 
Guidance INS; TERCOM; DSMAC; GPS 
Propulsion Cruise turbo-fan engine; Solid fuel booster 
Warhead W80 Nuclear Warhead; 1000-pound 
conventional warhead; conventional 
submunition dispenser with bomblets 
 
Accuracy (Circular Error Probable) 10 meters 
Note:  Specific characteristics differ from model to model.  INS = Inertial Navigation 
System; TERCOM = Terrain Contour Mapping; DSMAC = Digital Scene Matching 
Area Correlator; GPS = Global Positioning System 
Derived from “Tomahawk Cruise Missile.” 2017. U.S. Navy Fact File. 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=1300&ct=2 (June 20, 
2017) and Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2016. “Tomahawk.” Missile 
Threat. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/tomahawk/.  (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies 2016; Tomahawk Cruise Missile 2017) 
Named for the Native American war axe, the United States Navy describes the 
Tomahawk as, “an all-weather, long range, subsonic cruise missile used for deep land 
attack warfare, launched from U.S. Navy surface ships and U.S. Navy and United 
Kingdom navy submarines.” (Chief of Information 2017).  There are three variants of the 
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Tomahawk cruise missile.  The Tomahawk Block II nuclear variant (TLAM-N), an air-
launched cruise missile, utilizes INS and TERCOM for navigation and contained a W80 
nuclear warhead capable either a five or 150 kiloton yield (The W80 Warhead 2007).  A 
conventional variant of the Block II, the TLAM-C, was a sea-launched variant of the 
Block II and the cruise missile workhorse of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, launching 288 
TLAM  attacks from 16 surface ships over the course of the short war (United States 
Department of Defense 1992).  Despite lacking the accuracy of laser guided precision 
weapons, the Block II complemented the F-117 Stealth Fighter, enabling coalition forces 
to pressure the Iraqi military 24 hours a day while minimizing the risk to aircrews 
(Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson 1994).46   
The Tomahawk’s success in the Gulf War demonstrated unmanned, stealthy 
platforms could now strike accurately from a distance almost anywhere on the globe 
(Figure 5.2), a lesson that would prove invaluable in future conflicts (United States 
Department of Defense 1992).  In 1993, the Tomahawk Block III entered service 
incorporating GPS guidance, extended range, and greater accuracy.  The Block III was 
first employed in Operation Deliberate Force to strike targets in Bosnia in 1995 and again 
in Iraq in 1996 (Federation of American Scientists 2016).  The latest variant of the 
Tomahawk, the Block IV, is 60 percent more accurate (Stevens, Spence, and Young 
1995), contains an onboard camera for damage assessment and the ability to loiter over 
an area for ad-hoc long range targeting, and the longest range of any sea-based weapon - 
1,000 miles (Pallone 2017; Tomahawk Cruise Missile 2017).    
                                                 
46 In all, 333 cruise missiles were used in the Gulf War including TLAMs, CALCMs, and 
the Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM) (Cohen 1993). 
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The Tomahawk’s first successful combat venture was the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  
From the initial phases of the campaign, the Tomahawk was used to attack heavily 
defended targets in Baghdad, leveraging its ability to fly largely undetected and in any 
weather condition.  Though 32 Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (CALCMs) 
were also sent to Iraq – fired from B-52 bombers rather than navy destroyers and 
submarines – they represented only a small portion of the total cruise missiles force 
(Stevens, Spence, and Young 1995).  As there were no CALCMs prepositioned in 
forward deployed location such as Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory, B-
52s needed to be armed in the United States and flown on a 14,000 mile round trip to the 
area of operations (Stevens, Spence, and Young 1995).   
 
Reprint from Stevens, Ted, Floyd Spence, and CW Bill Young. 1995. “National 
Security and International Affairs Division B-256664.” 
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA296538 (August 5, 2017). (Stevens, Spence, and Young 1995) 
 
Figure 5. 2  Areas Covered by the Tomahawk's Range 
Block Ill coverage from outside 12-nautical mile territorial waters 
D Block Ill coverage from outside 12-nautical mile territorial waters 
D iNo coverage 
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It was much more effective for the American military to lean on the Tomahawk 
which could be carried aboard Navy ships and submarines in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, 
and Mediterranean Sea (Cohen 1993).  However, because engineers had not yet 
introduced GPS to the Block II model, and satellite navigation was relatively new to 
military operations, the Tomahawks were limited by their TERCOM navigation systems 
which required observable land features to operate.  Navy target planners were concerned 
the featureless desert in southern Iraq would not provide the features required for 
accurate navigation (Stevens, Spence, and Young 1995).  In response to this concern, the 
Navy devised a clever work-around:  they programmed their missiles to fly over the 
Zagros Mountains of Iran in order to ensure accurate navigation before turning west to 
strike targets in Baghdad (Atkinson 1993).  The Tomahawk taught military planners that 
it was possible to strike vital Iraqi targets early in the campaign which could have 
otherwise resulted in unacceptable losses of aircraft and aircrews.  While the exact 
number of missiles that reached their targets is difficult to determine due to lack of 
verifiable battle damage assessments, the Center for Naval Analyses and the Defense 
Intelligence Agency believe cruise missiles achieved results comparable to those of 
manned aircraft during the Gulf War with approximately 75% reaching their desired 
target.  Manned aircraft, such as the F-117 were successful 80% of the time (Cohen 1993; 
Stevens, Spence, and Young 1995). 
 The Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile represents the culmination of nearly 
100 years’ worth of weapon innovation.  From the cruise missile’s conception as a 
weapon that could strike deeper behind enemy lines on the battlefields of World War I, to 
the embodiment of the Hart’s “indirect approach” in the 1991 Gulf War, the cruise 
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missile offered American leaders a low-cost coercive power.  As President Clinton would 
discover in the 1990s, the Tomahawk was the ideal weapon to demonstrate the resolve 
expected of the sole remaining post-Cold War superpower.   
However, the cruise missile’s development required intense and lengthy 
advancements, particularly in the field of navigation, to make the concept of unmanned, 
precision strike a reality.  It was not until the advent of more accurate navigational 
systems, culminating in integration of highly accurate satellite navigation systems (i.e. 
Global Positioning Systems), that the cruise missile would present itself as a reliable 
enough weapon against targets while producing minimum collateral damage.  President 
Clinton would discover soon after his inauguration in 1993 that the cruise missile’s 
accuracy enabled him to act with force against international problems, yet avoid the 
entanglements associated with troop deployments. 
 
A New World Order 
 In his speech before Congress in 1991, President George H.W. Bush outlined the 
coming of a “new world order,” consisting of diverse nations seeking peace and security, 
free of the specter of the recently-concluded Cold War (Bush 1991).  While the precise 
definition of the new world order may be debatable, what had emerged since the fall of 
the Soviet Union was a world increasingly characterized by nationalism, extremism, and 
regional conflict (Nye 1992).  When President Clinton began his presidency in 1993, he 
found himself governing a nation trying understand its role in a rapidly changing political 
world.  Elected on a platform arguably oriented more toward domestic economic reform 
than international issues, the new president’s foreign policy focused more on Arab-Israeli 
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peace than on simmering terrorist movements and Iraqi sanctions (Pear 1992).  In the 
wake of the Gulf War, President Clinton would need to develop a foreign policy strategy 
that could deal with post-Cold War threats while protecting American interests abroad.  
The changing security environment required a new coercive strategy based on precision 
conventional weapons.  Judging by the prolific exploitation of the Tomahawk in the 
1990s and beyond (Table 5.3), it appeared the cruise missile would become an integral 
part of that coercive strategy. 
 
 Coercive diplomacy calls for, “the use of threats and commitments to demonstrate 
resolve” (Leng 1983, 381) over the course of international bargaining.  Yet, these threats 
may be backed up and punctuated by limited, exceptional, uses of force to demonstrate 
Table 5. 3 U.S. Tomahawk Use by Year, 1991-2018 
Year Incident/War Country No. Used 
1991 Gulf War Iraq 288 
1993 Operation Bushwhacker Iraq 23 
1993 U.N. compliance enforcement Iraq 69 
1995 Operation Deliberate Force Bosnia 13 
1996 Air defense targets Iraq 44 
1998 Retaliation for U.S. embassy bombing Afghanistan/Sudan 79 
1998 Operation Desert Fox Iraq 415 
1999 Operation Allied Force Serbia/Montenegro 218 
2001 Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan 50 
2003 Iraq invasion Iraq 802 
2008 Al-Qaeda militants Somalia 2 
2009 Al-Qaeda militants Yemen 2 
2011 Operation Odyssey Dawn Libya 112 
2014 ISIS targets Syria 47 
2016 Response to anti-ship missile attack Yemen 5 
2017 Response to Syrian chemical attack Syria 59 
2018 Response to Syrian chemical attack Syria 100+ 
Source:  Adapted from Griffin, Andrew. 2017. “Tomahawk Missiles: What Are the 
Weapons Dropped in Syria Air Strikes and What Do They Mean?” The Independent. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/tomahawk-missiles-
syria-air-strikes-what-are-they-mean-power-precision-statistics-a7672666.html (July 11, 
2017). 
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resolve (George 1991; George, Hall, and Simons 1971).  In the Cold War, bargaining 
between states was dominated by the state’s ability to match or dominate its adversary’s 
nuclear capabilities while at the same time using bluffs backed by credible force (Fearon 
2002; Schelling 1956; Wagner 1982).  As the bipolar nuclear threat faded, President 
Clinton faced with new and ambiguous challenges to American interests that were likely 
to emerge with little or no warning.   
With the threat of an engagement escalating into a nuclear conflict between the 
superpowers set aside, the United States would have a free hand to intervene when its 
interests are threatened with coercive capabilities not commonly seen in American 
history (Haass 1994, 1999).  Following the response to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, 
the American message was that incursions into another state’s sovereignty would not be 
tolerated.  The United States signaled to the international community that potential 
threats facing the new president, often even those peripheral to American interests, may 
be met with a military response.  Possible provocations requiring the exercise of military 
force could, in the early 1990s include hostage rescues, punishing terrorist organizations, 
and sanction enforcement.  In theory, such threats would be dealt with successfully if 
limited in scope, duration, and force (Haass 1994).  
 
Missile Diplomacy and Iraq 
 In the waning days of his presidency, President George H.W. Bush coerced Iraq 
into complying with United Nations’ (U.N.) sanctions using limited cruise missile 
attacks.  President Bush set a precedent for President Clinton and highlighted the cruise 
missile’s non-nuclear coercive utility in the post-Cold War era.  The U.N. was concerned 
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about Iraqi reprisals against its civilian population after the cessation of hostilities in Iraq.  
The Kurdish population in northern Iraq continued to be particularly at risk.  The U.N. 
then enacted Resolution 688 (U.N. Security Council 1991b) to put international pressure 
on Saddam Hussein to discontinue his repression of the Iraqi civilian population.47  To 
coerce Iraqi compliance, the United States and its allies established Operation Southern 
Watch, instituting a no-fly zone around those areas suffering under Iraqi government 
oppression to prevent Iraqi aircraft from supporting its military ground operations in 
violation of the U.N. resolution (Cordesman 1998).  Iraq also failed to comply with U.N. 
Resolution 687 (U.N. Security Council 1991a) which called for monitoring and 
destruction of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapon stockpile (Ibrahim 1993).   
With tensions mounting in December 1992, Iraq violated the southern no-fly zone 
resulting in the shootdown of an Iraqi fighter aircraft.  By early January 1993, Iraq moved 
surface to air missile (SAM) batteries to areas within range of the southern no-fly zone, 
threatening coalition air patrols (Gordon 1993).  In response to these provocations, 
President Bush ordered an airstrike on the Iraqi SAM batteries, but poor weather over the 
targets prevented the attack (Wines 1993).  By mid-January, with Iraq in continued non-
compliance with U.N. resolutions, President Bush made the decision to launch 45 
TLAMs against the Zaafraniyah industrial complex south of Baghdad, where it was 
believed Iraq enriched uranium for its fledgling nuclear weapons program (Brigety II 
2007; Sparks 1997).  Only eight missiles failed to reach their targets.   
                                                 
47 At the conclusion of the Gulf War, the coalition of nations opted not to pursue regime 
change following the removal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. 
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The Tomahawk’s characteristics made it uniquely suited for this mission.  First, 
military planners could enjoy a high level of assurance that these missiles would reach 
their targets, with little collateral damage given the TLAM’s accuracy and operational 
control.  Second, the unpiloted TLAM allowed the Bush administration to initiate an 
armed response to Iraqi transgressions without risking an aircrew in the heavily defended 
airspace surrounding Baghdad.  There was no risk of a downed pilot being leveraged as a 
political tool as had happened during the Gulf War, especially given the upcoming 
change in presidential administrations (Sciolino 1991).48  Third, because a relatively 
small number of navy ships can carry as many as 56 TLAMs, each with a 1,000-pound 
warhead, the strike could deliver 37,000 pounds of ordinance to their targets (Arleigh 
Burke Class (Aegis) Destroyer n.d.).  An equivalent manned strike with bombers would 
have required overflight permission from Gulf states, multiple suppression of enemy air 
defense (SEAD) missions, and several attack waves.  The Tomahawks, launching from 
American ships in international waters, avoided such diplomatic complications (Brigety 
II 2007).  The day after the strike, on President Clinton’s inauguration day, Saddam 
Hussein declared a ceasefire as an “expression of goodwill” and agreed to allow 
previously banned weapon inspectors into Iraq (Fineman and Meisler 1993). 
 President Clinton entered office in January, 1993, with two pressing international 
crises already underway, both involving humanitarian disasters.  These conflicts assured 
                                                 
48 Twenty-two Americans were taken prisoner by the Iraqis over the course of the Persian 
Gulf War.  All but two of these were downed aircrew.  These former prisoners of war 
assert they were tortured and otherwise mistreated at the hands of their Iraqi captors 
(ABC News Internet Ventures 2006).  This mistreatment was documented by the United 
Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross and put on display when Iraq 
presented the captured pilots, faces bruised, in front of cameras to make apparently 
coerced statements (Sciolino 1991). 
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that cruise missiles would have utility in his foreign policy.  Bosnia had been reeling in 
genocide since 1992 and the breakup of Yugoslavia.  Channeling ancient animosities kept 
suppressed under communism, Serbian forces under Slobodan Milosevic practiced a 
genocidal policy of “ethnic cleansing” against local non-Serbians, primarily Muslims 
(Hendrickson 2002b).  A peripheral interest in the wake of the Gulf War, the conflict 
received little attention from the Bush administration that had been operating under the 
principals of the “Powell Doctrine.”  Named after Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Colin Powell, the Powell Doctrine reflected the anxieties of the Vietnam 
generation by asserting that when employed, force must be overwhelming.  As a 
peripheral interest, Bosnia did not require this level of response from the United States.  
But as atrocities mounted, pressure increased throughout the 1992 presidential election 
and into the early Clinton administration for action against the Serbs.  But debate ensued 
over whether that action should involve American troops (Sobel 1998). 
 The second conflict at the beginning of President Clinton’s presidency involved a 
U.N. humanitarian mission to Somalia led, in part, by the United States.  Though 
ultimately a political failure, the Somali experience was instructive, helping to shape 
future American policy for the use of military force in secondary foreign policy crises.  It 
taught the new president that he must be cautious when committing troops to deal with 
situations that were of limited concern to national security.  The American experience in 
Somalia began with relatively high public support, but when faced with the deaths of 
American soldiers in the streets of Mogadishu, the Somali capital, American public 
support dissolved (Burk 1999).  The effort to avert mass Somali starvation under the 
Bush administration expanded under President Clinton into a peacekeeping and nation-
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building venture (Bolton 1994).  Divorced from strategic significance, however, 
Clinton’s “assertive multilateralism” assumed combat troops could be effectively 
deployed to a failing state to perform functions for which they were neither doctrinally 
nor structurally equipped (Carr 1993).   
The result was failure.  On 3 October 1993, 12 American soldiers were killed and 
78 wounded.  The body of an American soldier was dragged through the streets of 
Mogadishu as a show of factional defiance to the U.N. intervention.  The situation forced 
the Clinton administration to rethink its commitment to the operation (Richburg 1993).  
Underscoring the confusion over why the United States was so deeply committed, 
President Clinton asked, “Why are we still there?  What are we trying to accomplish?  
How did a humanitarian mission turn violent?  And when will our people come home?” 
(Clinton 1993b, para. 2)  By 1994, facing political pressure, President Clinton removed 
American troops from Somalia, taking a lesson about the severe political effects of 
enduring high-profile casualties when using the military for limited, peripheral, non-
combat operations. 
 On the heels of the January cruise missile strike in Iraq, and facing a growing 
problem in Somalia, foreign policy challenges would test President Clinton almost 
immediately upon entering office by a bizarre Iraqi plot to assassinate former President 
Bush on a visit to Kuwait.  In April 1993, President Bush embarked on a three-day trip to 
Kuwait City when Kuwaiti officials arrested 16 would-be assassins equipped with a car 
bomb and suicide explosives.  Two of those arrested were Iraqi nationals.  In the ensuing 
two-month investigation, Kuwaiti and American intelligence officials concluded that Iraq 
planned and ran the operation through the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) (Clinton 
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1993a).  In response, Clinton ordered IIS headquarters in Baghdad bombed with 23 
Tomahawks.  The strike occurred in the middle of the night to minimize civilian 
casualties, yet still sent a powerful message to both Saddam Hussein and his intelligence 
apparatus.  Evoking Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the strike was framed as an act of 
national self-defense (Von Drehle and Smith 1993).  The cruise missile strike was outside 
the auspices of the ongoing Operation Southern Watch and was conducted unilaterally to 
punish Saddam Hussein, deter acts of state-sponsored terrorism, and damage the Iraqi 
intelligence apparatus (Kempster and Lauter 1993). 
 President Clinton’s decision to unilaterally punish Iraq is salient to the effect of 
cruise missiles on conflict initiation.  First, the United States used force to punish Iraqis 
when there was little political pressure to do so.  Not only was the evidence for an Iraqi 
assassination plot debatable given the lack of evidence directly linking Saddam Hussein 
to the conspiracy,49 but once the plot was discovered and thwarted, there was no longer 
an imminent threat to either the United States or its citizens (Brigety II 2007; Weiner 
1993).  Second, given the time and lack of political pressure, the Clinton administration 
was free to operate under relatively few constraints, with a consideration of international 
law, and with a retaliation plan deliberately thoughtful of targeting options that would 
minimize risk and collateral damage.  Colin Powell, the former Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff under President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State under President 
George W. Bush, notes Clinton’s aversion to casualties in his 1993 autobiography, My 
American Journey. 
                                                 
49 After the 2002 invasion of Iraq, a U.S. Joint Forces Command report detailing the 
findings of an investigation into Iraq’s support for terrorism found no IIS documents 
referring to the plot to kill President Bush (Isikoff 2008; Woods et al. 2006). 
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“He asked me about Bosnia.  Wasn’t there some way, he wanted to know, 
that we could influence the situation through airpower, something not too 
punitive?  There it was again, the ever-popular solution from the skies, 
with a good humanist twist; let’s not hurt anybody.” (quoted in Brigety II 
2007, 148; C. L. Powell and Persico 2010, 562).   
 
Practically immune to counter-attack, the Tomahawks targeted against the Iraqi 
Intelligence Service were precise enough to keep collateral damage to a minimum.50  The 
cruise missiles expended in what was labeled Operation Bushwhacker provided the 
president with the ability to respond almost immediately, without extensive international 
deliberation, and in a manner that made him look decisive in a crisis (Sparks 1997). This 
action increased his domestic approval rating ten points, to the highest levels achieved to 
that point in his presidency (J. Smith and Devroy 1993).  Whether or not the strike 
achieved the desired coercive effect may be irrelevant.51  The other political advantages 
gained in the unilateral cruise missile strike outweighed any short-term coercive outcome 
while reinforcing the precedent for cruise missile use in a small-scale, limited, crisis. 
Before the decade was out, the United States attacked Iraq on two more 
occasions.  In September 1996, American warships and bombers launched a total of 44 
Tomahawks and CALCMs against Iraqi air defense targets in southern Iraq.  Operation 
Desert Strike was in response to an Iraqi military incursion against the Kurdish people of 
northern Iraq, a violation of U.N. mandates (Sparks 1997).  Prior to the attack, the United 
States threatened Iraq with a display of force by putting its forces in the region at a higher 
state of readiness, but this was not enough to coerce the desired changes in Iraqi 
                                                 
50 The attacks took place at night, at a time when it was estimated any civilians working 
in the area would be absent. 
51 Although the ISS headquarters was badly damaged, neither it nor the intelligence 
service were “crippled” as had been initially reported by the Clinton administration (P. 
Clark 1993).  Consequently, the long term coercive effects are debatable. 
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behavior.  Cruise missile strikes soon followed.  Although an effort to punish Saddam 
Hussein while also expanding the still in-place no-fly zone, the strike was more of a way 
to send a coercive political message to Iraq and to deterring further incursions into 
Kurdistan, with minimum bloodshed and military commitment.  Then Secretary of 
Defense William Perry, speaking at a Pentagon news briefing, highlighted the desire to 
deter Iraqi aggression while limiting American involvement in Iraq’s internal affairs, 
Now Saddam Hussein has demonstrated once more his willingness to use 
military power recklessly. And we must demonstrate once more our 
willingness and capability to check that power and deter Saddam Hussein 
from being the regional bully…The plan does not involve the United 
States in the conflict under way in Iraq. But it does make Saddam Hussein 
pay a price for his aggression (Pentagon news briefing on U.S. missile 
strike against Iraq 1996). 
 
The third cruise missile strike on Iraq, Operation Desert Fox, began in December 
1998.  The cruise missile strike was part of a larger multi-day air operation in response to 
continued non-compliance with U.N. weapons inspections.  In the waning months of 
1997, Iraq continued to violate no-fly zones, which allied warplanes actively patrolled, 
ultimately threatening to shoot down an American U-2 spy plane.  The United States and 
the United Kingdom responded with threats of military action and a build-up of military 
forces through the early months of 1998.  According to President Clinton, the purpose of 
the raid, one of the largest of his presidency, was to, “degrade Saddam's capacity to 
develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten 
his neighbors.” (quoted in Newman et al. 1998, para. 4)  Politically, the United States 
intended for the attack to punish Iraq for its non-compliance with U.N. mandates and 
weaken Saddam Hussein’s sources of political power, namely his elite Republican Guard 
forces and the weapon programs Saddam Hussein brandished to maintain regional 
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prestige (Roberts 1999).  However, unlike the Gulf War, where the United States enjoyed 
the support of 28 allies, this mission had only one ally, the United Kingdom, who 
capitalized on the opportunity to employ their own Tomahawks in combat (Elliott et al. 
1998; Newman et al. 1998).52   
Part of a greater military effort lasting several days, the cruise missiles used in 
this strike were more than a coercive tool.  In Operation Desert Fox, cruise missiles 
ensured manned attack aircraft could accomplish their missions by clearing enemy air 
defenses that would have otherwise required many more SEAD missions.  Additional 
missions would have greatly extended the duration of the limited campaign and increased 
the risk to American and British pilots.  In this supporting role, the cruise missiles were 
an invaluable tool to keep the overall duration and commitment to the minimum required 
for political purposes. 
Iraq in the 1990s was a testbed for the concept of cruise missiles as a weapon of 
coercive diplomacy.  The ability to strike targets deep in Iraq – at will – shows how 
cruise missile are different from more traditional weapons such as manned bombers and 
ground forces.  Their stealth, precision, and capacity to reduce or eliminate risks to 
American military lives by either directly attacking targets, or supporting a wider effort 
by eliminating defense systems, made them a go-to weapon for dealing with the Iraqi 
regime.  By the time of Operation Desert Fox, the Tomahawk cruise missile, now more 
accurate with the full integration of satellite navigation, provided long distance weapon 
                                                 
52 Clinton’s critics argued the lack of international support was due, at least in part, to the 
perception that the raid was a ploy to divert attention away from the president’s growing 
domestic scandals and impeachment trial (Hendrickson 2002a; O. R. Holsti 2011; 
Reitman 1999).   
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accuracy not seen before.  In the end, attacking Iraq with cruise missiles in the 1990s 
appears to have been effective (Byman 2000).  Iraq was largely contained and American 
policy generally achieved its objectives.  When Iraq did transgress, cruise missile strikes 
ultimately forced Saddam Hussein to walk back his policies (Woods et al. 2006).   
Iraq would not be the only target of American cruise missiles in the 1990s.  The 
weapons would also be expended, albeit to a limited extent, in the Bosnian conflict, and 
to a greater extent in the Serbian conflict as part of a greater international military effort.  
However, there is another case where the United States initiated armed force against an 
adversary exclusively using cruise missiles.  This time, the adversary was not a state, but 
a transnational terrorist organization. 
 
Non-State Actors 
 In August 1998, the international terrorist organization, Al Qaida, detonated two 
bombs near American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 252 people including 12 
United States citizens.  In little more than a week, forensic teams determined the Al 
Qaida organization was responsible, and that the mastermind behind the attack was 
Osama Bin Laden (Hendrickson 2002b; National Security Council and Records 
Management Office 1998).  In retaliation, and to dissuade further attacks, President 
Clinton ordered a massive cruise missile strike from four Navy warships and one 
submarine.  The attack, Operation Infinite Reach, was designed to send the message that 
American military power had unlimited reach and sufficient resources to strike terrorist 
networks (Newsweek Staff 1998).   
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The United States Navy targeted the 79 cruise missiles against Al Qaida training 
camps in Afghanistan and a suspected chemical weapons plant in El-Shifa, Sudan.  As in 
other cruise missile strikes, President Clinton’s goal was to minimize collateral damage 
using precision weapons, selectively target terrorist centers of gravity, and avoid civilian 
casualties by carefully controlling the timing of the attacks (National Security Council 
and Records Management Office 1998; Zenko 2010).    
The attack against terrorist targets in response to the embassy bombings was the 
first time a state initiated a significant military response against a terrorist organization 
while at the same time punishing a non-state actor for a terrorist act and deterring future 
attacks.  Additionally, it marked not only the American entry into what would later 
become the global war on terrorism, but the first time the United States simultaneously 
initiated force against two countries, neither of which it was at war with. (Zenko 2010).  
Perhaps the only analogous event in American history was President Ronald Reagan’s 
1986 attack on Libya, using F-111 fighter-bomber aircraft, to punish Libyan leader 
Muammar Gaddafi for supporting a terrorist attack on a nightclub in Germany 
(Hendrickson 2002b).  However, unlike the Libyan strike, the bombings in Afghanistan 
and Sudan were not designed to punish a state leader for supporting terrorism, but punish 
the terrorist organization itself.  As a secondary objective, the United States hoped the 
cruise missile attack in Afghanistan would kill the embassy bombing mastermind and Al 
Qaida leader, Osama Bin Laden.53  Not only were the attacks targeted toward the 
resources and infrastructure of a non-state actor, but they were accomplished without 
                                                 
53 Osama Bin Laden escaped the attacks unharmed.  Expecting retaliation for the embassy 
bombings, Bin Laden fled his compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan, seeking refuge in the 
capital city of Kabul (Zenko 2010) 
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invading the sovereign soil of another state.  Cruise missiles again proved to be the 
perfect weapon for such an attack. 
The attack on a non-state actor in retaliation for a terrorist attack represented a 
policy shift for the United States (Perl 1998).  President Clinton approached the terrorist 
threat in four ways.  According to Hendrickson (2002b), the Clinton Administration’s 
policy efforts focused on, “providing ‘no concessions’ to terrorists; bringing to justice 
those who support or conduct terrorist activities; working to ‘isolate’ and ‘change the 
behavior’ of terrorists; and working with other countries to advance their counterterrorist 
efforts.” (101)  The Afghan and Sudanese strikes marked the first time the United States 
had publicly announced the purpose of the strike as being preemptive in nature against a 
terrorist organization; striking multiple sites within a state that is not conclusively to 
blame for the original attack.  The primary goal was to strike non-governmental 
organizational infrastructure instead of a single individual aside from Bin Laden.  Hence, 
the cruise missile strike enabled the Clinton administration to shift from anti-terrorist 
policies to a more global, proactive, militaristic, and unilateral posture (Perl 1998).54  
  In the years following the attacks, Al Qaida continued, and even expanded, its 
terrorist operations.  The strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan later constituted a rallying cry 
for Al Qaida and a primary recruitment tool (Wright 496AD).  In this respect, Operation 
                                                 
54 Operation Infinite Reach was not without its detractors and was of questionable 
success.  First, critics accused the president of using the strikes as a diversion from his 
foremost domestic problem, impending impeachment.  However, experts later found no 
connection between Operation Infinite Reach and Clinton’s domestic political concerns.  
The 9/11 Commission, investigating the Al Qaida attacks on the World Trade Center in 
2001, would come to the conclusion that the key justification for the U.S. attacks in 1998 
was indeed the demonstration of resolve in the face of terrorism (The National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2014; Zenko 2010). 
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Infinite reach may be considered a strategic failure, but the operation demonstrated that 
states could use cruise missiles, with little protest from the international community, to 
strike non-state actors within sovereign states.  However, it also revealed that while 
cruise missiles can provide a military option for dealing with terrorism, the targets they 
strike are only as good as the intelligence that uncovers them and the speed of the 
decision cycle that orders the attack.   
The day before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in an interview in 
with Australian businesspeople, President Clinton claimed that he had another 
opportunity to kill Bin Laden shortly after Operation Infinite Reach.  However, because 
the Al-Qaida leader was operating out of urban Kandahar, Afghanistan, even cruise 
missiles may have delivered unacceptable collateral damage (J. Miller 2014).  This 
offhand comment illuminates two important points for this discussion.  First, there was 
clearly a temptation to direct cruise missiles to kill Bin Laden, but because the expected 
collateral damage was expected to be too large, even with precision weapons, the strike 
was called off.  Second, it shows how reliant the administration had become on using 
cruise missiles for these sorts of missions.  When the administration determined a cruise 
missile strike was not feasible, they considered no other military alternative suitable. 
 
Conclusion 
 The debut of Tomahawk cruise missiles in the 1991 Persian Gulf War ushered in 
a new era in the application of precision airpower.  No longer was affecting the 
adversary’s means to make war relegated to massive bombing campaigns and nuclear 
weapons (Olsen 2010), arguably an ineffective and inefficient means of exercising 
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coercion (Pape 1996).  Instead, key parts of a state’s political, economic, and military 
infrastructure could be selectively cut off in a way that reduced the risk to civilian 
populations and military personnel, using land attack cruise missiles.  Because using 
force to coerce an adversary into complying with a state’s demands no longer risked a 
large-scale confrontation, the United States in the 1990s was free to use cruise missiles to 
coerce and punish its adversaries in situations in which force may have been less 
desirable than diplomacy.  The possession of technologically sophisticated cruise missiles 
increased the likelihood the United States would initiate militarized interstate disputes.  
These missiles provided a qualitatively different capability than many believed to be 
available prior to 1991 when cruise missiles were relegated to either nuclear or 
unsophisticated anti-ship missions.  But the lesson was not limited to the 1990s, the 
United States continues to rely on cruise missiles to boost coercive foreign policies. 
The Clinton Administration was not the only administration to discover the 
benefits offered by using cruise missiles to pursue national security goals.  President 
George W. Bush launched Tomahawks in the first salvos of the 2003 Iraq War to 
eliminate Saddam Hussein in a government decapitation move, with the goal of bringing 
an early end to the conflict (Cole 2017; Pape 1996).  Though decapitation was 
unsuccessful, Tomahawks were effective in paralyzing key elements of Iraqi command 
and control networks, ensuring a speedy Iraqi military collapse.  President Barack Obama 
favored cruise missiles in his first strikes against the so-called Islamic State in Syria, 
showing the cruise missile’s versatile utility as a coercive weapon for attacking a non-
state enemy within a conflict in which the initiating state does not wish to become 
entangled.  President Donald Trump directed cruise missiles attacks twice within the first 
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two years of his presidency to show resolve against Syria by striking a Syrian airbase and 
industrial facilities as punishment for alleged Syrian chemical weapon attacks against 
civilians.  The strike was meant to send a message to the government of Syria to deter 
further attacks and compel Syria to again give up chemical weapons.55  In many ways, 
the Syrian strikes were an extension of President Barack Obama’s threat to attack Syria 
should they continue to carry out chemical attacks against their own people.  Yet the 
strike neither committed the United States to a larger conflict with Syria nor drew the 
international condemnation otherwise expected from initiating unilateral violence against 
a sovereign state.  
 The case of American missile diplomacy in the 1990s demonstrates how public 
opinion, domestic political pressure, and advanced weapon technology can culminate into 
an increased likelihood that military force will be employed to deal with national security 
challenges.  Since the Vietnam War, the American public has come to expect that when 
the United States uses military force, military and civilian leaders will endeavor to 
minimize military casualties and civilian collateral damage.  Research suggests that as a 
conflict ages, Americans become less sensitive to small losses (J. E. Mueller 1973).  
Cruise missiles provide the president with the ability to bypass losses at the beginning of 
a conflict by minimizing military and civilian casualties.  Additionally, by using cruise 
missiles as the primary means to initiate increasingly common discrete military 
operations, the United States discovered in the 1990s that not only can collateral damage 
                                                 
55 In 2014, the U.S., working with Russia, a Syrian ally, undertook a multilateral effort to 
destroy Syria’s chemical weapons.  Though Syria voluntarily agreed to cooperate, it was 
later discovered that enough chemical weapons remained to mount further strikes (Shane 
2017). 
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be moderated, but military commitment is reduced by limiting the cost and resources 
invested in the operation (Zenko 2010).  Furthermore, by avoiding the long-term 
commitment otherwise associated with military action, there is more freedom to initiate 
conflict to divert attention from domestic political challenges.   
President Clinton discovered, whether intentionally or not, that when he ordered a 
military strike to punish international pariahs for their transgressions, he enjoyed 
measurable increases in national satisfaction polls.  These political benefits were the 
byproduct of nearly 60 years of domestic cruise missile technological development and 
the revolution in military affairs.  It was not until cruise missiles could be relied upon to 
deliver a payload to a target quickly, reliably, and accurately that they would begin to 
have political and coercive value that, in some cases, surpasses and even replaces that of 
manned military operations.   
This case study exposes a clear trend.  In a post-Cold War world where limited 
military strikes against adversaries have become more acceptable internationally and 
domestically, cruise missiles provide a state with the attractive ability to employ limited 
force to both increase domestic and international legitimacy while demonstrating 
international resolve.  Hence, the threshold for military force initiation lowers when a 
state is in possession of cruise missiles. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  CONCLUSIONS 
  
This dissertation provided the first systematic empirical test of the cruise missile’s 
influence on state behavior.   My goal was to empirically determine whether states who 
possess cruise missiles have a greater likelihood of initiating military force against their 
adversaries.  I answered this question using a mixed methods research design to test the 
three hypotheses listed in Figure 6.1.  The research began with data collection and a 
series of statistical quantitative analyses based on original data collected on cruise missile 
possession.  I followed this phase of research with two qualitative case studies to 
illustrate the quantitative results.  A systematic examination of the data revealed that 
states with cruise missiles are, using multiple measures of conflict initiation, more than 
twice as likely to initiate military force than states that do not possess cruise missiles.  In 
addition, cruise missile-armed states are more likely to use threats and displays of force 
to coerce their adversaries.  Each of these effects appears to be independent of regime 
type.  Case studies selected using predictive values from the quantitative analysis 
supported these findings.  In the case of both the 1982 Falkland Conflict and American 
use of cruise missile “diplomacy” in the 1990s, the qualitatively unique capabilities 
provided by cruise missiles appeared to increase the likelihood Argentina and the United 
States, respectively, would initiate military force as a means of coercion.   
 This concluding chapter serves two purposes.  First, it appraises the purpose and 
procedures entailed in this research effort.  I revisit the methodological procedures used 
to answer the primary research question:  Do cruise missiles change state behavior by 
increasing the probability a state will use military force to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives?  After revisiting the methodology, I briefly examine each chapter’s main 
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points, focusing on the empirical chapter’s conclusions.  Then, I offer a final assessment 
of how this research contributes to the force initiation and cruise missile literatures.  In 
sum, it contributes to the force initiation literature by adding an empirical assessment of a 
weapon’s effect on whether a state uses armed force.  It also contributes to the small, but 
important, cruise missile literature by providing the first systematic investigation into 
whether these weapons provide a threat beyond their well-catalogued capabilities.   
Figure 6. 1 Summary of Research Question and Hypotheses 
  
Research 
Question 
Do cruise missiles change state behavior by increasing the 
probability a state will use military force to achieve its foreign 
policy objectives?   
  
Hypothesis 1 States armed with cruise missiles are more likely than states 
without cruise missiles to initiate military force. 
  
Hypothesis 2 States armed with cruise missiles are more likely to initiate crises 
through threats and displays of force than states that do not have 
cruise missiles. 
  
Hypothesis 3 There is no difference between the probabilities that democratic 
or autocratic states with cruise missiles will use military power to 
achieve foreign policy objectives. 
  
 
The second purpose of the chapter is to evaluate the research and perform a final 
integration of the quantitative and qualitative strands of research.  I systematically assess 
each hypothesis based on quantitative empirical evidence as illustrated by the qualitative 
case studies.  Using a weaving approach, I bring together each strand of the quantitative 
and qualitative research to make a final determination as to whether the evidence 
provides enough support to accept or reject each hypothesis.  After completing this phase 
of the explanatory sequential mixed methods design, I turn to the implications of my 
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findings.  Finally, I revisit the dissertation’s limitations and suggest areas for future 
research. 
 
Procedures and Summary of Main Points 
 Though the research question could have simply been answered using a relatively 
straightforward quantitative design, by using a mixed method approach I was able to 
probe the question more deeply than would have otherwise been possible.  Mixed method 
designs have the advantage of using each strand of research, quantitative and qualitative, 
to mutually support the conclusions of the opposite strand and using one or the other 
strand to identify cases or data for further systematic and deliberate study (Creswell 
2008; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; Plano Clark and Ivankova 2015).  The type of 
mixed methods research I used here was the explanatory sequential mixed method design 
which employed quantitative analysis to empirically test the hypotheses and identify 
cases for further qualitative analysis (Fetters, Curry, and Creswell 2013; Igo, Kiewra, and 
Bruning 2008; Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick 2006; Lieberman 2005; Seawright and 
Gerring 2008).  In this chapter, I weave together a final evaluation of the results from 
each of these two strands. 
 The research design consists of three phases that unfold over the course of each 
chapter.  To lay a foundation, I began this research with a review of the literature in 
Chapter Two.  First, I appraised the common correlates to the use of force.  The literature 
relating to the initiation of military force by one state to another centers around seven 
main themes:  regime type and age, state wealth, alliances, territorial contiguity, 
revisionism, and the role played by arms transfers and individual weapons.  We saw that 
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although significant debate exists in the literature, these characteristics, individual and 
nuanced to each state, play a significant role in the likelihood a state may use armed 
force.  For example, states that share a border may also compete for resources and 
territory, increasing the odds they may come into conflict (Bremer 1992; Diehl 1985; 
Hensel 2000; Hill 1945; Joyce and Braithwaite 2013; Luard 1986; Vasquez 1993, 1995, 
2009; Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Wallensteen 1981).  Furthermore, in a parallel to this 
research, we see empirical evidence that states armed with ballistic missiles are 266 
percent more likely to initiate a crisis (Mettler and Reiter 2013).   
In addition to the force initiation literature, I examined the small body of literature 
that deals specifically with cruise missiles.  The cruise missile’s place in history dates to 
World War I.  The literature indicates that little attention was paid to the missile’s 
potential until the mid-1970s.  It was then that advancements in technology and capability 
forced scholars and policy makers to reexamine their earlier assessments of its place 
within security constructs.  As the technology progressed, we see that cruise missiles 
became more accessible, leading to a “contagion” of cruise missile proliferation 
(Gormley 2008b).  These bodies of literature, aligning with the primary dependent and 
independent variables, contribute to our understanding of both the factors that correlate 
with force initiation and the dangers posed by cruise missiles.  This dissertation built on 
each by connecting cruise missiles to force initiation with a systematic empirical test of 
the missile’s role in interstate disputes and conflict.   
 Beyond a literature review, Chapter Two also presented a theory to explain why 
cruise missiles may increase the likelihood of military force initiation between states.  
Using coercion theory as a framework, I argued that cruise missiles provide a variety of 
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coercive mechanisms to the state at a lower cost than can be delivered by manned 
airpower alone.  These coercive mechanisms include direct pressure, denial, weakening, 
and political destabilization (Byman and Waxman 2002).  Furthermore, the cruise missile 
may make the use of force more attractive to the initiating state when used to signal 
resolve and capability to both the adversarial state and the domestic audience.  In the face 
of sunken costs, using cruise missiles may sidestep potential quagmires associated with 
troop deployment and other large-scale operations requiring costly mobilizations and 
potential for the loss of life.  Finally, Chapter Two presented three hypotheses grounded 
in the existing literature, and framed by coercion theory.  First, I proposed that states 
armed with cruise missiles are more likely to exercise military force than states that do 
not have cruise missiles.  Second, I posited that cruise missile-armed states are more 
likely to initiate crisis through threats and displays of force.  Third, I proposed that the 
use of cruise missiles as coercive tools does not vary by regime type.  Rather, 
democracies and autocracies, armed with cruise missiles, are equally likely to initiate 
armed force in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives. 
 Having assessed the relevant literature and presented a theory to explain the 
correlation between cruise missiles and the probability of using military force, I turned to 
the first phase of the explanatory sequential mixed method design, the collection and 
analysis of quantitative data.  In a mixed methods project such as this, it is common for 
one of the strands to have priority, or be the primary focus of evidence to support the 
hypotheses (Creswell 2008).  For this project, the quantitative strand was the research 
focus as it provided the empirical evidence to test the hypotheses, a means to select case 
studies, and a method to generalize the findings to the universe of possible cases. 
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The data set I used to test the three hypotheses relied on four primary sources.  
First, I coded for my primary independent variable, cruise missile possession, using 
original data on cruise missile acquisition by year.  I accomplished this by a querying the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database 
(SIPRI 2015) for cruise missile arms transfers during the period in question.  Then, I 
validated this information, and coded for indigenous cruise missile programs not captured 
in the SIPRI database, using information provided by the National Defense Intelligence 
Agency (Systems 1999), Kueter and Kleinberg (2007), and Werrell (1985).  Next, I 
coded for the primary dependent variable, military force initiation, using two common 
conflict data sets, the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set (Brecher et al. 2016) 
and the Correlates of War Project’s (CoW) Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set 
(Palmer et al. 2015).  However, since the ICB data set is not dyadic, I used Mettler and 
Reiter’s (2013) coding of initiators and targets.  Finally, to test for whether democracies 
or autocracies with cruise missiles have different likelihoods of initiating force, I used 
Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s (2009) measurement of regime type based on public 
accountability in the Democracy and Dictatorship data set to produce an independent 
variable that is observational, reproducible, and possesses identifiable coding properties.  
To control for joint democratic dyads in the general force initiation model, I used data 
derived from the Polity 4 Project (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). 
 After completing the quantitative data collection, I proceeded to analyze the data 
using descriptive statistics, logit, probit, and fixed-effects models.  I found strong 
evidence to suggest that states armed with cruise missiles are more likely to threaten, 
display, and initiate military force than states who do not possess cruise missiles.  
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Furthermore, this likelihood appears to be independent of regime type as both 
democracies and autocracies appear to be equally likely to initiate conflict when armed 
with cruise missiles.  Though I will go into more detail below, I must note that the 
primary threat to validity over the course of the quantitative analysis was the threat of 
selection bias due to endogeneity.  Endogeneity may occur in this sample if cruise missile 
acquisition is not randomly assigned, allowing states to self-select into the treatment 
sample.  To control for bias, I endogenized cruise missile acquisition using a three-
equation multivariate probit model to account for cruise missile procurement for both the 
initiating and target state.  Once I controlled for selection effects, I predicted the chances 
the initiating state would issue a challenge.  Even having controlled for endogeneity, the 
evidence strongly supports my hypothesis throughout Chapter Three.   
 The second phase of the mixed methods design begins in Chapter Four with the 
first of two illustrative case studies.  In this chapter I examined the 1982 Falkland 
Conflict, a crisis in which cruise missiles played no small part in the hostilities between 
Argentina and the United Kingdom.  Like the second case study in Chapter Five, I 
selected this case study by using predicted values from the statistical models employed in 
Chapter Three, isolating cases where the model predicted with a relatively high 
probability that a state with cruise missiles would likely initiate militarized disputes.   
Chapter Four’s central argument was that misperceptions on each side of the 
Falkland Conflict increased the likelihood Argentina would abandon 150 years’ worth of 
peaceful negotiations and occupy the islands by force.  On the Argentine side, the 
government perceived that the British were losing interest in the region and simply 
needed the right conditions to abandon their claims.  On the British side of the equation, 
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the erroneous assessment that Argentina’s air-launched cruise missiles (in this case, 
French-made Exocet anti-ship cruise missile) were not operational helped lead to the 
hasty decision to send a fleet to take back the islands.  However, the sinking of British 
ships by Argentine Exocets forced the British Navy to reassess and alter their strategy, 
though not to the point of complete withdrawal.  Instead, with countermeasures in place, 
the British Navy simply moved beyond the range of Argentine aircraft.  In the end, 
though the small number of Argentine cruise missiles accounted for the most significant 
damage on the British force, they were too few to drive back the major power’s response 
to Argentine aggression.   
In Chapter Five, I continued my illustrative case analysis with an examination of 
the American use of cruise missiles during the 1990s.  Popularly referred to as “cruise 
missile diplomacy,” this case contrasts with the first case study by occurring after the use 
of precision land attack cruise missile technology in the 1991 Persian Gulf War which 
demonstrated the cruise missile’s use as a tool for coercive punishment rather than 
defensive denial.  After the success of the Tomahawk cruise missile in the Gulf War, the 
United States found that coercive military force could be used when faced with foreign 
policy crises in which the employment of more overt and resource intensive military 
solutions (like troops or manned aircraft) were not considered practical.   
Cruise missiles satisfied three needs for American decision makers.  First, by 
reducing the risk to military personnel, cruise missiles permitted the use of military force 
in a more agreeable context to domestic audiences who had grown increasingly weary of 
military casualties.  Second, using cruise missiles to punish adversarial behavior avoided 
the commitments associated with greater military operations such as mobilization and 
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troop deployments.  By launching from ships off the coast, the United States no longer 
required the long logistical tail and basing agreements that plagued earlier military 
adventures.  Third, cruise missiles provided a low cost means to lend credibility to 
American military threats abroad.  When challenged by state or non-state actors, the 
United States found a way to respond militarily against entities in sovereign countries 
with little notice and with precision, lowering the risk of collateral damage.   
Having considered the procedures and main points of the dissertation thus far, I 
now proceed to weave together the first two strands of research.  I accomplish this final 
phase of the research by further integrating the quantitative and qualitative phases 
through a discussion and analysis of each hypothesis as observed through the lenses of 
each strand.  This discussion demonstrates that each phase is not only mutually 
supportive, but extends the discussion of the thesis by bringing the empirical evidence 
provided through statistical analysis to life with the rich description provided by the 
illustrative case studies.   
 
Quantitative and Qualitative Strand Integration 
 Looking beyond this dissertation’s methodological procedures and main points of 
each chapter, I turn to the third and final phase of the explanatory sequential mixed 
methods design.  I accomplish the integration of the quantitative and qualitative phases of 
this research through narrative weaving.  Fetters, Curry, and Creswell (2013) describe the 
narrative weaving approach as a technique that, “involves writing both qualitative and 
quantitative findings together on a theme-by-theme or concept-by-concept basis.” (2142)   
Here, I use each hypothesis as a central theme.  I follow each hypothesis with the 
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empirical results that support the hypothesis’s validity as well as the illustrative examples 
from the two case studies, as applicable.  By approaching the analysis in this way, it is 
easier to discern how each strand interacts and influences the interpretation of the other.  
In short, this discussion constitutes a second touchpoint for the quantitative and 
qualitative phases of this research, the first touchpoint being the use of the statistical 
analysis to aid in the selection of the case studies (Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick 2006).  
But, before diving into this analysis, I first evaluate whether this endeavor answered the 
research question and if validity issues taint the results. 
 This dissertation began with a simple question:  Do cruise missiles change state 
behavior by increasing the probability a state will use military force to achieve its foreign 
policy objectives?  Specifically, this research asked if states armed with cruise missiles 
are more likely to initiate armed conflict than states who do not possess cruise missiles?  I 
argued that cruise missiles reduce the need to commit combat troops and increase 
capability in coercive situations calling for an exemplary use of force, increasing the odds 
a state will initiate a limited military use of force at levels short of war.  The empirical 
evidence suggests that when states acquire cruise missiles, they become more likely to 
initiate military force.   
Validity 
 No research project, no matter how well done, can be entirely conclusive.  The 
greatest threat to a project’s conclusions comes in the form of research validity, or the 
accuracy and/or correctness of the research’s methodology and procedures.  Threats to 
validity may come in four general forms.  Measurement validity questions whether the 
data and variables used accurately represent the behavior in question.  In this dissertation, 
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the primary independent variable was the possession of cruise missiles.  I defined cruise 
missiles using Betts’s (1981) oft-cited description that depicts cruise missiles as, 
“unmanned, expendable, armed, aerodynamic air breathing, and autonomous vehicle[s].” 
(31)  This standard definition includes both anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles.  The 
primary dependent variable, the use of military force, is operationalized two ways.  First, 
I coded challenges from the ICB data set, capturing crisis and military hostility.  Second, 
I coded initiations of force from the MID data set to capture the use of military force 
short of war.  By applying two measurements for military force, I added robustness to the 
results by capturing the different measurements used in these two common data sets.  To 
code for threats and displays of force I used standard MID data set measurements.  For 
regime type, I use dichotomous independent variable for democracy produced by 
Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2009, 2010) and control variables to account for joint 
democratic dyads using data derived from the Polity 4 data set (Marshall, Gurr, and 
Jaggers 2016). 
 The second threat to validity is external.  External validity is concerned with the 
extent that the research’s results can be generalized to other cases and situations.  
Typically, and as is the case here, case studies suffer from poor external validity.  Each 
case consists of its own contextual variables that make generalizability a challenge.  
Hence, the case studies included in this effort are for the purposes of explanation only, 
they are not prescriptive nor do they purport that cruise missiles interact with the state in 
the same way each time to increase the likelihood of conflict.  Instead, they are a post-hoc 
effort to show how cruise missiles affected state behavior in the past, information not 
available through statistical analysis alone.  In contrast, quantitative analysis generally 
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enjoys external validity, however threats to validity still require controls.  Here, to control 
for selection effects due to the non-random assignment of cruise missiles to the 
population, I endogenized the states’ cruise missile procurement using a three-equation 
multivariate probit model.  First, I predicted cruise missile acquisition (for potential 
initiators and for potential targets), then I predicted MID or ICB initiation.  Additionally, 
by using data sets that include the entire universe of possible cases, I ensured that the data 
sample matches the target population as closely as possible for this type of research.  
Where small numbers of observations existed, as in the case of regressions involving land 
attack cruise missiles only, I used a penalized maximum likelihood logistic regression to 
account for potential bias due to the limited number of cruise missile states as compared 
to the greater number of MID initiations 
 A third threat to validity is internal.  Internal validity affects the causal 
interpretability of the findings.  For this dissertation I ensured internal validity in several 
ways.  First, I based the values for the independent variable, cruise missile possession, on 
the year of initial acquisition, lagged one year in the statistical calculations to account for 
temporal antecedence to ensure I tested for the cruise missile’s influence on conflict and 
not conflict’s influence on the acquisition of cruise missiles.  Additionally, to control for 
cross-unit heterogeneity, I used a fixed-effects model to control for all stable 
characteristics not otherwise measured using control variables.  To test for covariance, I 
performed multicollinearity tests using correlation matrices to ensure that the control 
variables used were not subverting the variables of interest.     
 The final validity concern involves statistical conclusion validity.  Statistical 
conclusion validity is a determination of whether the reported results reach the correct 
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conclusion as to the relationship between the variables and the responses under 
examination.  In this dissertation, I used proper statistical techniques, common to this 
type of research, that carry enough statistical power to correctly reject, or accept, the null 
hypotheses as applicable.  I used robustness checks to ensure my chosen tests were not 
violating statistical assumptions.  Finally, heterogeneity was addressed, as noted, using 
fixed-effects as recommended by the Hausman Specification Test (Hausman 1978). 
Discussion 
 Having addressed validity concerns, I now turn to the results of the quantitative 
and qualitative findings.  The quantitative portion consisted of 1.1 million dyad-years 
spanning 1946, the year that marks the beginning of the modern era of cruise missiles, to 
2007, the year data across the included data sets was available.  Over these years, I 
observed 378 ICB challenges and 2,742 MID initiations.  States possessed cruise missiles 
in 28 percent of the total observations.  Overall, there were 78 states in the sample that 
possessed cruise missiles during the period under study.  
Hypothesis 1:  States armed with cruise missiles are more likely than states without 
cruise missiles to initiate military force. 
 As hypothesized, the quantitative statistical analysis to test the first hypothesis 
shows that states armed with cruise missiles are more likely to use military force than 
states that do not have cruise missiles.  Specifically, these cruise missile-armed states are 
significantly more likely to initiate an ICB challenge or MID initiation.  States possessing 
cruise missile initiate conflict at a rate 2.8 times that of non-cruise missile states for ICB 
challenges.  Using logit, probit and fixed effects models, I found a significant and 
positive relationship between cruise missile possession and ICB challenges.  Logit odds 
209 
 
ratios suggested that states with cruise missiles have 2.42 times greater odds of initiating 
an ICB challenge than states that do not possess cruise missiles.  A marginal effects 
analysis showed us that the predicted probability that a state will initiate an ICB 
challenge increases 2.5 times after acquiring cruise missiles from a .02 percent 
probability to .05 percent probability. 
 I replicated my analysis of ICB challenges by swapping the ICB challenge 
independent variable with the MID initiation variable.  Again, the findings as they relate 
to Hypothesis 1 also supported the proposition that states armed with cruise missiles are 
more likely to initiate military force than their non-cruise missile armed counterparts.  
States possessing cruise missiles initiate disputes at a rate 2.8 times that of non-cruise 
missile states for MID initiations.  Results from fixed effects logit regression analysis 
found positive and significant correlations between cruise missile possession and MID 
initiation.  States armed with cruise missiles are 2.49 times more likely to initiate a MID.  
Additionally, a marginal effects analysis told us that the predicted probability of a MID 
initiation before a state acquires cruise missiles is .2 percent, but that probability 
increases to .4 percent after acquisition. 
 The case studies supported these outcomes, contributing to the validity of 
Hypothesis 1.  In Chapter Four, I examined the role of air-launched Exocet anti-ship 
cruise missiles in the 1982 Falklands Conflict.  This case study demonstrated how the 
Argentine procurement of air-launched Exocet anti-ship cruise missile increased the 
likelihood that Argentina would abandon 150 years of peaceful negotiation over the 
sovereign disposition of the Falkland Islands and attempt to take the islands by force.  
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The increased prospect of using force can be inferred by Argentina’s actions following 
the acquisition of air-launched Exocet cruise missiles in the late 1970s.   
The timing, purchase, and deployment of French-made Exocet missiles is 
significant.  Prior to the Falkland Conflict, the only noteworthy use of cruise missiles was 
the Egyptian sinking of the INS Eilat in 1967.  When the small Egyptian gunboat was 
able to sink an Israeli destroyer with a single Soviet-made P-15 Termit anti-ship cruise 
missile, states with arguably inferior naval power took note.  The lesson to be taken from 
the INS Eilat was that cruise missiles could mitigate asymmetrical military advantages at 
sea (Associated Press 1987; Farenkopf 2016).  The 1970s saw an increased demand in the 
more sophisticated Exocet missile, including 10 air-launched versions to Argentina.  By 
1982, Argentina had five missiles which became fully operational only a few months 
prior to the invasion as the military pressured French assistance teams to resolve final 
technical problems.   
The British appeared to have been unaware of the Exocet’s operational status 
prior to sending a task force in response to the invasion. But when hostilities commenced, 
the British petitioned NATO allies, including France, to embargo further arms shipments 
to Argentina (Eddy, Linklater, and Gillman 1982).  Thus, Argentina was unable to 
receive the additional five Exocets they expected from the French that would have likely 
forced the British from the field should in the face of additional ships sunk (Woodward 
1992).  Regardless, the rapid shift in military power provided by the small number of 
Exocets, combined with private knowledge about intention and capability on each side, 
increased the likelihood of conflict by increasing the perceived possibility of Argentine 
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success through greater anti-access/area-denial capabilities that would have otherwise 
ensured a deterrent against an otherwise unlikely British response. 
The missile diplomacy used by the United States in the 1990s, as presented in 
Chapter Five, also provides an illustrative example of how cruise missiles increase the 
probability of using force in coercive situations.  Following the success of the Tomahawk 
land attack cruise missile in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States surmised that 
this was a weapon capable of coercing adversaries at a low physical and political cost.  
When faced with foreign policy challenges requiring limited, yet decisive, responses, as 
was often the case in the 1990s, the United States found that it was able to respond 
militarily without mobilizing troops or committing to full-scale engagements.  Instead, 
the United States could add credibility to threats and punish undesirable adversarial 
action by selectively bombarding key elements of a state or organization’s political, 
economic, or logistical infrastructure.  With cruise missiles, this military action could be 
done in a way that reduced the risk to both friendly military personnel and target state 
civilians, making the use of force more palatable to domestic audiences.  Hence, in 
situations such as the alleged plot to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush and 
the attack on American embassies abroad, a firm, but limited, military response could be 
initiated quickly and effectively as a means of coercive punishment.  By nearly 
eliminating the long-term commitment and risk otherwise associated with military force, 
the United States had more flexibility to escalate a coercive foreign policy abroad.  
Cruise missiles effectively lowered the threshold for initiating military force by providing 
an attractive option to use force to signal resolve while maintaining or increasing 
domestic and international legitimacy.   
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Hypothesis 2:  States armed with cruise missiles are more likely to initiate crises 
through threats and displays of force than states that do not have cruise missiles. 
 As hypothesized, states armed with cruise missiles are more likely to initiate 
crises through threats and displays of force than states that do not have cruise missiles.  In 
Chapter Three, I used a multinomial logistic regression to reference levels of hostility in 
the MID data set against a base level of no militarized action to test a state’s preference to 
use threats or displays of force instead of no militarized action, given their dichotomous 
possession of cruise missiles.  Unlike the previous hypothesis, I did not replicate my 
results with ICB data as that data set had no comparable measurement to the MID data 
set’s hostility level variable.  This analysis found that cruise missile possession is 
positively and significantly correlated with using threats or displays of force.  
Additionally, the analysis confirmed the previous findings that there is a positive and 
significant correlation with the use of force.  Using relative risk ratios to interpret the 
base conclusions, I found that states armed with cruise missiles are at a 231 percent 
greater risk of using threats and 260 percent greater risk of displaying force.  
Interestingly, the risk of using force or going to war is nearly two times higher when the 
state possesses cruise missiles.   
 The case studies in Chapters Four and Five illustrate the results of quantitative 
testing.  First, in the Falkland Conflict case study I observed that the planned removal of 
a British naval presence in the South Atlantic combined with secret British overtures to 
the Argentine government for the eventual relinquishing of sovereignty, signaling a 
desire to withdraw from the South Atlantic.  Given this apparent signaling, and a belief 
that the British would not likely respond to an obvert occupation with military force, the 
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Argentines probed British resolve with a small incursion on nearby South Georgia Island.  
When this crisis was met with diplomatic protest and the small diversion of a handful of 
British ships and Marines to the area, the Argentines were alarmed, but not deterred from 
taking escalatory steps to move beyond this display of force.  Rather, British objections 
reinforced a need to act soon, if action were to be taken at all.  In fact, had Argentina 
waited another year, the United Kingdom’s response would have been much more 
difficult to muster.  Their only two aircraft carriers were to be sold to Australia, and at the 
time of the invasion the Royal Navy was mostly home for the Easter holiday rather than 
dispersed globally.  This lack of basic strategic foresight indicates that Argentina 
believed the United Kingdom would not mount a significant military response, despite 
the British reaction to the initial show of force on South Georgia Island. 
 Chapter Five captured nearly a decade of aggressive behavior by the United 
States, some of which included threats and display of force in the form of changes in 
regional force readiness or repositioning of naval vessels.  To manage this wide scope, I 
noted two prominent uses of threats and displays of force in this case study (Palmer et al. 
2015).  Each time, the United States intended these actions to coerce a change in 
adversarial behavior (i.e. Iraq).  The United States generally followed up these threats and 
displays of force with actual force to bend Iraq’s will.  First, in 1996, the United States 
responded to the massing of Iraqi troops near the Kurdish region of northern Iraq by 
putting its forces in the region at a heightened state of readiness, sending a message to 
Iraqi leadership.  After a short period to allow Iraq to change its behavior, the United 
States attacked several military sites in southern Iraq with Tomahawk land attack cruise 
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missiles to demonstrate resolve.  This American pressure resulted in the gradual 
withdrawal of Iraqi forces.   
The second instance began in the later months of 1997 when repeated Iraqi 
violations of the United Nations-imposed no-fly zones and non-compliance with weapon 
inspections mandates.  The emerging crisis culminated with Iraqi threats to shoot down a 
United States spy plane.  The United States and United Kingdom threatened military 
action, publicly preparing for military strikes in the final months of 1997.  This overt 
threat resulted in a marginal degree of Iraqi compliance with weapon inspections, yet Iraq 
continued to threaten inspectors resulting in an intensified threat of force by the United 
States.  These threats culminated in a greater military response, Operation Desert Fox in 
late 1998, featuring a prominent cruise missile element and manned attack bomber 
missions. 
Hypothesis 3: There is no difference between the probabilities that democratic or 
autocratic states with cruise missiles will use military power to achieve foreign policy 
objectives. 
 As hypothesized, there was no significant statistical difference between the 
probabilities that democratic or autocratic states with cruise missiles will likely use 
military power to achieve foreign policy objectives.  In the quantitative phase of this 
research, I used logistic regression to compare the interaction effects between autocracies 
and democracies who are with and without cruise missiles.  This method tested the effect 
of cruise missiles on force initiation when combined with the dichotomous regime type 
democracy or non-democracy as defined by the Democracy-Dictatorship data set 
(Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010).  Like my tests of Hypothesis 1, I replicated the 
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analysis using the ICB challenge and MID initiation variables.  In each case, there was no 
significant statistical difference between democratic and autocratic states armed with 
cruise missiles and their probability of initiating military force.   
To explore the interaction effects, I proceeded with an analysis of marginal effects 
to obtain predictive margins.  I found there is scant difference between the probability a 
democratic state with cruise missiles and an autocratic state with cruise missiles will 
initiate either an ICB challenge or militarized interstate dispute.  There is only a .1% 
difference in the predicted probability of initiating an ICB challenge based on regime 
type, and only a .2% difference in the predicted probability of a MID initiation. 
Using the case studies to illustrate a null hypothesis presents a challenge.  As with 
any case study, the analysis can be so narrow as to be of little more than anecdotal value 
and therefore not reliably generalizable.  However, it is worth noting that each case study 
represents a situation where an autocratic regime (1982 Argentina; 1996 Iraq) and a 
democratic state (The United States of America) appeared to have had greater odds of 
using force in a cruise missile context.  In each case, regime type and domestic politics 
played roles.  In the Falkland Conflict, there is a strong argument that the primary 
explanation for Argentina’s forcible incursion was to divert attention away from domestic 
strife, social unrest, and a flagging economy (e.g. Levy and Vakili 1992; Oakes 2006).  
With a limited number of air-launched Exocet cruise missiles in operation the junta could 
reasonably (though ultimately erroneously) expect a hedge against British retaliation, 
possibly lowering the expectation of casualties. 
In the case of the United States’ missile diplomacy, the use of cruise missiles to 
respond to foreign policy crises played well to domestic audiences.  Though some argued 
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that some cruise missile raids were, in part, an attempt by President Clinton to divert 
domestic attention from political scandal (e.g. Hendrickson 2002a, 2002b; O. R. Holsti 
2011; Reitman 1999), the consensus is mixed.  Regardless of the exact political 
motivation, by using cruise missiles, the United States reduced or eliminated the risk to 
service personnel abroad while the Tomahawk’s precision permitted a target and timing 
selectivity to reduce collateral human costs in the adversary nation.  Thus, in both case 
studies, the interaction between the capabilities provided by cruise missiles and domestic 
audience costs played a role, to some degree, in the decision to initiate armed conflict. 
 
Policy Implications 
This dissertation has implications for how policy makers may wish to approach 
existing and future military policy.  Though I do not advocate for or against any 
particular policy approach, the postulated implications I present here could impact how 
leaders may wish to manage cruise missile-related policy in the future.  The following 
section presents a modest speculation about this research’s implications.  Our new 
understanding of the relationship between cruise missiles and the likelihood of initiating 
military force, threats, or displays of force continues to evolve as technology, state needs, 
and political expectations change.  I begin by considering the surprising observation from 
Chapter Three related to the Missile Technology Control Regime.  Though the regime’s 
intent is to curb the spread of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, membership in the 
regime appears to be positively correlated with cruise missile procurement.  This 
disconcerting inference leads us to a discussion of the dangers of cruise missile 
proliferation considering their possession appears to be related to increased incidences of 
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conflict initiation.  Next, I examine the debate surrounding the modernization of legacy 
cruise missile programs in the United States, such as the proposed next generation cruise 
missile as advocated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.  Finally, I look to analogous 
weapon systems that have the potential to supersede the cruise missile’s place in defense 
strategies, remotely piloted aircraft (drone) and hypersonic weapons.  These new and 
emerging weapons, respectively, share many of the same characteristics that make the 
cruise missile an ideal weapon for state coercion.  As such, it may not be surprising that 
these weapons could potentially share similar implications for international peace.  
In 1987, the G-7 industrialized countries released guidelines for an informal, 
agreement between states, with the objective of reducing the threat of nuclear 
proliferation by reducing the proliferation of nuclear delivery systems such as ballistic 
and cruise missiles (Government of Canada 2017).56  The G7 countries created the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in response to a growing concern over the 
proliferation of nuclear weapon delivery platforms, especially ballistic missiles, in the 
1970s (Ozga 1994).  The regime also included limitations on the transfer and sale of 
cruise missiles, and related technologies, with ranges greater than 300 kilometers and a 
payload capacity greater than 500 kilograms (the weight of a small nuclear warhead).  
While this prohibition effectively reduced or eliminated the exchange of advanced land 
attack cruise missiles, it still permitted the sale of smaller anti-ship cruise missiles.  In 
fact, the United States remains a significant exporter of the anti-ship Harpoon cruise 
missile and France continues to be successful in its sale of the Exocet missile worldwide 
                                                 
56 The G7 consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 
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(Carus 1992).  Leaving the market open to these ASCMs means we risk these missiles 
falling into the hands of groups willing to use them to pursue terrorist or insurgent 
objectives, as was the case with the attacks on American and Emirati ships off the coast 
of Yemen when they were fired upon by Iranian versions of the Chinese-built C-802 
ASCMs (Binnie and Gibson 2016; Iranian Cause and Effect 2016).  But, despite efforts 
such as the MTCR to curtail their proliferation, cruise missiles continue to spread (Mistry 
2002).  This dissertation’s findings support this assessment. 
The quantitative analysis in Chapter Three yielded a surprising result with direct 
application to the efficacy of the MTCR.  Whereas Mettler and Reiter (2013) found no 
significant relationship between regime membership and ballistic missile acquisition, I 
found membership to have a significant positive correlation with cruise missile 
acquisition.  In short, when a state joins the MTCR, cruise missile proliferation likely 
increases.  This presents a problem for the regime.  If the intent is to curtail the 
proliferation of these weapons, why then does it appear to positively correlate with cruise 
missile proliferation?  As I note in Chapter Three, we may be able to attribute the 
connection to the elevation of trust between states.  Joshi (2016) notes that when a new 
state joins the MTCR they may signal that they are willing to strengthen their export 
controls, reducing supplier states’ perceived risk that their technology will, in turn, be 
supplied to a third party.  This appears to have been the case for India in 2016.  After 
induction into the MCTR, they found it easier to purchase Predator drones from the 
United States and they may soon be exporting their own BrahMos cruise missile to other 
states in the regime (Joshi 2016; Mitra 2018).  This apparent contradiction between the 
intent of the MCTR and the practice of cruise missile proliferation should give policy 
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makers a moment of reflection and reason to revisit the topic of cruise missile 
proliferation. 
Cruise missiles continue to spread to new countries, despite international 
agreements designed to curb their proliferation as states seek defense alternatives that 
provide a wider range of options in a crisis.  Since 1990, cruise missile procurement has 
been largely relegated to peripheral states as they seek ways to efficiently close the gap 
between themselves and wealthier states who have the capacity to develop and field more 
technologically sophisticated equipment.  Understanding the connection between cruise 
missiles and the initiation of military force advances our understanding of the relationship 
between advanced military technology in future conflict and may have implications for 
future counter-proliferation policy and weapon procurement.   
Cruise missile proliferation may increasingly become a concern for international 
security as countries seek efficient alternatives to more costly and sophisticated airpower 
platforms.  Policy makers have only started to shift their focus back to cruise missiles due 
to their unique and growing operational capabilities.  As I note below, though cruise 
missiles appear to be a popular and versatile coercive weapon, we still do not understand 
their effectiveness to produce meaningful changes in adversarial behavior.  In larger 
conflicts, cruise missiles used in isolation may not provide enough damage to be decisive.  
After all, the use of more than fifty cruise missiles on a Syrian airfield in 2017 was not 
enough to dissuade the Syrian regime from using chemical weapons on its own people.   
However, in the hands of violent extremist organizations (i.e. terrorists), the 
consequences of cruise missile use could be more significant.  Not only could cruise 
missiles be hidden on civilian container ships and unleashed on hapless coastal cities, the 
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versatile payload capacity enjoyed by most modern cruise missiles bring a potential of 
delivering non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological 
weapons (Kiziah 2003).  This danger increases as more states, particularly poorer 
revisionist states with ties to extremist groups and less inhibitions against proliferation, 
seek to purchase cruise missiles to fill gaps in their defenses by exploring cheap 
alternatives to expensive ballistic missile and stealth aircraft systems (Gordon 2003; 
Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan 2014).   
Policy debate in the United States revisited the role of cruise missiles in the 
national defense strategy with the controversial proposal to design and deploy a modern, 
stealthy, next generation cruise missile, the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon, to 
replace the aging Tomahawk land attack cruise missile as the primary conventional and 
nuclear air-launched delivery system (Lowther and Agnes 2016; Perry and Weber 2015).  
Opponents argue the new missile is not needed in light of the billions projected to be 
spent on a new, stealthy, deep-penetrating bomber being developed by the U.S. Air Force 
(Harrison 2016).  A new cruise missile of the advanced type proposed by the DoD, they 
say, would only be useful for providing a redundant standoff capability for aging 
bombers such as the B-52, yet their very presence could destabilize for international 
security by potentially instigating an arms race.  Simply put, the LRSO would be 
redundant and cause more security problems than it would solve.   
Conversely, proponents assert the new missile will provide capabilities a new 
bomber simply cannot provide.  Besides their ability to effectively evade air defenses, the 
loss of a single cruise missile carries a far lower cost in both man and material than a 
bomber and its crew and serves to enhance global stability by bolstering nuclear 
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deterrence.  Furthermore, proponents argue cruise missile capabilities must continue to 
advance in the face of an aging fleet which is becoming increasingly unreliable (Woolf 
2017).   
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) (2018a), a recurring U.S. Department of 
Defense report outlining the role of nuclear weapons in national defense, echoes the 
concerns over cruise missile modernization in the face of adversarial cruise missile 
development and deployment.   The NPR highlights the threats posed by adversary state 
cruise missiles such as those deployed by China in the South China Sea and Russia’s 
aggressive nuclear modernization program.  The document ultimately calls for the 
modernization of American cruise missile systems including development of the LRSO 
weapon (Mattis 2018a).   
This research intersects with current American policy guidance by identifying 
whether cruise missiles inherently lower the bar for military strikes at levels below the 
threshold of warfare.  Considering the evidence presented here, a new cruise missile with 
even more enhanced capabilities than what already exists may prove to be a tempting 
coercive weapon.  As major cruise missile producing states continue to modify and 
improve their existing systems, the implications for future limited conflict initiation could 
be dire. 
Aside from highlighting the possible dangers posed by cruise missile 
proliferation, this dissertation may be extrapolated to similar weapon types such as 
remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), also known as drones, and hypersonic weapons. RPAs 
and cruise missiles have many characteristics in common.  Like a cruise missile, an 
armed RPA can precisely deliver a bomb to a target with minimal collateral damage or 
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risk to the user (Chehtman 2017).  However, unlike a cruise missile, the RPA can return 
from its mission and be used for surveillance and reconnaissance.  Though there are 
many types of RPAs, most enjoy the advantage of reusability and persistence (the ability 
to linger for extended periods of time) over the target area (Bergen and Rothenberg 2014; 
Ehrhard 2010; Kaag and Kreps 2012).   
Much of the scholarship on RPAs debates the ethicality of their use.  Since they 
are piloted remotely, and they often operate in a grey area of belligerency, RPAs are 
typically used outside the battlefield in civilian areas where the risk of collateral damage 
can be high (Andresen 2016).  Furthermore, the use of RPAs by the United States has 
generally happened in secret, or at least far from the domestic spotlight, leading some to 
question whether or not their use removes the domestic audience from the decision to use 
force abroad (P. W. Singer 2012).  Since RPAs and cruise missiles share many of the 
same operational characteristics and similar use norms, the outcome reported here that 
states with cruise missiles are more likely to initiate military force may extend to states 
with RPAs.  If RPAs similarly affect force initiation, policy makers should take note and 
perhaps go as far as to consider incorporating RPA technology in a construct such as the 
MTCR. 
Another analogous weapon to the cruise missile is the hypersonic missile.  A 
hypersonic missile is one that can travel at extremely high speeds, in some cases five 
times the speed of sound, and extremely long distances, providing the ability to strike a 
target anywhere around the globe in a matter of minutes (White and Price 1999).  Most 
modern weapons lack the ability to attack time-sensitive targets at long ranges.  
Hypersonic weapons, however, promise to provide that capability while evading ever 
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more capable missile defenses (Brumfiel 2018; White and Price 1999).  The United 
States, China, and Russia have all made aggressive steps to develop hypersonic 
technology.  The last decade has seen an increasing number of operational tests, though 
there currently does not exist a fully operational hypersonic weapon system.   
Once an operational hypersonic missile is fielded, there will be no known defense against 
it and unlike modern cruise missiles that often take hours to reach their target, a 
hypersonic missile may only take minutes (Deptula 2018).   
A hypersonic missile takes the advantages of speed, stealth, maneuverability, and 
precision provided by cruise missiles and multiplies them exponentially.  Though not yet 
fully operational, it has already been postulated that as hypersonic missiles proliferate, 
they can pose a serious threat to international stability (Al-Rodhan 2015; Brimelow 2018; 
Deptula 2018; Ekmektsioglou 2015; Speier et al. 2017).  Their lightning-quick ability to 
penetrate defenses with almost no notice can potentially disarm an adversary before they 
have time to react, forcing a “launch on warning” posture when a target state is forced to 
retaliate before inbound missiles reach their destinations.  Such a posture may be 
inherently destabilizing by significantly compressing the time to thoughtfully respond to 
perceived attacks (Speier et al. 2017).   
Policy makers are just beginning to grapple with the potential consequences of 
hypersonic weapons.  Though the cruise missile, may appear quaint when compared with 
hypersonic weapons, there is an obvious parallel between the two in terms of coercive 
potential.  Having established an empirical connection between cruise missiles and 
conflict initiation, we may assume that hypersonic missiles may have a similar effect on 
state behavior.  Despite calls to incorporate hypersonic weapon technology into the 
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MTCR (Speier et al. 2017), the apparent positive correlation between MTCR 
membership and cruise missile proliferation should be a warning that non-proliferation 
regimes may have unintended consequences. 
As the United States enters the Post-Post-Cold War era, understanding how the 
capabilities of qualitatively unique weapon systems affect conflict is particularly salient.  
Cruise missiles provide unique and eminently usable capabilities.  Their stealth, 
precision, and portability can make their presence a significant disruptor in modern 
warfare.  Dennis Gormley (2008c), a leading scholar on cruise missile proliferation 
warns, “Though new weapons do not inherently increase the risk of conflict, when 
coupled with preemptive doctrines, advanced weapons that are difficult to detect and that 
could allow for a surprise attack-especially those seen as capable of producing decisive 
results without recourse to WMD-may tempt states to take risks.” (8)   
As I have established here, cruise missiles appear to encourage states to take risks, 
future arms agreements should take this into more serious consideration.  This 
contribution provides the policy community with empirically tested conclusions that help 
explain how an increasingly proliferated weapon helps shape the use of military force.  
This new information should help policy makers shape future cruise missile proliferation 
policy and mitigate potentially destabilizing coercive measure between adversaries. 
 
Contributions 
 Beyond the policy implications, this dissertation provides multiple scholarly 
contributions to international relations study.  It adds to our understanding of the 
relationship between technological weapon development and armed conflict with the 
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first-ever systematic empirical investigation into the correlation between cruise missile 
possession and force initiation.  Most notably, it bridges the gap between the force 
initiation and cruise missile literature by empirically demonstrating that there is a 
significant correlation between a state’s possession of cruise missiles and the likelihood it 
will initiate conflict.  Though the existing force initiation literature focuses on state-
centric characteristics such as regime type, wealth, great power status, and territorial 
contiguity, there is a niche for understanding how particular weapons shape state 
behavior.  Fordham (2004), Mettler and Reiter (2013) and Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrman 
(2016) have led the way in this effort.   
I seek to contribute my part by both articulating a theory to explain the connection 
between cruise missile possession and the use of force based on coercion theory and 
systematically testing for empirical evidence to support said theory.  Additionally, 
Appendix A provides a new schema for understanding the cruise missile’s historical 
utility by typifying three phases of cruise missile development, largely based on the 
American experience, that demarcate the weapon’s place in military doctrine.  This new 
way of classifying the missile’s technological advancements adds to the cruise missile 
literature by providing a framework for understanding how the general limitations on 
cruise missile capability throughout history affected its impact on military strategy and 
utility. 
 In addition, I provide an original data set capturing the current state of cruise 
missile possession.  By querying the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database (SIPRI 2015), I was able to determine the year of 
initial cruise missile acquisition for states without indigenous cruise missile production 
226 
 
capability.  These data were then cross-referenced with information provided by the 
National Defense Intelligence Agency (Systems 1999), Kueter and Kleinberg (2007), and 
Werrell (1985) to validate the dates and types of cruise missile possession for states with 
domestic cruise missile programs that predate previous arms transfers in order to get the 
most accurate picture of which states do and which do not have cruise missiles.  Future 
research can easily incorporate this data into later investigations using common conflict 
data sets for quantitative empirical tests. 
 Beyond developing a new quantitative data set, I provide a qualitatively different 
perspective on the Falkland Conflict.  The Falkland Conflict is generally treated as a 
textbook example of diversionary theory (e.g. Levy and Vakili 1992; R. A. Miller 1999; 
Oakes 2006).  As Robert Farley (2018), a visiting professor at the U.S. Army War 
College notes, “The Falklands War ended with a decisive British victory over thirty years 
ago.  Nevertheless, the war remains alive in the imagination of analysts and historians ... 
the issues that brought about the war, the way the war was fought, and the situation the 
war left behind continue to hold important lessons for practitioners of foreign policy 
today.” (n.p.)  This dissertation approaches the 1982 fight between Argentina and the 
United Kingdom from a new angle.  While acknowledging the application of 
diversionary theory, I also argued that Argentine cruise missiles increased the chance that 
the Falkland Islands would be taken by force by providing a robust denial capability to 
hedge against British military retaliation.  Previous treatments note the significant role 
played by the Exocet missile, but omit its qualitative contributions to the initiation of the 
conflict itself. 
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 Finally, this dissertation provides surprising challenges to existing research.  
When using MID initiation data rather than ICB challenge data, I found Mettler and 
Reiter’s (2013) conclusion that ballistic missile possession increases the likelihood of 
conflict does not hold.  Rather, using a different measure more specific to force initiation, 
rather than the more broadly defined crisis initiation, logit and probit models produced no 
significant relationship between ballistic missile possession and the initiation of threats, 
displays, or uses of force.  Additionally, as noted above, unlike Mettler and Reiter’s 
(2013) assertion that there is no relationship between ballistic missile procurement and 
MTCR membership, and Barkley’s (2008) conclusion that MTCR membership is 
negatively correlated with ballistic missile possession, I find MTCR membership is 
positively and significantly correlated with cruise missile acquisition.  Also, states with 
ballistic missiles have a positive and significant chance of being the target of threats and 
displays of force.  This may be a testament to their socio-political significance and a 
focus of arms control rather than practical military utility.  
 
Limitations and Areas for Future Research 
 Though this research succeeded in finding evidence to support its initial premise, 
it is nevertheless limited in scope.  But where this dissertation falls short, future research 
realizes opportunity.  First, though I include full-scale warfare in the default coding 
scheme for elements of my data analysis, the main crux of my thesis does not propose 
that cruise missiles increase the incidence of war.  Rather, as coercive instruments, cruise 
missiles have utility throughout the full spectrum of conflict as states seek mechanisms to 
impose their will upon their adversaries.  Future research may discover utility in testing 
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for the effects on war initiation, exclusively, especially as more sophisticated weapons, 
such as drones and hypersonic weapons, are developed and become more prevalent.  
How do these new weapons, and cruise missiles, change power disparities between 
states?  Do they invite preemptive action or perhaps increase escalation?   
Second, I do not necessarily propose that states will use cruise missiles as first 
strike weapons in conflict, nor do I examine cruise missile use in isolation.  This research 
does not predict every condition under which a state may launch a cruise missile other 
than to assert that the capabilities provided by modern cruise missiles make them a 
logical choice for coercive airpower.  As noted in Chapter Five, the United States 
discovered in the 1990s that cruise missiles make ideal weapons to exert punishment for 
adversarial transgressions.  However, as Chapter Four demonstrated, just because a state 
possesses cruise missiles does not mean these weapons will constitute the first volley 
against an adversary.  Rather, the capabilities they provide may support a more 
aggressive and broader strategy.  When the data is more readily available, additional 
research that codes for the circumstances surrounding the specific use of cruise missiles 
in the past may be able to predict when cruise missiles are most likely to be used in the 
future. 
Third, this dissertation did not test for the effectiveness of using cruise missiles in 
a coercive campaign.  Furthermore, having treated all cruise missile’s as essentially non-
nuclear, this research did not comment on the cruise missile’s coercive value as either a 
conventional or nuclear deterrent.  Pape (1996) warns us that coercive strategies present 
challenges for the coercer and do not always provide the desired results.  Essentially, 
reasons Pape, bombing alone is a poor coercive tool.  But bombing as a coercive strategy 
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will never go away due to entrenched bureaucratic interests and political pressure.  Pape 
asserts, “Sometimes states can succeed only by decisively defeating their opponents.” 
(314)  Though Pape is generally writing about strategic bombing campaigns, his warning 
translates well to the use of cruise missiles for coercion.  The cruise missile’s utility as a 
vanguard weapon to eliminate air defenses in preparation for more large-scale combat is 
generally unquestioned, but their actual effectiveness as a coercive tool has gone largely 
unmeasured.  Anecdotally, one could make a strong argument that despite the low cost, 
when used alone, the cruise missile lacks the firepower required to make meaningful 
change in an adversary’s behavior.  After all, when over fifty cruise missiles failed to 
stop the Syrian regime from using chemical weapons on its people, the United States and 
its allies used over one hundred more cruise missiles a year later to dissuade the regime 
from again using chemical weapons.  The first strike was not enough to significantly 
affect the Syrian regime’s behavior.   
However, one could also argue that the cruise missile’s ultimate effectiveness as a 
weapon is irrelevant.  Its real power comes in the form of the signal it can send to other 
nations by strengthening the credibility of threats.  For instance, had the Obama 
Administration used cruise missiles to attack Syria when the Syrian dictator Bashar al-
Assad used chemical weapons on its own people, a “red line” for President Obama, 
perhaps states like Russia and China would not have been emboldened to invade Ukraine 
and encroach in the South China Sea.   
Although cruise missiles by themselves may not bring enough destructive power 
to dissuade a state adversary, as noted by the recent experience with Syrian chemical 
weapons attacks, they may provide the sort of precision attack needed to dissuade 
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adversaries on the grey margins where non-traditional threats operate for limited 
objectives and in conflicts short of war.  Future research is needed to understand how 
evolving conventional capabilities affect the use of force.  Given the central role cruise 
missiles play in the United States’ use of military force, it will become increasingly 
important to understand these new dynamics. 
Fourth, this dissertation did not question whether the increased likelihood of using 
military options to confront foreign policy challenges associated with cruise missile 
possession constitutes an unjust use of force.  Does the greater probability of using force 
to solve an international dispute, brought by the cruise missile’s capabilities, make their 
use unjust or does the use of cruise missiles as a means of limiting casualties justify the 
increased prospect of violence?  Does the relative ease with which cruise missiles may be 
used for limited punishment constitute a just and proportionate use of force?   
Similar questions have been asked about the ethicality of the American use of 
RPAs to pursue terrorists across sovereign borders (e.g. Ahmad 2014; Andresen 2016; 
Brunstetter and Braun 2011; Calhoun 2003; Chehtman 2017; Enemark 2013; Kaag and 
Kreps 2012; P. W. Singer 2012; Stiltner 2016; Williams 2015).  Brunstetter and Braun 
(2011) argue that because RPAs can offer coercion short of full-scale war, they can 
provide a more proportional response to certain security threats.  However, they also 
concede that the ease and safety of RPAs may also encourage countries to manufacture 
specious justifications for their employment, what the authors call a, “potentially 
worrisome,” (339) situation.  Based on this dissertation’s results, we could ask the same 
of cruise missiles.  If they do, indeed, lower the bar for the use of force, do states need to 
be more cautious that they are exercising force ethically and proportionally?  The use of 
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RPAs in recent years for the extrajudicial killings of terrorists has cast a shadow over the 
use of cruise missiles, though the question deserves further research. 
 
Final Thoughts 
 My research goal was to determine if a state’s possession of cruise missiles 
increases the likelihood that state will use military force to resolve its foreign policy 
challenges.  The question was not necessarily a new one.  Researchers have pondered the 
effects of weapons on the use of force for some time.  However, research into this subject 
focuses almost exclusively on nuclear weapons, as deterrence appears to have kept peace 
between superpowers during the colds war.  But with the specter of nuclear annihilation a 
memory, at least for now, we turn our attention to the security challenges posed by other 
advanced technologies.  As the world settles into a post-Cold War status quo, 
understanding whether the capabilities provided by these weapons increases, or 
decreases, the chances of conflict deserves attention.  The answer to this question may 
inform not only policy avenues to pursue as diplomats negotiate agreements between 
states, but may also inform whether resources should be channeled into further weapon 
development. 
Some weapons provide such a qualitatively different military capability that their 
possession alone may affect the relationship between states.  The goal of this research 
was to investigate the possibility that cruise missiles were one such qualitatively different 
weapon.  As the United States locates its place in the Post-Post-Cold War era, 
understanding how the capabilities of particularly capable weapon systems effect the 
likelihood a state will initiate a military use of force is important.  Can a weapon provide 
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a capability so unique that having it in an arsenal changes the decision calculus of 
national leaders?  Nuclear weapons, of course, may have this effect; however, nuclear 
weapons provide such an extreme capability that their use is primarily relegated to that of 
strategic deterrence.  Cruise missiles, on the other hand, provide qualitatively unique 
capabilities.  Not only are some cruise missiles capable of themselves carrying nuclear 
weapons, but their stealth, precision, and portability can make their use a game changer 
in modern warfare.  It is no wonder they have seemingly become the weapon of choice 
for the United States when there is a call to punish an adversary.   
This dissertation provided the first systematic empirical test of the effects of 
cruise missiles on the initiation of military force.  Using an explanatory sequential mixed 
methods design, it found that a state armed with cruise missiles is significantly more 
likely to use threats and displays of military force as well as initiate military force to 
coerce its adversaries.  Furthermore, this research demonstrated that the increased 
probability of using force is independent of regime type.  As such, the proliferation of 
these weapons should alarm national leaders seeking peace in the international 
community if a greater number of actors with these weapons means a greater possibility 
of conflict.  With the nuclear-induced decline of large-scale conflict between major 
powers since the end of World War II, the question of how states can effectively 
demonstrate resolve without resorting to full-scale warfare becomes salient.  The coercive 
capabilities cruise missiles provide at levels short of war have seemingly promised and 
delivered as a weapon capable providing an attractive coercive option as states pursue 
their foreign policy objectives. 
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APPENDIX A:  THREE PHASES OF CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT 
 
To understand how cruise missiles affect the initiation of military force, it is 
helpful to explain the evolution of the cruise missile’s technology, doctrine, and use.  
This appendix proposes three distinct phases of historical cruise missile development 
wherein the technologies available largely shaped the limits of the cruise missile’s 
capabilities.  These capabilities, in turn, dictated the cruise missiles’ utility as a coercive 
weapon.  I begin by examining the history of the cruise missile program in the United 
States, typifying three phases of cruise missile technological development and use.57  
These three periods take the cruise missile from a weapon that lacked the ability to 
perform as advertised to a lethal weapon that is not only eminently usable, but would 
become the go-to weapon for American coercion in the 1990s and beyond. 
I identify three phases of cruise missile development in the United States (Figure 
A.1).  In the first phase, from World War I until the end of World War II (circa 1914-
1945), the concept of a pilotless flying bomb came into its own.  This phase is marked by 
a weapon whose concept was sound but lacked the technological requirements to fully 
develop.  Only in the final days of World War II do the required advancements in 
propulsion and navigational technologies allow the German Luftwaffe to effectively field 
the first fully operational cruise missile, the V-1 “Buzz” bomb. 
                                                 
57 Though several countries have developed significant cruise missile programs, creating 
their own unique doctrine over time, as the originator of the cruise missile concept, the 
U.S. experience is indicative of the technological and political challenges that shaped 
modern cruise missile use.  Therefore, rather than develop a historical narrative around 
every state’s cruise missile program, I use the Americqan case to illustrate how cruise 
missiles have gone from tactical battlefield concept, to nuclear strategic and tactical 
weapon, to coercive option in 100 years of development and progress. 
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The second phase (circa 1945-1970) saw prolific technological advancements 
following the end of the Second World War.  These advancements enabled weapon 
engineers to revisit earlier disappointments in the development of flying bombs.  While 
not perfect, the advancements made over the course of the Cold War, fueled by 
ideological competition between the superpowers, finally brought the technologies that 
would make the cruise missile usable together as a nuclear delivery system and effective 
anti-ship weapon.   
 
The third phase of cruise missile development (1970-present) begins in the 
waning years of the Cold War.  Advancements in navigation and a newfound 
appreciation for conventional applications enabled what was once the “unwanted black 
sheep” of the weapons community (Werrell 1989) to take a central role in conventional 
denial and punishments strategies in the decade following the fall of the Soviet union.  It 
Phase I 
c. 1916 – c. 1945 
 Immature 
technology 
 Delicate aircraft 
 Unreliable 
 Notable weapons 
o Navy-Sperry 
Flying Bomb 
o Army Kettering 
Bug 
o APHRODITE 
Phase II 
c. 1945 – c. 1970 
 Nuclear focus 
 Navigational 
advances 
 ICBM precursor 
 Notable weapons 
o Snark 
o Navaho 
o SLAM 
Phase III 
c. 1970 – Present 
 Conventional focus 
 Navigational 
advances 
 Battle proven 
 Notable weapons 
o Tomahawk 
o CALCM 
o Harpoon 
Note:  SLAM = Strategic Low Altitude Missile; ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missile; CALCM = Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile 
Figure A. 1  Three Phases of Cruise Missile Development in the United States 
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is in this phase that the Tomahawk cruise missile would come into its own and enable the 
United States to demonstrate a decisive foreign posture toward threats while minimizing 
the risk to military personnel and collateral damage abroad.   
 
Phase I 
Although the modern cruise missile matured in the second phase of cruise missile 
development following World War II, the United States conceived of the concept of a 
flying, pilotless, bomb during World War I.  Remarkable failures and immature 
technologies that held the notion of a flying bomb in check marked these early years.  In 
1915, the inventor of the mercury vapor lamp, Peter C. Hewitt, approached Elmer A. 
Sperry of the Sperry Gyroscope Company with the idea for a “flying bomb” (Werrell 
1985, 7).58  With the backing of the United States Navy, the scientists began development 
of the Navy-Sperry Flying Bomb.  This early cruise missile-like aircraft was little more 
than a miniature canvas biplane that could be launched in the direction of the enemy, 
mechanically programed to cease flight when it had flown for enough time to likely be 
over an enemy target.   
The prototype Hewitt and Sperry developed had multiple advantages over existing 
piloted aircraft of the time.  Because they intended the weapon for one-way travel, it had 
a longer theoretical range than a manned aircraft, meeting a need for a weapon that could 
strike deep behind enemy lines, farther than artillery could reach.  Additionally, because 
the craft was unmanned, and the body mostly consisted of canvas, these early prototypes 
                                                 
58 Unless otherwise noted, the general history and background contained in this section is 
derived from Werrell (1985). 
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could absorb a large amount of enemy fire with little overall structural damage.   Bullets 
would simply pass through leaving a small hole in their wake.  The only reliable way to 
shoot one of these early weapons down was to manage a precise hit to the engine.  
Finally, because there was no pilot, the aircraft could not be scared away with anti-
aircraft defenses or nearby enemy interceptor aircraft.  However, with these advantages 
came clear disadvantages.   
The limited technology available in the first half of the Twentieth Century 
severely hobbled these early prototypes.  The test model Sperry and Hewitt developed 
was expensive, had a complicated launch system, and its inaccuracy made it all but 
impossible to hit a target at range.  In addition, the United States Army also developed a 
flying bomb at this time in parallel with the Navy version.  Dubbed the Kettering Bug 
after its primary developer, Charles F. Kettering, future vice president of General Motors, 
and for its small, uncomplicated, design, the Army version, like the Navy version met 
with limited success.  Only 1 in 12 Navy tests functioned properly while the Army 
version enjoyed a comparatively successful 3/5 average.   
These early projects revealed hard lessons that engineers would need to address in 
the years to follow.  First, developers discovered that simply getting an unmanned aircraft 
into the air was a challenge unto itself.  Because the vehicles were delicate, a crash on 
launch meant a total loss, complicating development.  Second, without a pilot, building 
an aircraft that could remain stable over long distances, given the limited technology of 
the time and a trial and error development process, proved difficult if not impossible.  
Third, because designers intended these weapons to be cheap, one-way aircraft, each 
model that was launched was destroyed, limiting the ability to gather lessons learned off 
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the crash remains.  Finally, neither guidance systems, nor engines, worked as advertised.  
In the future, the guidance and propulsion obstacles would prove the most difficult 
obstacle to overcome. 
The interwar years saw a lull in progress.59  For its part, the United States Navy 
focused on the development of flying drones.  The Navy primarily used these drones for 
target practice, though there were some attempts at offensive weapon development.  But, 
as World War II began, personnel shortages and costs put pressure on the Navy’s 
program.  Critics argued the drones were unnecessary and offered few benefits over 
manned aircraft.  The most notable development in drone aircraft was an Army Air Corps 
program, code named APHRODITE.  This ambitious program used worn-out B-17 heavy 
bombers that were stripped of equipment and packed with 18,500 pounds of explosives.  
A pilot and a technician would take off with the aircraft, but bail out before reaching 
enemy territory.  From there, the aircraft flew via radio commands, with a remote pilot 
able to navigate the aircraft to its target using a television camera (A. L. Weeks 2000).  
But even with marginal successes, the APHRODITE aircraft were still limited by 
weather, vulnerable to enemy defenses, and limited in accuracy.  By 1945, the allies 
abandoned the program.60 
 
                                                 
59 The lull in development was an American phenomenon. In Great Britain and 
particularly Germany, the utility of a pilotless bomb was clear to military leaders.  As 
such, research into cruise missile technology was supported and encouraged, more so on 
the eve of World War II.  In Germany, this research culminated in the V-1 “Buzz Bomb” 
(Farquharson 2002). 
60 Notably, Joseph P. Kennedy, oldest brother of President John F. Kennedy, was killed 
on an Aphrodite mission when the drone bomber he piloted inexplicably exploded after 
takeoff (Hanle 2007). 
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Phase II 
The second phase of cruise missile development effectively began in the waning 
years of World War II with the German V-1 “Buzz Bomb.”  Taking advantage of the 
short distance between occupied France and England, and pressured with pilot shortages, 
Germany created a flying bomb so groundbreaking that it served as the template for 
future cruise missile designs.  Often overshadowed by its larger, more successful, and 
perhaps more psychologically menacing counterpart, the V-2 rocket, the V-1 was a 
winged aircraft with a pulse jet engine capable of traveling an average of 150 miles at 
400 miles per hour and hitting a target the size of a city.   
The Germans launched the V-1 from a rail system with the assistance of a booster 
rocket.  From there, it navigated to its target using a magnetic compass and barometric 
device which sent signals to the rudder and tail surfaces for control.  A small propeller in 
the nose counted rotations, arming the weapon at 38 miles, and locking the controls to put 
the V-1 into a dive at a pre-programmed distance.  Germany produced 30,000 V-1s in the 
war, launching 10,492 at London with a 23% success rate.  Although the weapons 
managed to kill over 6,000 civilians, they were limited by their fixed launch sites which 
made their flight paths predictable.  Once found, they were relatively easy to shoot down 
or knock off balance by flying alongside and tipping their wings.  If they did reach their 
target, their limited accuracy and small warhead made them more successful as a 
psychological, rather than a military, weapon.  When the war was over, the United States 
became interested again in the idea of a relatively small, disposable flying bomb, so the 
military captured several German V-1s for a new American program, the JB-2.   
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While the United States’ armed services each experimented with their own 
versions of the JB-2, iterations such as the Navy’s Loon and the Air Force’s JB-10, these 
met limited success.  But as an evolutionary step in technology, these V-1 derivatives 
demonstrated a proof of concept that the technology had advanced sufficiently to begin 
work on new cruise missile programs with a shift in emphasis from technical 
development to international and domestic political considerations.  With the separation 
of the Air Force from the Army in 1947 (National Security Act 1947), the question of 
which service would take the lead in cruise missile and ballistic missile development 
arose, causing friction between the services.  Ultimately, the Air Force became 
responsible most cruise missile development with the Army and Navy maintaining 
limited research programs of their own.  
The late 1940s and early 1950s saw incremental developments in cruise missile 
technology.  The Air Force’s intention was to quickly put nuclear armed intercontinental 
cruise missiles into production as a stop gap while designing and producing 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that would eventually take their place (Stine 
1991).  Conversely, the Soviet Union, outmatched at sea, focused on using cruise missiles 
in anti-ship roles.  Later, the Soviets unsuccessfully attempted to match American efforts 
in intercontinental long-range nuclear cruise missile technology, attempts that their 
Russian successors have continued off and on until today (Gordon 2017; Huisken 1981).  
In 1949, the Air Force began operational tests of the Northrop Snark cruise 
missile.  Engineers designed the Snark to travel at high speeds and have much larger 
range and payloads than their JB-2 predecessors.  Still requiring a way to navigate these 
systems over long distances, the Snark was piloted remotely via a control aircraft, but in 
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later tests it used an inertial navigation system monitored by celestial navigation.  Despite 
a history of test failures, increasing requirements on the Snark led to the demand for 
longer ranges and increased payloads.  Though advanced for the time, the celestial 
navigation system was not up to the task of tracking celestial bodies while traveling 
hundreds of miles an hour and having to fight wind currents.  Engine, fuel, aerodynamic, 
and navigational problems plagued the Snark, making it a metaphor for a failed weapon 
system.  A common quip at the time referred to its Atlantic testing range as, “Snark 
infested waters.” (Zaloga 1993)  One Snark was even lost entirely, its remains found 
more than twenty years later by a Brazilian farmer in the Amazon rainforest (J. P. 
Anderson 2004).  Finally, in 1961, the Air Force scrapped the project due to its perceived 
lack of military value as compared to increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles. 
Concurrently developed with the Snark, the North American Navaho cruise 
missile was more ambitious and technologically advanced weapon.  Unlike the subsonic 
Snark, which was planned to be put into service first, the Navaho was designed to be 
supersonic with a range of 5,500 miles.  But like the Snark, the Navaho was plagued with 
test failures earning it the nickname “Never go, Navaho.”  (Gibson 2004)  Yet, before its 
cancellation in 1957, in favor of the Atlas ICBM, the Navaho produced key technological 
advances.  It was the first turbo-jet powered vehicle to fly two times faster than the speed 
of sound and the first to fly under computerized guidance (Boeing n.d.).   
By the 1960s, the cruise missile offered only two advantages over ballistic 
missiles and manned aircraft.  First, they were a cheaper weapon system than ballistic 
missiles and bomber aircraft, but only so much as it could be relied up on to reach its 
target.  Second, the cruise missile still did not put a pilot at risk.  The ability to minimize 
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operational risk eventually became an incredibly important political consideration for the 
American way of warfare in the coming decades.   
However, for military leadership, the disadvantages outweighed the advantages.  
The cruise missiles of the 1950s looked like aircraft but did not perform as well, and they 
were operationally inflexible.  Unlike cruise missiles, a leader could recall bombers from 
their missions if the political winds changed at the last minute.  Similarly, states could 
use bombers as a show of force by flying along a country’s border.  But a cruise missile, 
like a ballistic missile, once launched could not be recalled.  Finally, with the technology 
of the time, the cruise missile could not compete with the accuracy of bomber aircraft.  
Navigation continued to plague programs.  By the close of the 1960s, the military shifted 
its focus away from the cruise missile concept toward related, yet feasible for the time, 
projects such as decoys and standoff weapons (Huisken 1980, 1981).   
This shift in effort enabled weapon developers to focus less on an entire cruise 
missile system and more on the technical obstacles impeding their progress through 
separate, but related programs.  Aside from the seemingly endless navigation challenges, 
payload weight also challenged engineers.  With conventional warfare an afterthought at 
this point in the Cold War, the primary goal for these missiles was to deliver a nuclear 
weapon.  The nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima at the end of World War II weighed 
ten tons and yielded a blast equivalent to 20 kilotons of TNT.  With advances in weapon 
design, nuclear weapons in the 1960s could be made to weigh less than 500 kilograms 
and yield 200 kilotons (Van Creveld 1991).  These significantly smaller warheads were 
now not only able to fit on an ICBM, but could facilitate the development of a smaller 
cruise missile as well.   
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A second advancement in related weapon design was the development of small 
turbofan engines (Werrell 1989).  Cruise missiles such as the Snark were fitted with huge, 
gas guzzling engines that made the entire airframe the same size as a typical manned jet 
fighter.  With smaller, more efficient, turbofan engines, it would be possible to reduce the 
size while increasing range.  Smaller, high capacity computers improved navigation with 
the development of satellite terrain contour mapping (TERCOM) technologies.  Designed 
to overcome navigational challenges for the short-lived Strategic Low Altitude Missile 
(SLAM)61 project, terrain mapping allowed more accuracy - within 300 feet, which is 
accurate enough for employing nuclear weapons (Betts 1982).  With focus temporarily 
shifted from cruise missiles in both the Air Force and the Navy, these technologies were 
free to mature in other systems while waiting for the right political and operation need to 
come together in new cruise missile programs. 
 
Phase III 
The 1970s witnessed a sudden revitalization and renewed interest in cruise 
missiles as improved air defenses threatened the role of the strategic bomber in the 
nuclear mission.  This renewed interest, combined with technological advancement 
sparked a third phase of cruise missile development characterized by greater accuracy 
                                                 
61 SLAM was an ambitious project.  The missiles was designed to carry multiple nuclear 
weapons that could be jettisoned over their Soviet targets as the missile navigated across 
the country.  Its ramjet engine was designed to be powered by a small nuclear reactor 
giving it a theoretically unlimited range.  To accomplish this mission, engineers 
developed a terrain guidance system that compared the terrain altitude under the vehicle 
with the terrain stored in its onboard computers using a radar altimeter.  While SLAM 
never went beyond the testing phase, its terrain mapping system would go on to become 
the primary means of navigation for future cruise missile projects (Herken 1990). 
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and new conventional missions.  Faced with the possible obsolescence of one of the three 
legs of the nuclear triad,62 the United States Department of Defense strongly supported 
the idea of a standoff missile that could be deployed from a strategic bomber to penetrate 
deep into the Soviet Union at a safe distance.  The Air Force, reluctant to reduce the role 
of manned penetration tactics, resisted development, but was finally forced to proceed, in 
coordination with the Navy, when the Carter administration cancelled the new B-1 
Bomber program in 1977 (Werrell 1989).  The Navy, seeing the renewed potential for 
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) following the sinking of the Israeli ship Eilat63 and the 
Soviet Union’s reliance on the ASCM to counter American naval dominance, took 
renewed interest in cruise missile development with the hope that advances in 
miniaturization would make smaller cruise missiles capable of land attack mission more 
practical for naval vessels (Mizokami 2016). 
The third phase of cruise missile development saw advances leading to the 
modern weapons of today.  Advances in ancillary components such as engines, fuels, 
materials, and navigational systems were evolutionary in the 1970s.  However, the most 
crucial step forward was in the area of guidance.  The long ranges demanded of previous 
interconnectional cruise missiles like the Snark meant that even small errors in guidance 
had huge effects over long distances.  But with TERCOM developed, and subsequently 
shelved, for the SLAM, accurately navigating a cruise missile over land at long ranges 
                                                 
62 The nuclear triad consists of land-based ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, and 
strategic bombers. 
63 The sinking of the INS Eilat, an Israeli destroyer, by a pair of Egyptian small missile 
boats using Soviet ASCMs in 1967 sent shockwaves through naval warfare and sparked 
an ASCM arms race.  Within 10 years, most major navies would have their own ASCMs 
(Mizokami 2016). 
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became possible. 64  When combined with inertial guidance systems which were accurate 
enough to get a missile to a checkpoint where the TERCOM could fix a position and 
make adjustments, the TERCOM could be accurate to a target between 100 and 600 feet 
(Werrell 1985).  But, because a conventional warhead, with exponentially smaller 
explosive capabilities than a nuclear warhead, required higher accuracy, the digital scene 
matching area correlator (DSMAC) system was developed.  When combined with the 
inertial guidance and TERCOM system, the DSMAC could get the missile to within a 
few feet of its target (Betts 1982).   
In the 1970s and 1980s, these advances in guidance, combined with engine 
miniaturization and fuel advancements, led to the development of the Tomahawk land-
attack and anti-ship cruise missiles in both conventional and nuclear variants, the 
Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM), capable of launching from wings 
and bomb bay rotary launchers on B-52 strategic bombers (Betts 1982), and anti-ship 
Harpoon missiles with active sea skimming and homing radar to fix its targets over water 
(Naval Air Systems Command n.d.).  By the late 1980s, the United States military’s 
Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite navigation system was operational and slowly 
integrated into the cruise missile’s navigational suite increasing accuracy and capability.  
The navigational hurdle that held back the cruise missile for so long had finally been 
overcome. 
Chapters Four and Five illustrated two newfound missions that typify the cruise 
missile’s influence on coercive diplomacy in phase three.  First, as an anti-access/area 
                                                 
64 Because the sea is relatively flat with no fixed terrain, TERCOM does not work over 
water. 
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denial weapon capable of threatening first class naval powers, cruise missiles, such as the 
French Exocet, were employed by Argentina during the 1982 Falkland Conflict to 
threaten and attack the British Navy.  Demonstrating their flexibility across the spectrum 
of denial, early in the dispute the Exocets offered denial through the perception that the 
British Navy would not be able to achieve its objectives in the South Atlantic.  Later, the 
Exocets proved effective in wartime denial by making this threat a reality (Byman, 
Waxman, and Larson 1999).  The Argentine Exocets were so successful that only five 
air-launched models were needed to significantly alter British strategy during the conflict 
by denying the British freedom of movement at sea (Huber 1995).   
Second, following the successful use of the Tomahawk LACM in the 1991 
Persian Gulf War, the United States discovered their utility as a means of threatening and 
executing punishment for transgressions, otherwise not meeting the threshold for greater 
use of force (e.g. troop deployments). Throughout the 1990s, and beyond, the United 
States repeatedly used cruise missiles as a means of “exemplary” use of force (George 
1991).  In other words, the limited use of cruise missiles to destroy enemy targets, just 
enough force to demonstrate resolve, may persuade the adversary to cease or reverse an 
action, yet stopping short of a level of action considered to be brute force.  
Having distinguished between the three phases of cruise missile development, I 
build on these concepts in the dissertation using coercive diplomacy, a strategy made 
possible by advancements in technology and doctrine, as a theoretical framework.  I 
proposed that the cruise missile’s evolution played a large part in its ability to affect state 
behavior.  In the first phase of cruise missile development, the weapon was little more 
than an idea seeking to fill a tactical battlefield need.  The second phase saw cruise 
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missiles become both a strategic weapon and a means of denying enemies at sea.  It was 
not until the third phase of development that supporting technologies finally caught up 
with practical missions for the cruise missile.  Now more than a nuclear delivery vehicle 
and way to threaten enemy shipping, cruise missiles in the third phase could both be used 
directly, or to strengthen, a state’s coercive strategy to threaten, deny, or punish and 
adversary in situations where the use of force would otherwise be less likely.  Hence, the 
possession of cruise missiles, by providing a qualitatively different capability than other 
weapons, increases the likelihood of a state using force to pursue its foreign policy 
objectives. 
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APPENDIX B:  DATA ANALYSIS REPLICATION 
 
 
This appendix describes the STATA 15.1 commands used to generate the results for the 
analysis provided in Chapter Three of this dissertation.  Detailed descriptions of the 
variables are located in the dissertation text and variable description contained within the 
data set.  The data set used to generate the results is 
CrawfordCruiseMissileStataDataSet.dta 
 
STATA Replication Commands 
 
The commands used to generate summary statistics in Table 3.2 are: 
 
sum ICBchallenge MIDinitiation cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb 
nucleara nuclearb distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs 
pcyrs2 pcyrs3 if ICBchallenge <. & MIDinitiation <. & cruisea <. & cruiseb <. & 
BallisticMissilea <. & BallisticMissileb <. & nucleara <. & nuclearb <. & distance <. & 
contig <. & PowerParity <. & MajorPowera <. & jointdemocracy <. & pcyrs <. & pcyrs2 
<. & pcyrs3 <. 
 
The commands used to generate crosstabs in Table 3.3 are: 
 
tab ICBchallenge cruisea, col all 
 
tab MIDinitiation cruisea, col all 
 
The commands used to generate crosstabs in Table 3.4 are: 
 
tab ICBchallenge lacma, col all 
 
tab MIDinitiation lacma, col all 
 
The commands used to generate Models 1-3 in Table 3.5 are: 
probit ICBchallenge cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
logit ICBchallenge cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
clogit ICBchallenge cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, 
group(dyadid) 
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The commands used to generate Models 4-6 in Table 3.6 are: 
probit MIDinitiation cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
logit MIDinitiation cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
clogit MIDinitiation cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, 
group(dyadid) 
 
The commands used to generate Models 7-10 in Table 3.7 are: 
probit ICBchallenge lacma lacmb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
firthlogit ICBchallenge lacma lacmb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3 
 
probit MIDinitiation lacma lacmb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
firthlogit MIDinitiation lacma lacmb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara 
nuclearb distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3 
 
The commands used to generate Models 11-14 in Table 3.8 are: 
mlogit hostility cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) b(1) 
 
mlogit, rrr 
 
The commands used to generate Models 15-16 in Table 3.9 are: 
mvprobit (ICBchallenge= cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara 
nuclearb distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3) 
(cruisea=mtcr capabilities MajorPowera nukadum) (cruiseb=mtcr lnencapb MajorPowerb 
nukbdum), cluster(dyadid) 
 
mvprobit (MIDinitiation= cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara 
nuclearb distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3) 
(cruisea=mtcr capabilities MajorPowera nukadum) (cruiseb=mtcr lnencapb MajorPowerb 
nukbdum), cluster(dyadid) 
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The commands used to generate Models 17-18 in Table 3.10 are: 
logit ICBchallenge i.bn.cruisea#bn.democracy BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb 
nucleara nuclearb distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs 
pcyrs2 pcyrs3 if sidea1==1, cluster(dyadid) 
 
margins, over (cruisea democracy) 
 
logit MIDinitiation i.bn.cruisea#bn.democracy BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb 
nucleara nuclearb distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs 
pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust cluster (dyadid) 
 
margins, over (cruisea democracy) 
 
The commands used to identify candidates for case study analysis are: 
 
logit ICBchallenge cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
predict ICBchallengefit 
 
sum ICBchallengefit, detail 
 
sort ICBchallengefit 
 
list ISO3let1 ccode1 ccode2 ISO3let2 year if ICBchallengefit>=.0000362  & 
ICBchallenge==1 & cruisea==1 
 
list ISO3let1 ccode1 ccode2 ISO3let2 year if ICBchallengefit>=.0000362  & 
ICBchallenge==1 & cruisea==0 
 
logit MIDinitiation cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
predict MIDinitiationfit 
 
sum MIDinitiationfit, detail 
 
sort MIDinitiationfit 
 
list ISO3let1 ccode1 ccode2 ISO3let2 year if MIDinitiationfit>=.0004729  & 
MIDinitiation==1 & cruisea==1 
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list ISO3let1 ccode1 ccode2 ISO3let2 year if MIDinitiationfit>=.0004729  & 
MIDinitiation==1 & cruisea==0 
 
The commands used to complete the Hausman Specification Test to determine if 
fixed or random effects is appropriate: 
 
xtlogit ICBchallenge cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, fe 
 
estimate store fe 
 
xtlogit ICBchallenge cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, re 
 
estimate store re 
 
hausman fe re 
 
xtreg MIDinitiation cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, fe 
 
estimate store fe 
 
xtreg MIDinitiation cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, re 
 
estimate store re 
 
hausman fe re, sigmamore 
 
The commands used to test multicollinearity using a covariance matrix: 
 
probit ICBchallenge cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
estat vce 
 
logit ICBchallenge cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
estat vce 
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probit MIDinitiation cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
estat vce 
 
logit MIDinitiation cruisea cruiseb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
estat vce 
 
probit ICBchallenge lacma lacmb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
estat vce 
 
logit ICBchallenge lacma lacmb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
estat vce 
 
probit MIDinitiation lacma lacmb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
 
estat vce 
 
logit MIDinitiation lacma lacmb BallisticMissilea BallisticMissileb nucleara nuclearb 
distance contig PowerParity MajorPowera jointdemocracy pcyrs pcyrs2 pcyrs3, robust 
cluster (dyadid) 
estat vce 
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